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FOREWORD 
 
 My time in the JD/MES program has been a period of immense growth – 
personally, academically, and professionally. Upon entering the program, I knew I was 
committed to pursuing environmental and Aboriginal law as the core focus of my studies. 
I imagined a career spent advocating against major projects such as the Keystone XL 
pipeline, and the field of environmental assessment was on my radar at an early stage. 
During the very first month of my time at Osgoode Hall, I participated in the Anishinaabe 
Law Camp held at Neyaashiinigmiing, where an entire world opened to me. Listening to 
incredible scholars and lawyers including John Borrows, Lindsey Borrows, Hannah 
Askew, and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, I began to learn about Indigenous legal orders, 
and about different perspectives and worldviews regarding environmental governance. 
Following the camp, which I also attended in both my second and third years at Osgoode, 
I became immersed in working to understand concepts like treaty relationships and 
obligations, learning about Canada’s colonial history, and trying to figure out what was 
meant by the term “reconciliation.” Throughout all of this work, I kept returning to the 
concept of land and governance over land. While many disputes between Indigenous 
communities and the settler government revolve around land and natural resource 
development, I began to learn that the roots of this conflict have their origins in jurisdiction 
and sovereignty, and in competing views about governance authority over the land.  
 The area of concentration that I settled on for my MES was “environmental policy 
and Indigenous legal traditions.” In exploring this topic, I worked to weave together three 
components: 1) Canadian environmental law and policy; 2) Indigenous peoples in 
Canada, and 3) environmental justice. In addition to both law and environmental studies 
courses, I was fortunate to spend my summers gaining practical experience 
understanding the operationalization of environmental, Aboriginal and Indigenous law in 
the field. At both the Ontario Ministry or Environment and Climate Change in Toronto, 
ON, and the Pacific Centre for Environmental Law and Litigation in Victoria, BC, I worked 
to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of our settler current environmental law 
regime. My placement with West Coast Environmental Law through Osgoode’s 
Environmental Justice and Sustainability Clinical Program was foundational in cementing 
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the foundations for this Major Research Project, as I dove deeply into debates about 
approaches to environmental assessment, was directly involved in the ongoing federal 
environmental law reform, and completed a research paper examining how Indigenous 
inherent jurisdiction could be recognized in environmental assessment law.  
 The more I learned about environmental governance and Canada’s settler history, 
the more I felt I had an obligation to act positively, and take advantage of my opportunity 
as a graduate student to engage in beneficial research work. I indicated an interest to 
engage in a research project in fulfillment of my MES, and my supervisor Professor Dayna 
Scott graciously assisted in connecting me with the Neskantaga First Nation, who was 
interested in exploring the possibility of engaging in an Indigenous-led assessment of the 
Ring of Fire region in Treaty 9 territory.  
 This MRP also works to fulfil a number of learning objectives I have set for myself 
in completion of the MES program. These include, but are not limited to:  
• Gaining a thorough knowledge of the laws and policies governing environmental 
management and protection in Canada today, with particular emphasis on those 
governing natural resource developments;  
• Evaluating the effectiveness of Canada’s environmental law and policy regime, 
and understanding strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement;  
• Gaining an understanding of Indigenous legal traditions, including how the 
principles drawn from these legal traditions guide environmental management and 
protection; and 
• Understanding how environmental policy decisions impact Aboriginal rights, and 
how Indigenous communities defend their rights and inherent jurisdiction when 
governments fail to uphold and implement them. 
 
In environmental law, we often speak about the shortcomings or the failures of the 
law in adequately protecting our environment, which often stem from inadequate political 
will to enact laws. For many, the field can often feel hopeless and overwhelming, with 
victories few and far between. What I adore about the intersection of environmental and 
Indigenous law is the endless opportunity to craft creative solutions by engaging aspects 
of each legal tradition. This field is rapidly changing and evolving, and through this MRP, 
I hope to move beyond the theoretical towards the practical by working to imagine ways 
that the strategic intersection of Anishininuwug law and conventional environmental 
assessment models can result in a consent-based approach to natural resource 
development for the Ring of Fire.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Development of the Ring of Fire region in northern Ontario presents one of the 
most complex environmental challenges in recent years within the province. Situated in 
Treaty 9 territory, the Ring of Fire lies within a vastly undisturbed, critically important 
ecological landscape that has been home to numerous Indigenous communities since 
time immemorial. Development of the minerals that lie beneath the surface stands to 
permanently change the face of northern Ontario, and the province has just one chance 
to ensure that it is done properly.  
This report unpacks the history of the Ring of Fire region, situating the 
development’s current status within political, historical, and ecological realities. Part 1 of 
this report sets out the scope and purpose of this research project, including the 
methodology used, and the theoretical framework of legal pluralism that is applied 
throughout. Legal pluralism recognizes the equal legitimacy and authority of both settler 
law and Indigenous legal traditions in exercising governance over the land within the Ring 
of Fire region.  
Part 2 of this report provides a high-level overview of the history of development 
in northern Ontario, and also emphasizes the importance of the land from an ecological 
and Indigenous perspective. As this section will explore, mineral development in the Ring 
of Fire has been at a standstill for more than ten years, and numerous years of political 
negotiations have left countless issues unresolved.  
Part 3 of this report begins to explore and delineate the deficiencies of the current 
settler legislative model governing development of the region, addressing provincial, 
federal, constitutional and international legal obligations that influence the approach 
currently being taken.  
Part 4 of this report provides a comprehensive overview of competing approaches 
to land-based decision-making models, namely Indigenous-led approaches to impact 
assessment. Three unique categories of Indigenous-led impact assessments are 
explored: 1) those conducted for particular projects; 2) those conducted in partnership 
with the Crown or a project proponent, and 3) non-project-specific approaches to impact 
assessment. The strengths and limitations of each case study are explored, as well as 
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opportunities for these models to intersect with the settler approach to environmental 
assessment.  
Finally, Part 5 of this report provides a discussion and analysis of considerations 
for the Neskantaga First Nation when making a decision on how to effectively advocate 
through the assessment process for the Ring of Fire. General preliminary considerations 
are canvassed, as well as considerations specific to conducting an independent 
assessment versus strategically engaging in the settler environmental assessment 
process.  
This report is not intended to be prescriptive, although it is intended to have 
practical application. By engaging in a comprehensive case study approach exploring 
numerous approaches to Indigenous-led impact assessment, this report seeks to 
emphasize successful and effective strategies that may be advanced, taking into account 
the unique circumstances and challenges at play in the Ring of Fire, so that Neskantaga 
First Nation can make an informed decision about how best to allocate resources and 
advocate in relation to the Ring of Fire.   
 
 
  
 3 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the future of Ontario’s Far North has garnered significant 
attention from politicians, Indigenous communities, environmentalists, and scientists, 
among others. Defined within the Far North Act, 2010,1 this globally, nationally, and locally 
significant region covers 452,000 square kilometres.2 To put that into perspective, the Far 
North makes up 42% of the total area of Ontario, amounting to an area approximately as 
large as France.3 While this remote region seems far and distant for the majority of the 
Ontario’s population that resides in the southern reaches of the province, the Far North 
is significant for several reasons.  
Situated within the heart of the Far North is a contentious, crescent-shaped region 
of mineral deposits known as the Ring of Fire. Located approximately 500 kilometres 
north of Thunder Bay, the deposits discovered to date lie concentrated along a 20-
kilometre-long strip.4 This region has been home to intense mining exploration since 
2008, when the first commercial quantities of chromite in North America were discovered 
in the area.5 It has been dubbed by some as “Ontario’s oil sands” due to the potential 
value of the minerals, which include chromite, copper, nickel, gold, zinc, titanium, 
vanadium, platinum, and palladium.6 The region has been described as a “multi-
generational economic opportunity” with the potential to create long-term job growth in 
the region, with known mineral deposits valued at over $60-billion.7 Despite these 
economic benefits, several obvious challenges emerge in determining whether and how 
to develop this remote region of northern Ontario. 
                                                 
1 SO 2010, c 18 [Far North Act]. 
2 Ibid, s 2.  
3 Gord Miller, “Serving the Public: Annual Report 2012/2013” (2013) at 63, online (pdf): Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario <docs.assets.eco.on.ca/reports/environmental-protection/2012-2013/2012-13-
AR.pdf>. 
4 Jed Chong, “Background Paper: Resource Development in Canada: A Case Study on the Ring of Fire” 
(2014) at 1, online (pdf):  Library of Parliament 
<lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/BackgroundPapers/PDF/2014-17-
e.pdf>. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Miller, supra note 3 at 65; Chong, supra note 4 at 3.  
7 Chong, supra note 4.  
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First, the Far North “is the current and ancestral homeland for Indigenous peoples 
of the Nishnawbe Aski Nation,” formerly the Grand Council Treaty No. 9.8 Indigenous 
peoples have had a relationship with these lands since time immemorial, and have 
hunted, fished, and trapped in the region for generations according to seasonal and 
annual patterns and cycles. They “have prior rights to the custody of [the] land, which 
precede and supercede all of [the Crown’s] claims.”9 Their own legal traditions guide their 
relationship with the land, wildlife, and food systems. Contact with European settlers in 
northern Ontario occurred between 1500 and 1600 AD, bringing significant social 
changes and devastation to Indigenous communities through assimilative government 
policies and actions that took their land, outlawed religious beliefs and practices, 
destroyed plant and animal life, restricted movement, and prohibited the use of their own 
language.10 These actions have been described as cultural genocide.11  
Treaty No. 9 was signed in 1905, with adhesions signed in 1929-1930.12 These 
agreements were viewed by the government as land surrenders, while Indigenous 
signatories “understood and expected Treaty No. 9 to be a confirmation of the fur trade 
model of coexistence, a modest sharing of the land and its benefits.”13 The impacts of 
colonization continue to be felt today, and communities face significant challenges 
accessing basic services such as clean drinking water, education and healthcare. 
However, the Indigenous peoples have a sacred respect for the land, and many people 
continue to “depend on the environment to meet livelihood needs, including hunting, 
trapping, fishing and gathering” in ways that are protected as Aboriginal and treaty rights 
under s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.14 Today, approximately 24,000 Ojibway, Cree, 
                                                 
8 Cheryl Chetkiewicz & Anastasia M. Lintner, “Getting it Right in Ontario’s Far North: The Need for a 
Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment in the Ring of Fire [Wawangajing]” (2014) at 16, online 
(pdf): Wildlife Conservation Society Canada 
<www.wcscanada.org/Portals/96/Documents/RSEA_Report_WCSCanada_Ecojustice_FINAL.pdf>. 
9 Nishnawbe Aski Nation, “A Declaration of Nishnawbe-Aski (The People of the Land)” (1977), online: 
<www.nan.on.ca/article/a-declaration-of-nishnawbeaski-431.asp>. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Government of Canada, The James Bay Treaty: Treaty No. 9 (made in 1905 and 1906) and adhesions 
made in 1920 and 1920 (Ottawa: R. Duhamel, Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1964). 
13  John S Long, Treaty No. 9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 353. 
14 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 
1982]; Chetkiewicz & Lintner, supra note 8 at 20. 
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and Oji-Cree First Nations people live within 34 remote communities in the Far North. 
Many of these communities are accessible only by air or winter roads, although 
development in Ontario’s Far North stands to impact this accessibility to varying degrees.  
Second, the Far North is “an area of international ecological significance and a 
stronghold for biodiversity.”15 Consisting of two major ecological regions – the Hudson 
Bay Lowlands and the Boreal Shield16 - the region supports numerous species of 
mammals, birds, fish, and plants, “including such at-risk mammals as caribou, wolverine 
and polar bear.”17 The Far North is home to the largest continuous area of boreal forest 
free from large-scale human and industrial disturbance in the world.18 This boreal forest, 
along with the region’s peatlands, constitute the world’s single largest storehouse of 
carbon.19 As such, the region plays an important role in regulating the global climate, and 
protection of this key ecological region is necessary for the fight against climate change.20  
The Ring of Fire poses a complex challenge from an environmental assessment 
(“EA”) perspective.21 As any potential development stands to change the entire landscape 
of northern Ontario, with far-reaching ecological, socio-economic and cultural impacts, 
many have called for a strategic, regional-level EA prior to development of any individual 
mines.22 To date, no such commitment has been made by either the Ontario provincial 
                                                 
15 Miller, supra note 3 at 63-64.  
16 Chetkiewicz & Lintner, supra note 8 at 10.   
17 Miller, supra note 3 at 64. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Chetkiewicz & Lintner, supra note 8 at 11.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Both within Canada and throughout the world, multiple terms are used to describe “environmental 
assessment,” including “impact assessment,” “environmental impact assessment,” and “risk assessment.” 
Throughout this report, the terms “environmental assessment” and “impact assessment” are used 
synonymously, although for intentionally different reasons. “Environmental assessment” is used when 
describing the current provincial and federal environmental regimes, as well as when referring to any 
assessment processes that have been commenced or completed under these pieces of legislation. 
Presently, the term “environmental assessment” is favoured among domestic jurisdictions. The term 
“impact assessment” is used to refer to and signal the movement towards a broader assessment 
approach with sustainability at its core, as advanced in Bill C-69 and Canada’s proposed new Impact 
Assessment Act. The term “impact assessment” is also used throughout the part of the report discussing 
Indigenous-led assessment models, as these assessments generally take a broader approach, assessing 
the impacts of a particular project on a wide range of values important to each individual community, 
typically going beyond the factors taken into consideration under the current conventional environmental 
assessment legislation. 
22 See Cole Atlin & Robert Gibson, “Lasting Regional Gains from Non-Renewable Resource Extraction: 
The Role of Sustainability-Based Cumulative Effects Assessment and Regional Planning for Mining 
Development in Canada” (2017) 4 Extractive Industries & Soc’y 36; Chetkiewicz & Lintner, supra note 8; 
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government or the federal government. Voluntary project-level EAs led by mining 
companies have been started and suspended, and currently there are only a couple of 
individual project-level assessments moving ahead. In May 2018, the Government of 
Ontario entered into voluntary agreements with two individual First Nation communities 
to conduct EAs for two single road projects. Webequie First Nation will be the proponent 
for an assessment of an all-season supply road from their community to the proposed 
Ring of Fire development area,23 and Marten Falls First Nation will be the proponent for 
all-weather multi use community access road leading from the northern end of the Painter 
Lake forestry road to the community of Marten Falls.24 Phase 2 of the Marten Falls road 
would branch off of this initial segment, providing an all-season community access road 
north of the Albany River to connect the community with the Ring of Fire mineral 
deposits.25 Additionally, as the Ring of Fire lies within the Far North of Ontario, 
community-based land use plans have been developed by Indigenous communities under 
the Far North Act. These land use plans outline which lands are to be protected, and 
which are open to development, although there is “no mechanism to coordinate the plans 
coming out of various communities or to plan for regional-scale impacts.”26 
Indigenous peoples in the Far North stand to face tremendous impacts from 
development of the Ring of Fire. In addressing the Ontario government in 1977 through 
a document titled “A Declaration of Nishnawbe Aski (The People of the Land),” the 
Nishnawbe Aski Nation highlighted the importance of the land: “You [the Ontario 
government] have alienated life and land, by the exploitation of the natural resources. As 
a result of your greed there is a real possibility that our environment will be destroyed. If 
it is, we will also be destroyed because we are part of nature.”27 As Ontario only has one 
                                                 
Robert Gibson, “Turning Mines into Bridges: Gaining Positive Legacies from Non-renewable Resource 
Projects” (2014) 15 Journal Aboriginal Mgmt 4. 
23 Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks, “Webequie Supply Road Project” (2018), online: 
Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca/page/webequie-supply-road-project> [MECP, “Webequie Supply 
Road”]. 
24 Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks, “Marten Falls Community Access Road Project” 
(2018), online: Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca/page/marten-falls-community-access-road-
project> [MECP, “Marten Falls Community Access Road”]. 
25 Marten Falls First Nation, “Marten Falls First Nation Environmental Assessment on Community Access 
Road” (3 December 2018), online: <www.martenfalls.ca/2018/12/03/marten-falls-first-nation-
environmental-assessment-on-community-access-road/>. 
26 Chetkiewicz & Lintner, supra note 8 at ii. 
27 Nishnawbe Aski Nation, supra note 9. 
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chance to “get it right” in the Far North, it is critically important that Indigenous 
communities understand and take advantage of the available avenues for advocacy so 
that they can ensure their concerns are heard and taken into account throughout the EA 
process for the Ring of Fire, whenever decisions are made to move forward. 
 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT 
This research report will examine the role that Indigenous communities could fill in 
the EA process for the Ring of Fire region in Ontario’s Far North. The goal of this report 
is to outline the various forms of Indigenous-led impact assessments (“IA”) that have 
emerged across the country in different legal traditions, with a view to preparing the 
Neskantaga First Nation to take a decision about whether it wishes to conduct its own IA 
of the Ring of Fire development.  
This report will take an in-depth look at the complicated landscape of the Ring of 
Fire from an EA perspective. After thoroughly examining the history and importance of 
the Ring of Fire region, this report will outline the legislative framework that currently 
governs the development, working to expose areas where this legislative regime falls 
short. Provincial, federal, and constitutional law all have a role to play in governing 
development in Ontario’s Far North, and international commitments such as the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples28 stipulate standards of conduct 
that governments must adhere to when engaging in development on Indigenous 
territories. In response to these shortcomings in settler law, this report will explore 
alternative approaches to the conventional government-led EA process through a case-
study review of the trends, practices, and goals of Indigenous-led IAs.  Indigenous-led 
IAs typically combine conventional EA processes with governance frameworks, legal 
principles, and ways of knowing specific to the territory. In this way, Indigenous-led 
reviews are intended to achieve an enhanced ability to highlight local realities, capacities, 
challenges, priorities, practices, and cultural values, so as to inform community decision-
making moving forward.   
                                                 
28 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, 61st Sess, UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295 (2007) 1 [UNDRIP]. 
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The final analysis portion of this report will provide strategic advice for the 
Neskantaga First Nation regarding conducting their own assessment of the Ring of Fire. 
The focus will be on Indigenous-led IAs on treaty territory, an overview of the work that 
needs to be done before engaging in an assessment, and the challenges and 
opportunities that may arise.  
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
The findings in this research report are based primarily on publicly-available 
documentary sources gathered using standard legal research methods. In reviewing the 
relevant legal context and varying approaches to EA, both conventional and Indigenous-
led, much reliance was placed on a review of scholarly publications. Additionally, grey 
literature on Indigenous-led IA was consulted to gather information about trends and 
principles underlying the methodologies used by different communities.  
Information throughout the report was supplemented with selected interviews with 
individuals working with organizations whose work overlaps with areas of focus within this 
research report. The analytical methods used in this report were informed by discussions 
with Neskantaga community members and advisors. Ethics approval was granted from 
the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee at York University for research involving 
human participants, and is attached to this report as Appendix 1.  
 
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LEGAL PLURALISM 
A core thread that weaves through and guides the entirety of this report is the 
theoretical framework of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism as it exists within the Canadian 
context is aptly explained by Professor John Borrows in his book titled “Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution.” Borrows defines the concept as “the simultaneous existence 
within a single legal order of different rules [or legal traditions] applying to identical 
situations.”29 Borrows defines “legal traditions” as “a set of deeply rooted, historically 
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the 
polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the ways 
                                                 
29 John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 8.  
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law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught.”30 In Canada, the 
common law, the civil law, and Indigenous legal traditions overlap to play a role in dispute 
resolution and form the basis for Canada’s legal order. While the common law and civil 
law may make up the dominant legal order within Canada, what I refer to as “settler law,” 
Professor Borrows stresses that “the validity of each legal tradition does not rest solely 
on its historic acceptance or how it is received by other traditions.”31 Each legal tradition 
“has its own distinctive methods for development and application.”32 
Since the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights in s.35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, “new political and legal space has been opened up for the 
recognition and exercise of Indigenous governance” particularly in the area of 
environmental management.33 The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized 
the existence and exercise of Indigenous laws in cases including R v Van der Peet34, 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia35, and Delgamuukw v British Columbia36. Lawyer 
Jessica Clogg of West Coast Environmental Law argues that “ensuring that Indigenous 
law takes its rightful place in environmental decision-making has the transformative 
potential to achieve more sustainable outcomes for all.”37 There is a dynamic and growing 
wave driving the revitalization of Indigenous laws within communities across the country, 
and these legal traditions are being articulated in ways that increasingly intersect with 
settler law in Canada as competing frameworks for responding to contemporary 
environmental problems.38 EA is just one among many areas of the law where this legal 
pluralism is notably evident.  In the Canadian context, project proposals for resource 
development projects are always situated within the traditional territories of Indigenous 
peoples. While the Canadian government has a comprehensive set of processes outlined 
                                                 
30 Ibid at 7.  
31 Ibid at 8.  
32 Ibid at 8.  
33 Jessica Clogg et al, “Indigenous Legal Traditions and the Future of Environmental Governance in 
Canada” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 227. 
34 [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289.  
35 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation] 
36 [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw]. 
37 Jessica Clogg, “Reflections on Indigenous Jurisdiction and Impact Assessment” (17 August 2017), 
online (blog): West Coast Environmental Law <www.wcel.org/blog/reflections-indigenous-jurisdiction-and-
impact-assessment>. 
38 Clogg et al, supra note 33.   
 10 
in settler law regarding the procedures to be followed when assessing the environmental 
impacts of proposed projects, this process represents only one of a multitude of legal 
traditions that may be applicable to the governance of the land. Indigenous communities 
have their own equally valid legal traditions governing their decision-making in relation to 
the land.  
Scholars of Indigenous law including Professors Val Napoleon and Hadley 
Friedland have called for scholarship that goes beyond the recognition and assertion of 
Indigenous laws in order to “build on the current momentum to revitalize and fully realize 
the potential application of Indigenous law in the world today.”39 This scholarship needs 
to translate “from the theoretical and the philosophical to the practical and the concrete – 
and then back again”40 and should “support the practical application of specific Indigenous 
legal principles to the real issues that Indigenous peoples grapple with today, while 
recognizing how these principles form one part of a larger, coherent whole.”41  
While I am not in a position to draw out and apply specific principles of 
Anishininuwug law to the EA process for the Ring of Fire, I hope that this report may build 
on this call from Napoleon and Friedland by addressing some of the practical challenges 
of applying Indigenous legal traditions within the realm of EA by highlighting some of the 
issues and opportunities that communities may face in deciding how best to assert their 
rights within their traditional territories. Napoleon and Friedland rightly state that  
If Indigenous people cannot use Indigenous law, that is, if people cannot 
reason with it and apply it to the messy and mundane, then it will continue to 
be talked about only in an idealized way or as a rhetorical critique of Canadian 
law – arguably a backhanded twist of colonization that would render 
Indigenous law useless. As long as Indigenous laws are not accessible or 
usable, in a crunch, by default, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in 
Canada will turn to state law to resolve disputes. This inaccessibility 
perpetuates the colonial process of undermining and obscuring Indigenous 
legal traditions.42  
 
By working to identify spaces where Indigenous legal traditions may integrate with and 
operate independently alongside the settler EA regime, I hope that this report may reveal 
                                                 
39 Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, “An Inside Job: Engaging with Indigenous Legal Traditions through 
Stories” (2016) 61:1 McGill LJ 725 at 733. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid at 741.  
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new possibilities for approaching EAs from a legal pluralist perspective.  In addition to 
providing analysis that could lead to a competing Indigenous-led IA of the Ring of Fire, 
the report aims also to demonstrate how the incorporation of various Indigenous legal 
principles could improve, and render more rigorous, conventional EA processes as 
envisioned according to settler law.   
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2 OVERVIEW OF THE RING OF FIRE REGION 
  
While the Ring of Fire has garnered much recent political attention, challenges with 
developing the region and opening it up to mining activities are not new. Conversations 
over how to access the minerals in the Ring of Fire have been ongoing for the past 
decade, and in 2019 it remains that there is no road or rail access to the region, let alone 
any operating mines. However, the recent change of government in Ontario from the 
Liberal government of Kathleen Wynne to the Conservative government of Doug Ford 
has already sparked new debates and discussions over accessing the valuable minerals 
of the Far North. The Ring of Fire has been identified as a priority for the new government, 
and Premier Ford has declared that he would “hop on [a] bulldozer [him]self” in order to 
build the roads necessary to access the mining region.43 Although statements like this 
should be taken as hyperbole, this type of discourse reveals the ignorance of the Far 
North held by those unfamiliar with the region, and a lack of knowledge of the impacts 
that development could have on the region. For example, those who reside in the Far 
North have pointed out that Premier Ford will have little success with bulldozing through 
the Far North, as the landscape is comprised of muskeg, and a bulldozer would quickly 
sink.44    
In order to understand the nuances and complexities impacting the governance 
and development of the Ring of Fire in Ontario’s Far North and the Ring of Fire, it is 
essential to establish a timeline of the major events leading to the current state of affairs, 
including the major players involved, political goals, and legal developments. This timeline 
will shed light on why the Ring of Fire remains an inaccessible and undeveloped mass of 
minerals. In combination, it is also essential to understand the unique geographic and 
environmental features of the region which underscore the sensitivities associated with 
mining in the Far North and the challenges these features pose in terms of completing an 
EA. Finally, it is necessary to outline the importance of maintaining the social, cultural and 
                                                 
43 Maija Kappler, “Doug Ford tells supporters he can ‘take back’ Ontario from Liberals”, The Globe and 
Mail (19 March 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-doug-ford-tells-supporters-he-
can-take-back-ontario-from-liberals/>. 
44 Josh Dehaas, “How Ontario can get the Ring of Fire back on track,” TVO (4 October 2018), online: 
<www.tvo.org/article/how-ontario-can-get-the-ring-of-fire-back-on-track>. 
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ecological integrity of the region to the Indigenous communities who live there, bringing 
to the forefront what this development places at stake.  
 
2.1 HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE RING OF FIRE 
 Minerals were first discovered in the region known as the Ring of Fire in  Ontario’s 
remote Far North in 2002, when miners in search of additional veins of diamonds from 
the De Beers Victor diamond mine discovered a rich source of nickel, copper, platinum 
and palladium.45 However, the name didn’t catch on until 2007, when Richard Nemis, the 
head of junior mining company Noront Resources, discovered a large deposit of minerals 
and named his exploration camp the “Ring of Fire” after the hit Johnny Cash song.46 Since 
2007, over 30,000 mining claims have been staked in the region.47 The arc-shaped Ring 
of Fire covers an area of approximately 5,120 square kilometers, with the majority of 
minerals concentrated along a 20-kilometer-long strip as depicted in Figure 1, below.48  
Figure 1: Map Depicting the Ring of Fire Mineral Deposits and Mining Claims49 
                                                 
45 Peter Gorrie, “The Ring of Fire,” Ontario Nature (31 August 2010), online: <onnaturemagazine.com/the-
ring-of-fire.html>. 
46 Ibid.  
47 The Canadian Press, “Ring of Fire Blockades Lifted,” CBC News (21 March 2010), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ring-of-fire-blockades-lifted-1.931898>. 
48 Josh Hjartarson et al, “Beneath the Surface: Uncovering the Economic Potential of Ontario’s Ring of 
Fire” (2014) at 1, online (pdf): Ontario Chamber of Commerce <occ.ca/wp-
content/uploads/Beneath_the_Surface_web-1.pdf>. 
49 Four Rivers, “Ring of Fire Mineral Exploration” (2016), online (pdf): <www.fourriversmatawa.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/MAP007_2016_02_12_ROF_11x17_rev6.pdf>. 
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The “minerals lie close to the earth’s surface, having been pushed upward as a result of 
millions of years of heat and pressure.”50 With the exception of the De Beers open-pit 
Victor diamond mine midway up the James Bay coast, Ontario’s Far North has been 
closed to industry. “No part of the boreal forest is less touched by human activity” than 
the Far North – a “soggy land of black spruce, jack pine and white birch, with peat bogs 
along the James and Hudson Bay coasts.”51 This lack of development is due primarily to 
ecosystem sensitivity, and remoteness and lack of infrastructure.52  
 Despite these challenges, many are counting on the Ring of Fire to be the main 
driver of Ontario’s economy over the next decade. The Ontario Chamber of Commerce 
OCC (“OCC”) has described the Ring of Fire as “one of the province’s greatest economic 
development opportunities in a generation” and “an unparalleled opportunity for the 
                                                 
50 Gorrie, supra note 45.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Chong, supra note 4 at 5. 
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province to diversity its economy and solidify its place as a global leader in mining and 
mining technology.”53 In November 2013, Ontario’s Minister of Northern Development and 
Mines indicated that the Ring of Fire had known mineral potential worth $60-billion.54 A 
2014 report from the OCC titled “Beneath the Surface: Uncovering the Economic Potential 
of Ontario’s Ring of Fire” estimated that in the first 10 years of operation, the Ring of Fire 
will generate up to $9.4-billion in GDP, and over $25-billion over the first 32 years.55 
 The rush to develop the Ring of Fire really began in 2008 when North America’s 
first commercially valuable source of chromite, a component of stainless steel, was found 
in high concentrations.56 The discovery of these valuable minerals in the Far North 
prompted legislative action from the government of Ontario, as they worked to respond 
to a host of concerns that threatened development in the region.57 In the summer of 2009, 
Dalton McGuinty’s Liberal government introduced the Far North Act as well as 
amendments to Ontario’s Mining Act.58 While the impacts and issues raised by these new 
pieces of legislation will be explored later in this report, it is important to note at this 
juncture that the core purpose of these legislative moves was to ready the Far North for 
extraction, primarily by giving the government unilateral power to approve or reject 
community-based land use plans based on the “economic interest of all Ontarians”.59  
 The two projects that have garnered the most attention in the Ring of Fire are the 
“Eagle’s Nest” polymetal mine, and the “Black Thor” chromite mine, the claims for which 
are both owned by Noront Resources Canada. As part of the “Eagle’s Nest” project, 
                                                 
53 Hjartarson et al, supra note 48 at i-1. 
54 Government of Ontario, “Protecting the Far North: McGuinty Government Provides New Leadership 
Role for First Nations” (2 June 2009), online: <news.ontario.ca/mndmf/en/2013/11/ministers-statement-
on-ring-of-fire.html>. 
55 Hjartarson et al, supra note 48 at 8. 
56 Gorrie, supra note 45.  
57 Professor Dayna N Scott suggests that a confluence of developments led to Ontario’s move to 
introduce new legislation: Ontario had moved from a “have” to a “have not” province; the Ring of Fire 
deposits had recently been discovered and quantified; environmentalists were pressuring the province to 
take steps to conserve the Boreal Forest leading up to the Copenhagen climate change conference; 
conflict with First Nations opposed to permitting under the Mining Act and the “free entry” system for 
exploration on their territories was escalating; Ontario Court of Appeal judgments resulting from those 
disputes mentioned the fact that the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples was 
not fulfilled by this permitting system; and finally, the Environmental Commissioner was pressuring the 
Ontario government to establish a comprehensive land-use planning process for the Far North. A 
summary of some of the litigation related to mining conflict in Ontario’s Far North has been attached as 
Appendix 2.  
58 RSO 1990, c M.14 [Mining Act]. 
59 Far North Act, supra note 1, s 12(4). 
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Noront proposed the “construction, operation, decommissioning and abandonment of an 
underground nickel-copper-platinum multi-metal mine, an on-site metal mill, and a facility 
for the extraction of 358,000 cubic metres per annum of groundwater […] The proposed 
mine […] would have an ore production capacity of approximately 2,960 tonnes per day, 
with an anticipated life of approximately 11 years.”60 While individual mining projects do 
not require an individual EA in Ontario, Noront entered into a voluntary written agreement 
to subject the “Eagle’s Nest” project to the provincial Environmental Assessment Act.61 
The project did, however, require a comprehensive study under the federal Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act62 due to potential harmful alteration, disruption or 
destruction of fish habitat, and interference with navigable waters.63 As a result, a 
coordinated EA between the two levels of government was initiated for the “Eagle’s Nest” 
project. The harmonized EA process was initiated in April 2011, but has since been 
suspended as of June 2015, pending resolution of issues around transportation, resource 
access, and Indigenous rights claims. Further details on the EA process are provided in 
the “Legislative Context” part of this report. 
 The Black Thor deposit was discovered in 2008 by Freewest Resources Canada 
Inc., and is the largest chromite deposit in the Ring of Fire. Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. 
acquired Freewest’s interests in the Black Thor deposit in 2009 for $550-million,64 and 
also opted to enter into a voluntary agreement with Ontario to subject the deposit to the 
provincial EA regime. Cliff’s proposed to “develop and operate the Black Thor chromite 
deposit […] This undertaking [would] involve the establishment, construction and 
operation of an open pit/underground chromite mine and ore processing facility, including 
                                                 
60 Government of Canada, “Eagle’s Nest Project” (2018), online: Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency <www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/evaluations/proj/63925?culture=en-CA>. 
61 Government of Ontario, “Noront Eagle’s Nest Multi-metal Mine” (2018), online: 
<www.ontario.ca/page/noront-eagles-nest-multi-metal-mine> [Government of Ontario, “Noront Eagle’s 
Nest Multi-metal Mine”]; RSO 1990, c E.18. 
62 SC 1992, c 37 [CEAA].  
63 Knight Piésold Consulting, “Noront Eagle’s Nest Project: A Federal/Provincial Environmental Impact 
Statement/Environmental Assessment Report – Draft Copy” (2013) at ES-4, online (pdf): Noront 
Resources <norontresources.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/pdf/Eagles%20Nest%20Project%20Draft%20EIS%20EA/Volume%201%20-
%20Executive%20Summary.pdf>. 
64 Business Wire, “Cliffs Natural Resources Inc announces definitive agreement to acquire chromite 
deposits from Freewest Resources Canada, Inc,” (23 November 2009), online: 
<www.businesswire.com/news/home/20091123005521/en/Cliffs-Natural-Resources-Announces-
Definitive-Agreement-Acquire>. 
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associated transportation and electricity infrastructure, waste management and any 
ancillary activities.”65 However, in 2013, Cliff’s announced that they were halting work on 
the project citing delays with government EAs, land surface rights issues, conflict with 
local Indigenous communities, and negotiations with the province,66 and in 2015, Cliffs 
sold the Black Thor project along with the rest of its assets in the Ring of Fire to Noront 
at a loss for a mere $20-million, with strong objection from the Matawa Nations.67 Noront 
has not moved forward with any development plans for the Black Thor project since 
acquiring it.  
 A major “roadblock” for the project proponents in developing these projects as 
planned is the fact that the mineral deposits lie in Treaty 9 territory, within the traditional 
territories of the nine Matawa First Nations, as depicted in Figure 2, below.68  
                                                 
65 Government of Ontario, “Voluntary agreement for the Cliffs Chromite Project Environmental 
Assessment” (2016), online: <www.ontario.ca/page/voluntary-agreement-cliffs-chromite-project-
environmental-assessment>. 
66 CBC News, “Cliffs stops work on chromite project in Ring of Fire,” CBC News (12 June 2013), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/cliffs-stops-work-on-chromite-project-in-ring-of-fire-1.1319912>. 
67 Rachelle Younglia & Bertrand Marotte, “Cliffs Natural Resources completes costly exit from Ontario’s 
Ring of Fire,” The Globe and Mail (23 March 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/cliffs-to-exit-ontarios-ring-of-fire-with-sale-of-chromite-
assets/article23576822/>; Chiefs Council, Media Release, “Matawa Chiefs Oppose Noront’s Purchase of 
Cliffs Assets and Lack of Engagement on Environmental Assessment” (25 March 2015), online (pdf): 
Matawa First Nations Management <www.matawa.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MEDIA-RELEASE-
MATAWA-CHIEFS-OPPOSE-NORONTS-PURCHASE-OF-CLIFFS-ASSETS-AND-LACK-OF-
ENGAGEMENT-ON-ENVIRONMENTAL-ASSESSMENT_13-25-15.pdf>. 
68 The nine Matawa First Nations include: Aroland, Eabametoong, Ginoogaming, Long Lake #58, Marten 
Falls, Neskantaga, Nibinamik, and Webequie.  
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Figure 2: Map Depicting the Matawa Nation’s Homelands and Traditional Territory69 
Constitutional principles such as the duty to consult and accommodate (“DTCA”), to be 
discussed subsequently in this report, and the recognition and the affirmation of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights under s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 preclude mining 
companies from developing projects in the Ring of Fire without first consulting the 
Indigenous communities that live in the region whose treaty rights stand to be impacted 
by the development. In July 2011, the nine Matawa Nations signed a “Unity Declaration” 
which stated that “the nine First Nations take the position that our traditional territories are 
under our control, and approval to operate in our respective territories cannot be given by 
                                                 
69 Matawa First Nations Management, “Matawa First Nations Homelands and Traditional Territory” (2014), 
online (pdf): <community.matawa.on.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/FRGMAP005_b_2014_02_07_Matawa_First_Nations_Homelands_11x17.pdf>.  
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the Government or any other entities.”70 The Unity Declaration was a strong assertion of 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights to the land, water, and resources, and stipulated that written 
consent of the Matawa Nations was required before any development could proceed.71  
As political pressure to develop the Far North continued with the introduction of the 
Far North Act and amendments to the Mining Act, the Matawa First Nations Tribal Council 
appointed formed NDP Premier of Ontario Bob Rae in June 2013 as the chief negotiator 
to represent them in talks with the Ontario government about the opening of their land to 
the Ring of Fire development. In this role, Rae hoped to achieve: 
• real improvements in infrastructure (roads, hydro, broadband) for the whole region;  
 
• an agreed effort to increase investment in health care, education, and training;  
 
• a new economic relationship with the province, the federal government and the 
companies doing business in the region; and,  
 
• assurances that any environmental process will involve community meetings and 
genuine ways of ensuring compliance with essential standards.72 
 
The Matawa Nations developed a “Community Driven Regional Strategy” under which 
they aimed to negotiate an EA process with Ontario that would “include meaningful First 
Nation participation, consultation, decision making and would consider the accumulated 
impacts of more than one development.”73 Under this Regional Strategy, the Matawa 
Nations hoped to address three core pillars – land management, revenue sharing, and 
capacity building – in three stages. First, a Framework Agreement which would “contain 
all the topics to be discussed at the Negotiation Table and include a set of guiding 
                                                 
70 Matawa Nation Chiefs Council, “Mamow-Wecheekapawetahteewiin: Unity Declaration” (13 July 2011), 
online (pdf): Matawa First Nations Management <www.matawa.on.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Mamow-Wecheekapawetahteewiin-Unity-Declaration-Signed-July-13-2011.pdf>. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Gloria Galloway, “Bob Rae jumps into Ring of Fire,” The Globe and Mail (24 June 2013), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/bob-rae-jumps-into-ring-of-fire/article12768375/>. 
73 Matawa First Nations, “Community Driven Regional Strategy” (2013) at 2, online (pdf): Matawa First 
Nations Management <www.matawa.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Regional-Strategy-
Brochuresmallpdf.com_.pdf>; The Matawa First Nations Chiefs had been pursuing litigation regarding the 
comprehensive EA process for the Eagle’s Nest project, but dropped the litigation in favour of the regional 
negotiations that commenced. See: CBC News, “Matawa First Nations chiefs drop Ring of Fire legal 
challenge,” CBC News (11 September 2013), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/matawa-
first-nations-chiefs-drop-ring-of-fire-legal-challenge-1.1705871>. 
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principles, a funding regime, and goals and objectives”; second, the Negotiation Stage 
which would “work out the details of the topics from the Framework Agreement”; and, 
third, the Implementation Stage, where “the ratified agreements from the negotiations 
would be implemented by First Nations.”74 For these negotiations with the Matawa 
Nations, the province of Ontario appointed formed Supreme Court of Canada Justice 
Frank Iacobucci as their lead negotiator in July 2013. He was mandated to address 
several issues including environmental protection, regional infrastructure, resource 
revenue sharing, and social and economic supports.75  
 The parties signed the “Regional Framework Agreement” (“Framework 
Agreement”) in March 2014 which set out a number of principles and objectives for 
participation in a “community-based process of negotiation related to mineral and other 
related developments” in the Ring of Fire.76 These included the recognition of a 
government-to-government relationship between the parties, respect for existing legal 
and constitutional rights of all parties, and mutual respect, understanding, and 
participation.77 The purpose of this Framework Agreement was to establish a basis for 
the negotiation of one or more agreements related to the three pillars identified in the 
Matawa Nation’s “Community Driven Regional Strategy” – land management, revenue 
sharing, and capacity building. Importantly, the Framework Agreement recognized that 
mineral developments in the Ring of Fire “may have differential potential impacts on 
individual First Nation communities” requiring an “equitable approach that is proportionate 
to the degree of potential impact on a particular First Nation.”78 It and also recognized 
existing Memorandums of Understanding that had already been signed with two individual 
First Nations – Marten Falls and Webequie, both of whom are now proponents for 
individual project-level EAs of roads leading to the Ring of Fire.79  
                                                 
74 Ibid at 3.  
75 Government of Ontario, “Ontario Appoints Lead Negotiator for Ring of Fire” (2 July 2013), online: 
<news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2013/07/ontario-appoints-lead-negotiator-for-ring-of-fire-1.html>. 
76 Matawa First Nations & Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, “The Regional Framework 
Agreement,” (26 March 2014) at 1, online (pdf): Ontario Ministry of Energy, Northern Development and 
Mines <www.mndm.gov.on.ca/sites/default/files/rof_regional_framework_agreement_2014.pdf>.  
77 Ibid at 3-4. 
78 Ibid at 1-2. 
79 Ibid at 2.  
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 The Regional Framework Negotiation Process was not without its challenges, and 
a number of Matawa Nation chiefs spoke out against Ontario’s negotiating stance, which 
they claimed was inconsistent with the Framework Agreement. One criticism was of 
Ontario’s creation of a new Ring of Fire Infrastructure Development Corporation in August 
2014, which included no First Nation representation on its interim board. The body was 
created to “bring First Nations and the public and private sectors together to create 
partnerships and facilitate investment decisions in strategic transportation 
infrastructure.”80 This included providing advice on how to best utilize the $1-billion-dollar 
commitment to Ring of Fire infrastructure pledged by the Ontario government to develop 
an all-season transportation corridor to the Ring of Fire in its April 2014 budget.81 A 
second issue was that the province of Ontario was continuing to issue mining permits 
during the negotiations. In response, the Matawa Chiefs passed Resolution #01 in 
September 2014, which established a moratorium on permits.82 
 Debates over a transportation corridor continued to plague the Ring of Fire 
development throughout the Regional Framework Negotiation Process, as the provincial 
government made clear its intention to invest in this necessary infrastructure. 
Transportation proposals included one from the Mushkegowuk Council to develop a 410-
kilometer railway to the James Bay coast creating an energy and infrastructure corridor,83 
a joint federal-provincial proposal for a transportation corridor that would connect the Ring 
of Fire to four remote First Nations (Webequie, Eabametoong, Neskantaga, and 
Nibinamik) to Pickle Lake, Ontario for which $785,000 was pledged to study (the “east-
west” route),84 and a 340-kilometre long north-south rail line connecting the Ring of Fire 
                                                 
80 Government of Ontario, “Ontario Establishes Ring of Fire Infrastructure Development Corporation” (28 
August 2014), online: <news.ontario.ca/mndmf/en/2014/08/ontario-establishes-rof-infrastructure-
development-corporation.html>. 
81 Ibid; Maria Babbage, “Ontario pledges $1-billion for Ring of Fire,” The Globe and Mail (28 April 2014), 
online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/ontario-
pledges-1-billion-for-ring-of-fire/article18316210/>. 
82 Northern Ontario Business Staff, “First Nation leaders call for halt on Ring of Fire Permits,” Northern 
Ontario Business (23 September 2014), online: <www.northernontariobusiness.com/industry-
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to an existing CN Rail line near Nakina, Ontario, proposed by a team of Chinese 
engineers.85 In August 2017, after years of negotiations and delays, the government of 
Ontario announced that it planned to move ahead with an all-season east-west access 
road to the Ring of Fire in partnership with the Webequie and Nibinamik First Nations, as 
well as an all-season north-south access road in partnership with Marten Falls First 
Nation, representing dissolution of the “Unity Declaration” signed by all nine Matawa 
Nations in 2011.86 This announcement shocked sidelined communities, who claimed that 
Premier Kathleen Wynne’s “‘divisive approach’ in negotiating agreements with individual 
communities of the Matawa Tribal Council [is] a strategy to run roads into the region 
without their approval” and runs contrary to the Framework Agreement.87 These side 
deals with individual First Nations represent a shift from the government-to-government 
approach envisioned by the Framework Agreement to a “divide and conquer” approach 
which was used due to a failure to force through a wider agreement with all impacted 
communities. As of May 2018, EAs are underway with Marten Falls and Webequie for the 
construction of two portions of road leading from the respective communities to the Ring 
of Fire.88  
The new Conservative government in Ontario has opted not to renew funding for 
the Framework Agreement negotiations, and the appointment of Frank Iacobucci was not 
renewed.89 The future of the collective negotiation process now remains uncertain – Bob 
Rae suggests that the provincial government would likely abandon the main negotiating 
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table created by the Framework Agreement and will likely favour striking deals with 
individual member First Nations.90 
 
2.2 ECOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF ONTARIO’S FAR NORTH 
 This divisive approach to developing the Ring of Fire also calls into question how 
these individual, project-level assessments for small segments of road can possibly allow 
for proper assessment of the impacts that development may have on Ontario’s 
ecologically sensitive and important Far North. As “one of the world’s largest, most intact 
ecological systems, reflecting a high level of ecological integrity and providing ecosystem 
services far beyond its borders,” the Far North has been the home of Indigenous peoples 
who have been sustaining themselves off of the land for generations.91 Landscapes like 
the Far North are rare – most of the region’s lakes and rivers are free from the impacts of 
human activity, the region is a stronghold for biodiversity, and the area contains “the 
largest single extant block of boreal forest free from large-scale anthropogenic 
disturbance anywhere in the world.”92 As the natural ecosystems in the Far North have 
been relatively undiminished by habitat loss and fragmentation, the region has provided 
stable ecological services over millennia.93 
Roughly half of the region’s land area is made up of the Boreal Shield, and the 
other half, Hudson Bay Lowland, as displayed in Figure 3, below.94  
Figure 3: Map Depicting the Far North Land Cover and Ecozones95 
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Almost a tenth of the surface area of the Far North is covered by fresh water lakes and 
rivers, including three of Canada’s largest rivers – the Albany, the Moose, and the Severn, 
and three other major rivers – the Winisk, the Attawapiskat, and the Ekwan. This water 
links the Far North’s ecosystems and communities to each other and works to moderate 
temperature and climate in the region.96 The Hudson Bay Lowland is the world’s third 
largest wetland. Water moves very slowly from the lowlands and peatlands into the many 
rivers and lakes of the Far North, which ensures that these lowlands remain “sinks” of the 
carbon and heavy metals, like mercury, that are stored in them. Changes in these slow 
water flows, caused by either climate change or human activity, “will upset this 
equilibrium, and can tip these slow-moving systems into a new condition where they begin 
to release stored materials into downstream waters and the atmosphere.”97 As the 
peatlands store more carbon than all other natural ecosystems in Ontario combined, they 
provide a major cooling benefit.  Moving southward and westward away from the coasts 
                                                 
96 Ibid at 8 
97 Ibid at 9. 
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of the Hudson and James Bays, the Boreal Forest of the Far North also serves “critical 
ecosystem functions, providing habitat for its distinctive fish, wildlife and plants, including 
critical habitat for species and habitats of conservation concern,” mediating ecosystem 
hydrology, and modifying local climate.98 In combination with the region’s peatlands, the 
forest plays a major role in moderating climate as a carbon sink. These important 
functions can be interrupted by human activity.  
In addition to the natural features of the landscape, the Far North is rich in 
biodiversity. 53 mammal species call the region home, including the beaver, muskrat, 
gray wolf, red fox, black bear, wolverine, marten, mink, otter, lynx, and moose.99 The Far 
North is also home to several iconic “special concern” and “threatened” species. Polar 
Bears, listed as “special concern” in 2011 under the Species at Risk Act,100 rely on the 
ice of Hudson Bay and James Bay to access prey, and on the coastal lowlands for 
summer refuge and denning. Over the past few decades, the impact of climate change 
has already been observed in the region, as there has been a significant decline in the 
body condition of the bears.101 The boreal caribou, listed as “threatened,” are also present 
in the Far North. Forest disturbance is a core threat for the caribou. This increases the 
abundance of prey, such as wolves, who feed on young calves, resulting in high mortality 
rates and declining populations.102 Many species of birds are also found in the Far North, 
particularly along the shores of James Bay and Hudson Bay. As the only tidal saltwater 
habitat between the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic, and the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, the 
shorelines provide one of North America’s “primary breeding and nursery landscapes for 
waterfowl and shorebirds.”103 These birds, of which 190 species breed in the Far North, 
are of major cultural and economic importance to First Nations communities in the area.104 
The Far North is also a “biodiversity hotspot” for fish, which at least 50 species currently 
residing in the water systems. Species such as walleye, whitefish, sucker, northern pike, 
lake sturgeon, and trout provide subsistence for local communities. Climate change 
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impacts to the region may result in more competition from non-native, warmer-water 
species and increased levels of mercury in fish tissue due to changes in waterflow from 
the lowlands.105 Finally, there are at least 150 species of plants that occur only in Ontario’s 
Far North, primarily in the Hudson Bay lowlands.106  
The water, climate, geology, wildlife, and communities of the Far North are 
interdependent and interconnected, and thus decision-making in the region must be 
informed by these relationships.107 While impacts from human activities are currently very 
modest, pressure to develop the mineral reserves in the Far North is growing, as is the 
desire to improve access among several of the 34 remote Indigenous communities in the 
Far North. The Far North Science Advisory Panel, established in 2008 by the Ontario 
Ministry of Natural Resources to provide scientific and technical advice on how to achieve 
the government’s vision for the Far North, aptly summarizes the cascading impact that 
the Ring of Fire could have on the region, and calls on the need for a regional-scale EA 
for any proposed development: 
Planning for development must be approached with great caution. Individual 
development projects such as mines, wind energy farms, hydro-electric power 
and tourism operations have the potential to affect local ecosystem integrity, 
through habitat alteration, changes in water levels, increased erosion, and 
release of pollutants to air and water. More significantly, as human activity 
begins to alter this ecologically intact land surface through development, there 
is increasing potential to affect ecosystem structure and function at a broad 
scale. In part, this is because individual projects must be linked by regional 
infrastructure, such as roads, airstrips, and transmission corridors. 
Transportation and transmission infrastructure has the potential to cause 
significant regional environmental impacts, including the creation of physical 
barriers to animal movement, habitat fragmentation, including stream habitats 
that are critical for spawning and movement, alteration of soil properties and 
surface water flows, and increased access through otherwise inhospitable 
terrain for invasive species, as well as predators, and hunters and anglers. 
These changes in turn alter interspecies dynamics and affect the abundance 
and distribution of species. Perhaps most important, however, the effects 
of roads are incremental and cascading. Once one road is built, to serve 
a single purpose or development project, it opens up the potential for 
further development, and creates pressure to build more road networks 
and power transmission lines. Well-planned and well-managed 
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infrastructure is therefore a critical component of land use planning for the Far 
North.108  
 
As this excerpt demonstrates, while small, individual projects such as short segments of 
road may not appear on their face to have significant environmental impacts, cascading 
development into the Far North may have devastating impacts to the environment and for 
the Indigenous communities who rely on it. The following subsection highlights the major 
concerns for the Neskantaga First Nation. 
 
2.3 IMPORTANCE OF TREATY 9 TERRITORY TO THE NESKANTAGA FIRST 
NATION 
 The importance of the land to the Neskantaga First Nation cannot be over-stated. 
The Neskantaga First Nation is a community of Oji-Cree people, whose reserve is located 
on the Attawapiskat Lake, approximately 180 km northeast of Pickle Lake and 560 km 
north of Thunder Bay, depicted in Figure 4, below.  
Figure 4: Map Depicting the Location of Neskantaga First Nation109 
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They are a fly-in community, with a population of about 425 members, 300 of whom live 
on reserve.110 Ice road access is available during the winter, with access times varying 
from 3 to 4 months during a cold winter, to a mere 5 to 7 weeks as of late.111 The 
Neskantaga First Nation have an oral culture, with both the Oji-Cree and Ojibway 
languages spoken and very much alive in the community.112 Community meetings 
discussing issues are held orally, in both traditional languages as well as English.113 
 In an affidavit sworn in an Application brought by the Matawa First Nations against 
the Attorney General of Canada and Cliffs Natural Resources at the Federal Court,114 
former Chief Peter Moonias provided an intimate account of the lived reality in his 
community, the importance of the land, and the impacts that the Ring of Fire development 
would bring. He states that “in our part of the world, the First Nations are the only ones 
living here. Our traditional and ancestral lands are all around us. They go in all directions 
from our reserve, to the north, south, east, and west.”115 People from the community use 
the land all throughout their traditional territory through activities like hunting, trapping, 
and gathering plants and medicines. Moonias states that “Our territory sustains us. Our 
people have lived in these homelands for generation after generation.”116 
 The Neskantaga First Nation’s reserve is located on the head waters of the 
Attawapiskat Lake and River, which is the “lifeline of [the] community.”117 The 
Attawapiskat Lake flows into the Attawapiskat River, which is hundreds of kilometers long, 
flowing all the way into James Bay. The community travels all along the river to hunt and 
fish in both summer and winter, and people harvest sturgeon, pickerel, white fish, pike, 
burbot, and geese.118 While the river is used as a method of transportation, there are also 
many sacred ceremonial sites along the river system used by the community for 
generations as places of healing and to practice ceremony.119  
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 The Neskantaga First Nation have constitutionally recognized Aboriginal and 
treaty rights that are protected by s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In the affidavit sworn 
by former Chief Peter Moonias, he recounts the history of treaty-making in the territory 
and its impact on the people. He states: 
We are beneficiaries of Treaty 9 [the James Bay Treaty of 1905]. The people 
who came down to have us sign the Treaty didn’t come to our community. We 
had to go to Fort Hope. At that time, no one from our community spoke English. 
And we only had a day and a half to sign the Treaty.  
 
Our understanding is that in Treaty 9, our people entered into a political and 
legal relationship with the Crown, based on the principles of friendship, mutual 
respect and shared arrangements. We promised to keep peaceful relations, 
and the Crown promised to protect our livelihood and jurisdiction as times 
changed. We understood that we would share the use of our lands and 
resources with the newcomers, so long as the right to hunt and fish and use 
our lands would continue and would be protected. We recognize our obligation 
to protect these lands as stewards while gaining sustenance from them. 
 
We know this because our elders tell us so. The rules and stories of how to 
care for the lands have evolved over millennia and continue to be practiced by 
our hunters and trappers. 
 
Our understanding is that we never ceded, sold or surrendered our homelands, 
and never gave up our inherent rights, including jurisdiction over our territories 
and peoples.120 
 
These words from former Chief Peter Moonias depict the contentious relationship that the 
community has had with the Crown over the past 100+ years, as well as the fundamental 
obligations that the community holds in relation to their lands. For these reasons, the Ring 
of Fire development is of significant concern for the community.  
 The Neskantaga First Nation is concerned with the Ring of Fire development for 
two primary reasons. First, they are concerned with the impacts the development would 
have on the lands and the environment. The development would result in mines built to 
the northeast of the reserve, within the community’s traditional territory. The development 
would be near a lake that is connected to the Attawapiskat River. As outlined above, 
Moonias describes this river as the “lifeline” of their people.121 The construction of mines, 
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bridges, and roads would create miles and miles of impacts, including on wildlife, on life 
on and in the river, and on air quality.122 Development also has the potential to create 
new sources of pollution.123  
 Second, the Neskantaga First Nation is concerned that increased access to the 
territory through new road construction would “cause substantial and permanent harm to 
[their] culture and way of life.”124 New roads may bring in new hunters and fishers to the 
land, impacting the resources available to those who rely on them, and may result in 
changes to the availability of hunting and fishing grounds.125 Things like hunting and 
fishing outfitters and camps may become established, bringing new people to live on the 
territory.126 These new roads through the traditional territory may impact burial and sacred 
sites which the community has spiritual obligations to protect.127 Additionally, increased 
access to the territory combined with the creation of new jobs and wealth in the area has 
the potential to negatively impact the community’s struggle with drug and alcohol 
abuse.128 Chief and Council have implemented several programs in the community which 
have assisted with this problem, but community elders are worried that money combined 
with easier access to the community may increase problems with drugs and alcohol, 
negatively impacting families.129 
 In addition to these specific community concerns, both the development of mines 
and the construction of new roads would seriously infringe the community’s treaty rights. 
That being said, the community is not against or opposed to the development. However, 
they are “committed to making sure that any development is respectful of [their] Treaty 
and Aboriginal rights, respectful of [their] traditions, respectful of [their] lands and water. 
[They] need to make sure that any development will benefit the long-term health and well-
being of [their] people, including future generations, rather than hurting [them].”130  
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The Neskantaga First Nation have their own forms of governance, protocol, law, 
authority, and jurisdiction which require them to manage and protect their lands and 
resources.131 They have a community-based decision-making model for issues affecting 
the land, as lands are held collectively by the community.132 The legal framework put in 
place by both the federal and provincial governments does not adequately take these 
obligations into account, and is viewed as “deficient” by the community for several 
reasons.133 However, before unpacking alternative approaches to EA for the Ring of Fire, 
it is necessary to understand the current legal framework, and identify why this framework 
does not adequately address some of the concerns of Indigenous communities in 
Ontario’s Far North. 
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3 OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT IN ONTARIO’S FAR 
NORTH 
 
 This portion of the report aims to outline the laws, policies and regulatory 
instruments in place within the settler law that impact resource development and land use 
in the Far North. The lands and resources in Ontario’s Far North are subject to a complex 
and intertwined system of decision-making processes at both the provincial and federal 
level. Central pieces of provincial legislation to be explored in this section of the report 
include the Far North Act, the Mining Act, and the Environmental Assessment Act. At the 
federal level, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012134 plays a crucial role 
in the assessment of projects impacting areas of federal jurisdiction. Federal 
environmental assessment legislation is an area of law currently undergoing significant 
review and redrafting. The introduction of Bill C-69135 in February 2018 set out the new 
proposed Impact Assessment Act, which would replace CEAA, 2012. The Bill is currently 
under review by the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural 
Resources, and would provide a broader assessment framework should it receive Royal 
Assent. As such, it is an important piece of federal legislation to examine. Finally, s.35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal and treaty rights 
across the country. Significant jurisprudence has evolved following this entrenchment 
outlining key principles such as the duty to consult and accommodate, and the Honour of 
the Crown, which have emerged as central concepts impacting state action when 
engaging with Indigenous communities on resource development projects. These 
principles play a central role in Ontario’s Far North, as the Ring of Fire sits within Treaty 
9 territory.  
Beyond domestic legislative tools, the Government of Canada must also uphold 
international commitments. In particular, the Government of Canada has committed to 
fully implementing UNDRIP through s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. UNDRIP sets an 
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important backdrop for discussions of Indigenous-led environmental assessment, 
particularly the requirement for free, prior and informed consent (“FPIC”).  
Aside from outlining key features of each of these legislative and policy measures, 
this portion of the paper seeks to highlight the deficiencies in the current settler legal 
regime, further emphasizing the need for an approach that moves beyond the confines of 
this legal framework, and points out critical opportunities for advocacy within this settler 
regime that may be useful for Indigenous communities wishing to effectively advocate to 
protect their interests.  
 
3.1 ONTARIO’S LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1.1 THE FAR NORTH ACT, 2010 
 
3.1.1.1 History of the Far North Act, 2010 
Governance of Ontario’s Far North was initially cast by the provincial government 
as a key part of its plan to fight climate change. In July 2008, then Premier Dalton 
McGuinty and his Liberal government announced that they would protect at least 225,000 
km2 of boreal region within Ontario’s Far North in accordance with its Far North Planning 
Initiative.136 The stated objective of this initiative was “to develop community based land 
use plans that served to identify areas that could be used to promote environmentally 
sustainable economic opportunities, while ensuring that large amounts of land [were] 
protected in Ontario’s Far North region.”137 The aim was to strike a balance between 
conservation and sustainable development, which was to be achieved by the government 
working alongside Indigenous communities to develop these so-called “community based 
land use plans” (“CBLUPs”). This collaborative mapping exercise would “permanently 
protect an interconnected network of conservation lands across the Far North” and allow 
communities to express what types of economic development they were interested in.138 
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New commercial forestry opportunities would be made available, and any new mining 
projects were to be consistent with these CBLUPs.139 
 In order to elicit advice related to land use planning in the Far North, the 
government created two separate bodies to provide input on the formation of future 
legislation. One body was the Far North Advisory Council, composed of conservation 
groups and resource-based development industries. It completed a report on the Far 
North Planning Initiative for the Minister of Natural Resources in March 2009, stating that 
it had the potential to “transform the unique region in a number of positive ways that would 
make it a precedent-setting model for the world.”140 Second, the Far North Science 
Advisory Panel was established in December 2008 and was comprised of government 
and non-government officials with expertise on “terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, 
biodiversity, mineral resources, carbon and climate change.”141 It was tasked with the 
mandate of “providing scientific advice around numerous issues related to land use 
planning in the Far North.”142 They released a report on the Far North Land Use Strategy 
in April 2010 which provided a series of recommendations to the government in achieving 
its broad vision for the Far North.143 
 Bill 191, An Act with respect to land use planning and protection in the Far North,144 
was introduced in the Ontario Legislature in June 2009. While the Bill was moving through 
the legislative process, the government moved its stance on the Far North Act. While 
initially touted as a key part of the government’s plan to fight climate change, as outlined 
in its 2008-2009 Climate Change Action Plan, the government began to promote the Far 
North Act as part of its new five-year Open Ontario Plan to strengthen the economy. As 
a result, the government’s “stressed the legislation’s importance for future mineral 
development, especially in the Ring of Fire.”145 
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3.1.1.2 Legislative Framework of the Far North Act, 2010 
The Far North Act received Royal Assent in October 2010, and was proclaimed 
into law in February 2011. The purpose of the legislation is to provide for community 
based land use planning in the Far North that: 
(a) sets out a joint planning process between the First Nations and Ontario; 
 
(b) supports the environmental, social and economic objectives for land use 
planning for the peoples of Ontario that are set out in section 5 [“Objectives 
for land use planning”]; and 
 
(c) is done in a manner that is consistent with the recognition and affirmation 
of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, including the duty to consult.146 
 
Any First Nation with a reserve in the Far North, or with which the Minister of Natural 
Resources has agreed to work, may indicate an interest to the Minister to initiate 
discussions with respect to establishing a joint body to “advise on the development, 
implementation and co-ordination of land use planning in the Far North” and other agreed-
upon advisory functions.147 Once this interest has been indicated, “the Minister shall work 
with them to prepare terms of reference to guide the designation of an area in the Far 
North as a planning area and the preparation of a land use plan.”148 Once the terms of 
reference are approved by the Minister and the council of the First Nation community, the 
Minister may make an order designating the planning area, and the parties may then 
jointly develop a CBLUP.149 These land use plans may specify prescribed categories of 
land use, land uses that are permitted or not permitted, land designated as protected 
areas, and how the plan addresses significant cultural and ecological features, among 
other matters.150 In developing the plan, First Nations and the Minister of Natural 
Resources must take into account the objectives of the Act, and the Far North Land Use 
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Strategy.151 Plans must be approved by both the Minister as well as the council of each 
First Nation community involved, and the Minister must consider the objectives of the 
legislation and the Far North Land use Strategy in doing so.152 
 Under the Far North Act, if there is no CBLUP for an area in the Far North, 
particular activities are prohibited, including: opening a mine, engaging in commercial 
timber harvest or oil and gas exploration, constructing or expanding an electrical 
generation facility, and constructing or expanding all weather transportation 
infrastructure.153 This provision freezing development also prohibits First Nations from 
engaging in modern forms in economic development throughout their traditional territory, 
and this prohibition may only be lifted by engaging in the land use planning process.154 
Additionally, regardless of whether there is a CBLUP in place, it may be overruled by 
Cabinet approval if the development helps meet the objectives of the legislation, or is in 
the social and economic interests of Ontario, essentially giving Cabinet the final say over 
land use planning.155  
 
3.1.1.3 Criticisms of the Far North Act, 2010 
These types of provisions throughout the Act that give the Minister or Cabinet final 
decision-making power have been a source of strong opposition from First Nations 
communities as they are seen as statutorily undermining Indigenous jurisdiction over 
traditional territories, and a violation of  the principle of FPIC that is recognized 
internationally in documents like UNDRIP.156 Some argue that the Far North Act, and 
                                                 
151 Ibid, s 9(7); For the objectives of the Far North Act, 2010, see: Far North Act, ibid, s 5: “(5) The 
following are objectives for land use planning in the Far North: 1. A significant role for First nations in the 
planning; 2. The protection of areas of cultural value in the Far North and the protection of ecological 
systems in the Far North by including at least 225,000 square kilometres of the Fr North in an 
interconnected network of protected areas designated in community based land use plans; 3. The 
maintenance of biological diversity, ecological processes and ecological functions, including the storage 
and sequestration of carbon in the Far North; and, 4. Enabling sustainable economic development that 
benefits the First Nations.” 
152 Ibid, ss 9(14), 9(16). 
153 Ibid, s 12(1).  
154 Nishnawbe Aski Nation, “Ontario’s Far North Act” (2019), online: <www.nan.on.ca/article/ontarios-far-
north-act-463.asp> [Nishnawbe Aski Nation, “Ontario’s Far North Act”]. 
155 Far North Act, supra note 1, s 12(4).  
156 Stan Beardy, “Elephant in the Room: A First Nations perspective on the Far North Act,” Republic of 
Mining (3 December 2011), online: <republicofmining.com/2011/12/03/elephant-in-the-room-a-first-
nations-perspective-on-the-far-north-act-stan-beardy-thunder-bay-chronicle-journal-december-3-2011/>. 
 37 
amendments to Ontario’s Mining Act (outlined below) emerged, at least, in part, from the 
conflict that arose between the community of Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (“KI”) First 
Nation and the exploration company, Platinex, in 2006. This conflict raised questions 
about jurisdiction and consent over development on Indigenous territories, as KI First 
Nation “refused to allow the exploration company to carry out a drilling program 
authorized under Ontario’s Mining Act regime. KI First Nation challenged the authority of 
the province to send in an exploration company without community awareness and 
consent,” acting in accordance with their own laws.157 As a result, several injunctions and 
contempt of court charges culminated in the imprisonment of five elected leaders and one 
community member.158 A similar situation unfolded in early 2007 involving the Ardoch 
Algonquin First Nation and a uranium exploration company, Frontenac Ventures.159 Both 
of these communities “insisted they held the jurisdiction to decide what kinds of activities 
can be undertaken on their lands.”160 In the case of KI First Nation, the dispute arose “as 
a response to KI’s assertion of its Aboriginal and treaty rights through Kanawayandan 
D’aaki,” meaning “keeping my land” in Anishiniimowin (Oji-Cree), which is KI’s sacred and 
legal duty to protect the land.161 
 While several First Nations communities in the Far North have engaged with the 
Ontario government in crafting CBLUPs,162 many Indigenous communities have been 
opposed to the legal regime since its conception, labelling it a “new form of colonialism”.163 
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The legislation has been interpreted as “a central plank in Ontario’s attempt to remedy 
the uncertainties of jurisdiction that were exposed in the KI struggle.”164 The Nishnawbe 
Aski Nation released a statement in September 2010 following the passing of third 
reading of Bill 191 in the Ontario Legislature. Then Deputy Grand Chief Mike Metatawabin 
stated:  
The passing of Bill 191 today indeed shows how little regard the McGuinty 
Government gives to the concerns of First Nations and other Northern 
Ontarians when it comes to decision making […] As we have stated time and 
time again, NAN First Nations and Tribal Councils do not want and will not 
recognize this legislation on our homelands. We will continue to uphold our 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights and jurisdiction over our land.165 
 
In fact, the legislation was drafted and passed without the Nishnawbe Aski Nation’s input, 
as consultations were scheduled unilaterally and on short notice, and then cancelled by 
government representatives when Nishnawbe Aski Nation representatives were unable 
to attend.166 
The question of jurisdiction features strongly in First Nations opposition to the Far 
North Act. Once a final CBLUP is approved by the First Nation and the Minister, all 
decisions to authorize land use activities must be consistent with the land use 
designations set out in the approved plan.167 As Professor Dayna Scott points out, “it is 
the inherent jurisdiction over the lands and the authority to make decisions about 
contested land uses that is at stake.”168 In an article titled “Confusion and concern over 
land-use planning across northern Ontario” published in the Conversation, Professor 
Scott outlines the perspective of community members from Peawanuck, a Cree 
community in northern Ontario near the shores of Hudson Bay. Community elders 
highlight that the authority to make decisions about land use in their territory comes from 
the Creator, and is an authority they have always exercised.169 First Nations communities 
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“have complex and nuanced mechanisms for authorizing various activities on the land 
that rely on their own laws: Different family groups have authority over different party of 
the territory based on the locations of harvesting areas, traplines, hunting camps and 
cabins.”170 Through the community based land use planning process of the Far North Act, 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry would gain access to all of this knowledge 
about the land, and then bring the authority to make decisions about the land under the 
government’s jurisdiction. 
 The disagreements over jurisdiction that emerge through discourse about the Far 
North Act stem directly from the interpretation of treaties on the land. While the Cree and 
Ojibwe “feel that they agreed to share their territories” under Treaty 9, “Ontario feels that 
there was explicit surrender and, thus, the Crown has jurisdiction. This is the unsteady 
footing from which planning proceeds in the [Far North].”171 A review of northern planning 
strategies across all of Canada has led scholars to conclude that “Ontario represents the 
worst type of planning with Indigenous peoples – a seemingly complete disregard for the 
perspectives and opinions of the people who will be most directly affected by the land use 
plans.”172 As such, it can be concluded that the Far North Act provides an inadequate 
framework for the development of the Ring of Fire. 
 In February 2019, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry 
introduced a proposal to repeal the Far North Act. The goal of this proposal is to reduce 
“red tape and restrictions on important economic development projects in the Far North 
including the Ring of Fire, all-season roads and electrical transmission projects for 
communities.”173 The proposal outlines that planning would continue for communities in 
the advanced states of developing a CBLUP, including the communities of Marten Falls, 
Webequie, Eabametoong, Mishkeegogamang, Constance Lake, Deer Lake and 
McDowell Lake First Nations. The deadline for these CBLUPs to be completed is 
December 31, 2020.174 Any approved CBLUPs completed by this date would be retained 
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under the Public Lands Act,175 which would be the statute for any future land use planning 
in the Far North upon repeal of the Far North Act, and planning for communities that have 
not yet reached the advanced stages will be discontinued.176 While First Nation 
communities have expressed opposition to the legislation since its first enactment and 
support its repeal, others are concerned about the government’s stated rationale for 
repeal of the Act, and worry that protection over lands in the Far North may be lost if the 
Act is repealed.177 
 
3.1.2 THE MINING ACT 
 Ontario’s Mining Act is a second piece of legislation that fits into the bigger picture 
of development in the Far North. As the Crown claims ownership of almost all existing 
mineral rights in Canada, this legislation is central for proponents wishing to access these 
minerals.178 Miners are required to “stake,” or, “mark land for future mining activity, 
including exploration,” subsurface mineral rights in accordance with applicable statutes, 
such as Ontario’s Mining Act.179 Over the past decade, this statute has undergone 
significant amendment and modernization, much of which stemmed from the same 
conflict that underlined the provincial government’s interest in implementing the Far North 
Act, outlined above, including conflict arising on the traditional territories of Indigenous 
communities in northern Ontario.  
 
3.1.2.1 Ontario’s Free Entry Mining System 
Much of this underlying conflict emerged predominantly because, historically, 
Ontario operated under what is known as the “free entry” or “open entry” system. A free 
entry system “allows miners to enter Crown lands for the purposes of locating and staking 
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mineral claims. It is these activities that guarantee the transfer of rights to discovered 
minerals from the Crown to the miner.”180 Under this system, “the miner who first makes 
a claim to a particular area is the individual who is legally entitled to the minerals located 
in that area.”181 The Crown retains no discretion as to whether to not to grant or deny 
rights to obtain the minerals.182 Once a miner stakes a claim, the claim is recorded, giving 
the miner authority to engage in exploration activities on the land, as well as the right to 
exclude all others from staking a claim within the claim area.183 Should the miner comply 
with technical requirements, they are entitled to a mining lease, which vests rights to 
obtain minerals in the claim holder.184 
Central in this system, and one of the reasons why it generated such conflict, is 
the fact that miners “do not have to seek permission prior to engaging in mining-related 
activities on public lands.”185 Contrast this with other resource-based industries, such as 
forestry, where a proponent would need to obtain permission or a licence from the 
government in order to engage in related activities.186 Under the Mining Act, a miner need 
only obtain a prospector’s licence in order to stake a mining claim on any Crown land, or 
on non-Crown land where the Crown has reserved the mineral rights.187 Authors Pardy 
and Stoehr have described the “free entry” system as a form of “private expropriation.”188 
Under this system, the Crown was “unable to comply with its constitutional obligations 
pursuant to s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, most notably the duty to consult and 
accommodate.”189 As a result, amendments were made, beginning in 2009. 
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3.1.2.2 Amendments to the Mining Act 
 In 2009, Bill 173, An Act to Amend the Mining Act,190 was passed into law. 
According to the Ontario Ministry of Energy, Northern Development and Mines, the 
modernization of the legislation “promoted mineral exploration and development in a 
manner that recognizes Aboriginal and treaty rights, introduced processes that are more 
respectful of private landowners, and minimized the impact of mineral exploration and 
development on the environment.”191 This is reflected in the purpose of the Act, amended 
in 2009, which now states that “the purpose of this Act is to encourage prospecting, 
registration of mining claims and exploration for the development of mineral resources, in 
a manner consistent with the recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and treaty 
rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, including the duty to consult […].”192 
Under the new Mining Act regime, “prospectors can no longer acquire rights to engage in 
certain exploration activities by merely staking a claim and having it recorded.”193 Many 
of these new rules and standards were introduced through the regulation Exploration 
Plans and Exploration Permits,194 which aimed to address some of the perceived reasons 
that conflict had arose on Indigenous territories.  The new amendments stipulate that a 
proponent must submit an exploration plan to the Director of Exploration prior to engaging 
in prescribed exploration activities.195 If the proponent’s exploration activities go beyond 
those prescribed for exploration plans, the proponent must apply for and receive an 
exploration permit prior to engaging in the activities.196 
 The amendments introduced new procedural requirements for proponents 
engaging in activities that may impact Aboriginal communities.197 When an exploration 
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plan is submitted to the Director of Exploration, the Director must provide a copy of the 
plan to potentially affected Aboriginal communities.198 Aboriginal communities who 
receive notification of an exploration plan have three weeks199 to provide written 
comments to the Director “regarding any adverse effects the exploration plan activities 
proposed in the plan may have on their existing or asserted Aboriginal or treaty rights.”200 
If the Director receives any comments from an Aboriginal community regarding the 
exploration plan, the Director may require the proponent to consult with the community 
as directed.201 So long as the Director does not require the proponent to obtain an 
exploration permit, the proponent may commence the exploration plan activities 30 days 
after the plan has been circulated to any impacted Aboriginal communities.202 The 
process is very similar when the Director contemplates issuing an exploration permit. One 
difference is that the Director may direct the proponent to consult with affected Aboriginal 
communities and require that they subsequently file a report regarding any consultation 
process that was conducted.203 If the Director is “satisfied that appropriate Aboriginal 
consultation has been carried out,” the Director may issue the exploration permit, 
attaching terms and conditions.204 
 
3.1.2.3 Ongoing Challenges with the Mining Act 
 Despite the amendments made to the Mining Act, scholars still argue that the new 
legislation is unconstitutional, and that the effect of the amendments has been to 
“preserve flaws of the old regime and to create new difficulties” as the reforms perpetuate 
a “regime of political management in which discretion reigns, uncertainty persists and a 
politically-driven hierarchy of interests is pursued.”205 Some have pointed out that the 
amendments do not challenge the rights associated with the free entry system, as miners 
can still access Crown lands and may stake claims and obtain exclusive rights to 
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discovered minerals.206 Additionally, miners “may still undertake certain low-impact 
exploration activities after staking a claim without engaging in consultation,” and “the 
Crown still has no discretion to decline to record a mining claim or require consultation as 
long as the claim complies with certain minimal technical requirements.” 207  
Professor Karen Drake argues that “the [reformed] Mining Act is unconstitutional 
insofar as it allows proponents to adversely impact First Nations’ treaty rights to 
implement their laws throughout their territories without requiring any consultation before 
this adverse impact occurs.”208 She states that the staking and recording of a claim should 
be enough to trigger the duty to consult. Using Treaty 9 territory as an example, Drake 
outlines that the first part of the three-part test triggering the duty to consult – that the 
Crown must have real or constructive knowledge of the asserted right – will be met, as 
the Crown will always have notice of the content of the treaty, as per Mikisew Cree First 
Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage).209 Drake points out that the second 
requirement – that there must be some Crown conduct or decision at issue – will also be 
met by the mere act of staking a claim. Citing the case of Ross River Dena Council v 
Yukon,210 the lack of Crown discretion in recording mineral claims fulfills this stage of the 
test, as “the government cannot circumvent its constitutional duties by legislating away 
its discretion.”211 Lastly, Drake argues that even early exploratory actions will have a 
potential adverse impact on asserted treaty rights, as Treaty 9 First Nation signatories 
“assert that their treaty rights include the right to exercise governance and jurisdiction 
over their territories based on the oral promises of the treaty.”212 Low impact exploration 
activities have the potential to adversely affect treaty rights as the activities violate the 
laws of Treaty 9 signatories.213  
On the other hand, the Government of Ontario may continue to interpret Treaty 9 
in a way that limits treaty rights to the written text of the treaty, not taking into account oral 
promises that were made during the negotiation. Under this interpretation, Ontario argues 
                                                 
206 Panagos & Grant, supra note 178 at 418.  
207 Drake, supra note 182 at 195-195.  
208 Ibid at 213. 
209 Ibid at 204; 2005 SCC 69 at para 34, [2005] 3 SCR 388. 
210 2012 YKCA 14, 358 DLR (4th) 100. 
211 Drake, supra note 182 at 200. 
212 Ibid at 205. 
213 Ibid.  
 45 
that “low impact exploration activities have no adverse impact on treaty rights, because 
these activities are unlikely to have any significant effect on the continued existence of 
animals and fish.”214 As these activities do not impact hunting and fishing rights, the duty 
to consult would not be triggered at the third stage of the test.215 However, this approach 
contradicts treaty interpretation litigation from the SCC. In R v Badger, the SCC stated 
that: 
When considering a treaty, a court must take into account the context in which 
the treaties were negotiated, concluded, and committed to writing. The 
treaties, as written documents, recorded an agreement that had been reached 
orally and they did not always record the full extent of the oral agreement […] 
They must be interpreted in the sense they would naturally have been 
understood by the Indians at the time of the signing.216 
 
The Government of Ontario’s interpretation of the modernized Mining Act and the 
obligations the legislation imposes regarding Aboriginal and treaty rights appear to 
continue to avoid the root cause of conflict over mining issues in Ontario – jurisdiction 
over lands and resources.  
 
3.1.3 THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ACT 
 A foundational component of the legislative scheme impacting development in the 
Ring of Fire is EA legislation, both provincially and federally. As a key decision-making 
tool in project planning and development, EA involves the process of identifying, 
evaluating and managing environmental factors of proposed projects.217 The scope of the 
assessment, the factors to be considered in completing the assessment, and the types of 
projects for which an assessment is mandatory vary with the legislation, and is different 
at both the provincial and federal level. As this section of the report will outline, Ontario’s 
EA legislation, the Environmental Assessment Act, is particularly inept at dealing with the 
impacts arising from mining projects like the Ring of Fire.  
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3.1.3.1 History of the Environmental Assessment Act 
 Ontario was the first province in Canada to have a legislated EA process. This 
move towards a legislated EA regime began under the Progressive Conservative 
government of Premier Bill Davis with release of the Green Paper on Environmental 
Assessment in September 1973 by the Ontario Ministry of the Environment.218  This paper 
recognized an existing legislative gap, as individual pieces of legislation that were in force 
at the time were incapable of “ensuring that all environmental factors [were] considered 
in a comprehensive and co-ordinated fashion, including public input, before major projects 
and technological developments proceed.”219 The government hoped to transition from 
an abatement approach, which dealt largely with after-the-fact pollution from existing 
sources, towards an approach emphasizing the restorative and preventative aspects of 
environmental management, and a need to “identify and resolve potential environmental 
problems as they emerge and before actual environmental damage occurs.”220 Their 
proposal within the Green Paper focused on three key elements: 
1. Integrated Consideration: “a recognition that environmental concerns are 
interconnected, often causally, with concerns and decisions in the economic and 
social system.”221 An EA process would “ensure that potentially significant 
environmental effects are integrated with the other issues considered in review of 
major undertakings.”222 This element also recognized the importance of public 
participation in identifying potential impacts, their significance, advantages and 
disadvantages, and trade-offs.223 
 
2. At an Early Stage: a recognition that the consideration should take place at an 
early stage, as it “ensures that environmental factors are considered at a time 
when alternative courses of action, including any measures to mitigate adverse 
effects, and the alternative of not proceeding, are still available and before actual 
environmental damage occurs.”224 
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3. Of the Entire Complex of Environmental Effects which might be Generated 
by a Project: a recognition of the importance of “expand[ing] the range of effects 
evaluated beyond the direct impacts of the project on the air, land or water,” such 
as “any potential effects on ecological processes or relationships, including the 
relationship of man to the environment.”225 
 
The Green Paper also set out options that had been considered by the government as to 
what should be included in the content of an EA, who should conduct the EA, who should 
review the EA, who should make decisions on the EA, and how the public should be 
involved.226 Following a period for public comment on the Green Paper, the 
Environmental Assessment Act, 1975227 was adopted, and came into force on October 
20,1976.  
 The Environmental Assessment Act, 1975 required that proposed undertakings 
undergo a comprehensive evaluation, which required both alternatives to the undertaking 
and alternative methods of carrying it out to be addressed. This evaluation was to be done 
by the proponent, and then submitted to the Ministry of the Environment228 which would 
coordinate a review by provincial ministries and the public.229 Decisions on the 
acceptability of the document submitted by the proponent would be made by the Minister 
of the Environment230, or by the Environmental Assessment Board following a hearing.231 
 The Act broadly defined what constituted an “undertaking.” An “undertaking” 
included a physical enterprise or activity as well as a proposal, plan or program.232 
Undertakings included public sector undertakings, or, those proposed by the province, a 
public body, or a municipality, and those proposed by the private sector.233 Public sector 
undertakings were subject to the Act unless exempted, and private sector undertakings 
were not subject to the Act unless specifically designated by regulation.234 Very few 
private sector undertakings were ever included.235 This conception of an “undertaking” 
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and the delineation between public and private undertakings pervades the current version 
of the Act. The “environment” was also defined broadly to include social, cultural and 
economic elements, as well as biophysical elements, such as air, land, or water, and plant 
and animal life.236 This broad definition is also maintained in the current version of the 
Act.  
A key issue with the original Environmental Assessment Act, 1975 was that it “had 
no mechanism for determining which public undertakings subject to it would have 
potentially significant impacts, warranting more in-depth evaluation.”237 This meant that 
all public sector undertakings had to follow the comprehensive assessment approach, 
regardless of their impacts. As a result, the Minister issued hundreds of exemption orders 
for projects, “without following any criteria and without allowing for public input,” leading 
to harsh criticism of the government’s commitment to apply the Act broadly.238  
In order to remedy this issue, one approach that was adopted in the early years of 
the legislation’s existence to address projects with relatively insignificant impacts was the 
“Class EA.” This type of assessment was not provided for in the Act, but was used “for 
small scale, recurring projects with potential impacts that were minor but significant 
enough to require some evaluation, but short of a full EA.”239 
The Environmental Assessment Act, 1975, now the Environmental Assessment 
Act, has undergone several rounds of amendment. A major source of legislative reform 
happened following the election of the Progressive Conservative government in 1995 
under Premier Mike Harris. Harris was elected on the platform of the “Common Sense 
Revolution,” and promptly introduced Bill 76, Environmental Assessment and 
Consultation Improvement Act, 1996,240 in June 1996, which would overhaul and amend 
the existing EA legislation.241 The Bill was received Royal Assent in November 1996 and 
came into force in January 1997. 
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 Bill 76 introduced a new first step in the EA process: the preparation and approval 
of “Terms of Reference.”242 This requirement remains in place today. The Terms of 
Reference are prepared by the project proponent and given to the Minister of the 
Environment. They “set out in detail the requirements for the preparation of the 
environmental assessment.”243 This may involve one of three sets of requirements: “(a) 
those set out in the Act, (b) those set out in regulation for particular types of undertakings, 
or (c) those designed by the proponent.”244 The Minister is to “approve the terms of 
reference, with any amendments that he or she considers necessary, if he or she is 
satisfied that an EA prepared in accordance with the approved terms of reference will be 
consistent with the purpose of [the] Act and the public interest.”245  
Another important amendment made by Bill 76 was the introduction of 
harmonization provisions, which apply “if another jurisdiction imposes requirements with 
respect to an undertaking to which [the] Act applies” and “if the Minister considers the 
requirements imposed by the other jurisdiction to be equivalent to the requirements 
imposed under [the Environmental Assessment Act].”246 These harmonization provisions 
give the Minister the power to issue an order varying or dispensing with requirements 
imposed under the Act in order to “facilitate the effective operation of the requirements of 
both jurisdictions.” This includes issuing an order declaring that the Act does not apply to 
the undertaking.  
Several other amendments to Ontario’s EA regime introduced by Bill 76 include: 
• The introduction of a legal requirement to consult with the public, including during 
the development of the terms of reference, during the preparation of an individual 
or class EA document, and once the final EA document is submitted to the Minister 
of the Environment; 
 
• The codification of class EAs. The Minister of the Environment retains the authority 
to “bump up” an undertaking that would otherwise fall within a class assessment 
to require a full EA; 
 
• The introduction of time limits throughout the EA process; 
                                                 
242 Bill 76, supra note 240, cl 3, s 5(2). 
243 Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 61, s 6(2)(c). 
244 Valiante, supra note 217 at 224.  
245 Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 61, s 6(4). 
246 Bill 76, supra note 240, cl 2, s 3.1. 
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• Changes in the process for EA decision-making:  
o an EA document no longer needs to be explicitly accepted, although it may 
be rejected; 
o the only final approval decision to be made is on the approval of an 
undertaking; 
 
• The introduction of a formal mediation process to resolve issues at two stages: 
before approval of the terms of reference or following government review and prior 
to a final decision on the application; 
 
• The replacement of the use of exemption orders for undertakings otherwise subject 
to the Act with the power to “declare that this Act, the regulations or a matter 
provided for under the Act does not apply with respect to a proponent, a class of 
proponents, an undertaking or a class of undertakings.”247 
 
Ontario’s EA legislation has remained largely the same since the amendments made by 
Bill 76 in 1996. The following section of the report sets out in detail the process to be 
followed for individual EAs under Ontario’s current Environmental Assessment Act, and 
briefly outlines the general requirements under the streamlined class and screening 
assessment process. 
 
3.1.3.2 Individual EAs 
 Individual EAs, which constitute a very small minority of assessments under the 
Act, are “prepared for large-scale, complex projects with the potential for significant 
environmental effects.”248 These types of projects require approval from the either the 
Minister of the Environment or the Environmental Review Tribunal (“ERT”), where the 
matter has been referred to the ERT for a public hearing under the Act.249 Individual EAs, 
which are sometimes also referred to as comprehensive assessments in the literature, 
follow eight general steps, outlined below.250 A graphic depicting the comprehensive EA 
process has been included as Appendix 3.  
                                                 
247 Ibid, cl 2; See Valiante, supra note 217 for a full review of the amendments made by Bill 76. 
248 Government of Ontario, “Preparing Environmental Assessments” (2019), online: 
<www.ontario.ca/page/preparing-environmental-assessments> [Government of Ontario, “Preparing EAs”]. 
249 Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 61, s 5. 
250 These eight steps were taken from: Government of Ontario, “Preparing EAs,” supra note 248. 
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1. Develop and Submit a Terms of Reference: section 6 
• The proponent must submit a Notice of Commencement to the Director of the 
Environmental Assessment and Permissions Branch.  
• The proponent must give the Ministry of the Environment the proposed terms of 
reference governing the preparation of an EA for the undertaking. 
• The proponent is advised to consult with the public, Indigenous communities 
and government agencies while preparing the terms of reference. A consultation 
report must be included with submission of the proposed terms of reference. 
• The proponent must give public notice of the proposed terms of reference and 
allow members of the public to comment on the document, the deadline for 
which is to be included in the public notice. 
• The Minister of the Environment will consider any public comments received 
before the deadline, as well as the public interest, in deciding whether to 
approve the proposed terms of reference. 
 
2. Prepare an Environmental Assessment: s 6.1 
• The proponent must submit a Notice of Commencement to the Director, 
Environmental Assessment and Permissions Branch. 
• The EA must be prepared in accordance with the approved terms of reference. 
• There are no limits on how much time a proponent can take to prepare the EA 
document.  
 
3. Submit an Environmental Assessment: s 6.2 
• The EA document must be submitted to the Ministry of the Environment for 
review and decision.  
 
4. Public and Government Review: ss 6.3 and 6.4 
• The proponent must give public notice of the submission of the EA document. 
• The Ministry of the Environment coordinates public and government review of 
the document submitted. 
• The Ministry consults with: government experts, Indigenous communities, the 
public, and any other interested party. 
• The public has 7 weeks to comment. 
 
5. Ministry of the Environment Review: s 7 
• The Ministry of the Environment prepares a review of the EA, and takes into 
account any comments received from members of the public received within the 
deadline, as well as the proponent’s response to the comments. 
• The Minister of the Environment will assess whether the proponent is in 
compliance with the approved terms of reference and the purpose of the 
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Environmental Assessment Act, and may direct the proponent to address and 
deficiencies. 
• The Minister of the Environment may reject the EA if the deficiencies are not 
remedied within 7 days. 
 
6. Public Consultation on the Ministry Review: ss 7.1 and 7.2 
• The public, government agencies, Indigenous communities or any other 
interested party has 5 weeks to provide comments to the Ministry of the 
Environment on their review of the EA. 
• During this time, anyone may provide written comments identifying any 
outstanding issues with suggestions for how they might be resolved, or may 
request that the proponent’s application, or a portion of it, be referred to the ERT 
for a hearing and decision.  
 
7. Minister or Tribunal Decision: ss 9, 9, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 10, 11, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 
• Once the public consultation is finished, the Minister has 13 weeks to make a 
decision. 
• The Minister may: (a) refer the project to mediation; (b) refer the application to 
the ERT for a hearing, or; (c) make a decision to approve, approve with 
conditions, or refuse the project. 
 
8. Implement the Project and Monitor Compliance:  
• Following approval, the proponent must gather other approvals as needed 
before construction can begin. 
• The proponent must report on how they have complied with commitments in the 
EA and the conditions of the approval.  
 
Despite the intense flurry of mineral claim activity that has taken place in the Ring 
of Fire, very few individual EAs have been initiated under the Environmental Assessment 
Act. Noront initiated the EA process for their “Eagle’s Nest” project in April 2011, one of 
the focal mining projects within the region. While the project was required to undergo a 
comprehensive EA under CEAA, Noront voluntarily subjected the project to the 
requirements of an individual EA Ontario’s EA legislation. As part of this process, Noront 
provided a Project Description to both provincial and federal authorities in April 2011. 
Final federal guidelines for completing an Environmental Impact Statement under the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act were issued to Noront in January 2012, and 
Terms of Reference to satisfy the provincial EA requirements were submitted to Ontario 
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in October 2012.251 Noront undertook baseline environmental studies to examine the 
mine site and access road corridor, and on December 20, 2013, Noront issued a Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Assessment Report for the “Eagle’s 
Nest” project. This document was intended to satisfy both provincial and federal 
environmental assessment processes.252 The most recent action taken with regards to 
this EA was the approval of the provincial Terms of Reference by Ontario’s Ministry of 
Environment in June 2015. This approval set out outstanding issues and concerns raised 
during the review by government agencies, Aboriginal communities, and others, and 
detailed the requirements for the preparation of Noront’s environmental assessment.253 
No licences, authorizations or approvals have been granted for the project, and the EA 
has since been suspended. 
Most recently, Ontario has struck voluntary agreements with Marten Falls First 
Nation and Webequie First Nation who will be the proponents for the EAs of two road 
projects in the Ring of Fire region.  
 
3.1.3.3 Streamlined Class and Screening EAs 
 Streamlined EAs constitute the overwhelming majority of assessments completed, 
and are frequently used “for routine projects that have predictable and manageable 
environmental effects.”254 These assessments differ from individual EAs as proponents 
follow a self-assessment and decision-making process, rather than approval being 
granted to each individual project.255 The stream-lined self-assessment process includes 
class EAs,256 as well as three categories of screening assessments provided for by 
regulation for electricity projects,257 waste management projects,258 and transit 
projects.259  
                                                 
251 Noront, “Eagle’s Nest Ni-Cu-PGE Mine: Environmental Assessment” (2018), online: 
<norontresources.com/projects/eagles-nest-mine/reserves-resources/>. 
252 Knight Piésold Consulting, supra note 63 at ES-5.  
253 Government of Ontario, “Noront Eagle’s Nest Multi-metal Mine”, supra note 61. 
254 Government of Ontario, “Preparing EAs,” supra note 248. 
255 Ibid.  
256 Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 61, Part II.1. 
257 Electricity Projects, O Reg 116/01. 
258 Waste Management Projects, O Reg 101/07. 
259 Transit Projects and Metrolinx Undertakings, O Reg 231/08.  
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 Of most relevance to the Ring of Fire are class EAs, under Part II.1 of the 
Environmental Assessment Act. Ontario currently has 11 class EAs, which cover things 
including: “municipal road, sewage and water infrastructure, highway construction and 
maintenance, conservation authority works, transit projects, and other public sector 
activities such as forestry, resource management, and transmission lines.”260 Under these 
classes, EAs are effectively “pre-approved,” meaning that “proponents may proceed 
directly with the project (without review or approval by the Minister or ERT), provided that 
the proponent has fully complied with the prescribed class EA requirements, and has 
otherwise obtained all other necessary instruments required by law.”261 A proponent must 
follow the planning, documentary and consultation requirements prescribed by the 
approved class EA, which are generally less extensive than what would be required by 
an individual EA.262  
 Should a class EA have significant outstanding environmental concerns that are 
not resolved through the prescribed class assessment process, anyone may request that 
the Minister of the Environment issue a Part II Order to require a project proponent to 
prepare an individual EA for the project.263 A bump-up request may be submitted after the 
proponent has issued a public notice of completion for the assessment. Members of the 
public may review the EA report, and request that the Minister bump up a streamlined 
project to a comprehensive assessment within 30 days. A graphic depicting the 
streamlined EA process, including the bump-up request process, has been included as 
Appendix 4. 
 
3.1.3.4 Ongoing Challenges with the Environmental Assessment Act 
 Critics of Ontario’s EA regime have long pointed to the fact that the legislation has 
never lived up to its full promise. When first introduced in 1976, the Act had a very broad 
mandate, but the government hastily limited the application of the legislation by regularly 
exempting projects and streamlining approvals through the introduction of less-than-
                                                 
260 Government of Ontario, “Preparing EAs,” supra note 248.  
261 Richard D Lindgren & Burgandy Dunn, “Environmental Assessment in Ontario: Rhetoric vs Reality” 
(2010) 21 J Envtl L & Prac 279 at 284. 
262 Ibid at 284.  
263 Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 61, s 16.  
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rigorous assessment processes.264 Ontario’s EA processes have repeatedly garnered the 
attention of public interest organizations, as well as provincial watchdogs. Both the 
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario and the Auditor General of Ontario have 
criticized the regime in their annual reports.  
In the 2007/2008 Annual Report from the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 
then Commissioner Gord Miller wrote that “Ontario has long been burdened with an 
environmental assessment system where the hard questions are not being asked, and 
the most important decisions aren’t being made […] The province has increasingly 
stepped away from some key environmental assessment decision-making responsibilities 
[…].”265 Miller urgently called for a new vision for EA, stating that “the Environmental 
Assessment Act has, over time, suffered so many truncations and add-ons that it no 
longer bears much resemblance to its original, idealistic self.”266 Specific points of critique 
in the Miller’s report include the fact that “no” is rarely an option under the Act, as projects 
are almost never rejected, the lack of integration between EA and the land use planning 
process, and that the need for projects and undertakings is not often subject to scrutiny.267 
More recently, the 2016 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of 
Ontario found that “Ontario’s environmental assessment process needs to be modernized 
and aligned with best practices in Canada and internationally. Because the Act is 40 years 
old – and is, in fact, the oldest environmental assessment legislation in Canada – it falls 
short of achieving its intended purpose.”268 Points of critique raised by the Auditor General 
included: 
• Ontario is the only Canadian jurisdiction in which EAs are generally not required 
for private-sector projects; 
 
• EAs are not completed for many significant government plans and programs; 
 
                                                 
264 Gord Miller, “Getting to K(no)w: Annual Report, 2007-2008” (2008) at 30, online (pdf): Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario <docs.assets.eco.on.ca/reports/environmental-protection/2007-2008/2007-08-
AR.pdf>. 
265 Ibid at 28. 
266 Ibid at 37. 
267 Ibid at 38. 
268 Bonnie Lysyk, “3.06: Environmental Assessments” in 2016 Annual Report Volume 1, Chapter 3: 
Reports on Value-for-Money Audits (2016) at 338, online (pdf): Office of the Auditor General of Ontario 
<www.auditor.on.ca/en/content/annualreports/arreports/en16/v1_306en16.pdf>. 
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• The public is not informed about most projects; 
 
• The type of assessment required for a particular project is often not based on the 
project’s potential environmental impact; 
 
• The cumulative effects of multiple projects are usually not assessed; and 
 
• The Ministry does not have effective processes to ensure that projects are 
implemented as planned.269 
 
One of the most glaring holes in the Environmental Assessment Act, which has 
vast implications for the Ring of Fire, is that the Act does not apply to mining projects. 
Despite the fact that Ontario is the largest mineral producer in Canada,270 Ontario is the 
only jurisdiction in Canada that does not apply its EA regime to mining projects.271 This is 
because “the Environmental Assessment Act does not apply to private companies unless 
designated by regulation or the company volunteers to be subject to the requirements of 
the Act.”272 Under the Act, an EA may be required for individual components of a mine 
site, such as the construction of a road leading to the mine, the mine’s electricity 
generation facility, granting permits on Crown land, and the disposition of Crown 
resources, all of which are assessed in isolation, and generally through the class EA 
process.273 A recent report from MiningWatch Canada compiled a list of 91 mining 
operations and projects in Ontario detailing whether the projects have undergone either 
federal or provincial EAs.274 Of the 91 projects, only 8 have undergone a provincial EA, 
all of which were voluntary. Noront’s “Eagle’s Nest” project in the Ring of Fire was one of 
the 8 projects listed, the EA for which has been suspended for several years. Each of 
                                                 
269 Ibid at 338-340. 
270 Ibid at 350.  
271 See MiningWatch Canada, “The Big Hole: Environmental Assessment and Mining in Ontario” (2014), 
online (pdf): MiningWatch Canada <miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/the_big_hole_report.pdf>: While not 
all other jurisdictions always undertake rigorous and thoughtful analyses and consultation processes for 
mines, they at least provide a starting point for this to happen.  
272 Ministry of Energy, Northern Development and Mines, “Ring of Fire Secretariat: Environmental 
Assessment” (2018), online: Government of Ontario <www.mndm.gov.on.ca/en/ring-fire-
secretariat/environmental-assessment>; See Lysyk, supra note 268 at 347: The only private-sector 
projects that must be assessed are: electricity, waste management, and large municipal infrastructure 
projects by private developers.  
273 Ministry of Energy, Northern Development and Mines, ibid. 
274 MiningWatch Canada, supra note 271 at 18-27.    
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these 8 assessments were also required to undertake a federal assessment. Of the 
remaining projects, neither federal nor provincial EA were conducted.275 The impacts of 
mining are serious and well-known, and the Environmental Assessment Act provides an 
inadequate legislative regime for assessing and preventing these impacts. 
An additional drawback of the Environmental Assessment Act is that it does not 
provide a strong basis for a regional-scale assessment. The Act defines an undertaking 
as including “an enterprise or activity or a proposal, plan or program in respect of an 
enterprise or activity by or on behalf of Her Majesty in right of Ontario, by a public body 
or public bodies or by a municipality or municipalities.”276 Arguably, the provincial 
government could classify development of the Ring of Fire as a “proposal, plan or 
program,” thus subjecting the entire region to an assessment under the Act. However, 
this designation would require strong political will.  
Further, the Environmental Assessment Act does not require assessment of the 
cumulative impacts that numerous developments within the Ring of Fire may have. 
Cumulative effects are “changes to the environment that are caused by an action in 
combination with other past, present, and future human actions.”277 The phrase 
“cumulative effects” is not explicitly mentioned within the Act, although consideration of 
cumulative effects should be required under any EA law that mandates assessment of 
biophysical and socioeconomic effects. Chetkiewicz and Lintner point to the importance 
of the implications of climate change in Ontario’s Far North, arguing that the potential for 
environmental changes in the subarctic climate is a compelling reason for consideration 
of cumulative effects in any EA of the Ring of Fire region.278 Climate change will impact 
the planning and design of infrastructure for transportation and energy, and historical and 
baseline data used in the planning or mines and infrastructure may no longer be valid.279 
A cumulative effects assessment would also help to address issues of habitat 
fragmentation which often results from piece-meal, individual project assessments. 
                                                 
275 Ibid. 
276 Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 61, s 1(1). 
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278 Ibid at 58. 
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Habitat fragmentation impacts wide-ranging species at risk that are present in the Far 
North, including caribou, through construction of roads, transmission lines, and dams.280 
 
Some of these challenges existent in Ontario’s EA regime may be supported 
through the possibility of a harmonized, coordinated, or joint EA process alongside the 
federal EA regime. Canada and Ontario have entered into an “Agreement on 
Environmental Assessment Cooperation” which provides for inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation and coordination in environmental assessment.281 As evident through the 
“Eagle’s Nest” EA, as well as the newly initiated road EA’s for which Marten Falls and 
Webequie First Nations are proponents, projects within the Ring of Fire may be subject 
to both federal and provincial EA requirements, or a proponent may voluntarily agree to 
have their project assessed under the EA requirements of a jurisdiction where they are 
not statutorily required to do so. Provincially, the Environmental Assessment Act contains 
provisions for harmonization of the EA process, which allow the Minister to vary or 
dispense with the requirements of the Act where another jurisdiction (i.e. Canada) 
imposes EA requirements with respect to an undertaking.282 Federally, where a project is 
subject to both provincial and federal requirements, the responsible authority of a 
designated project is obligated to consult and cooperate with particular jurisdictions where 
that other jurisdiction has powers, duties or functions in relation to an EA of the designated 
project.283 Additionally, a federal joint review panel, conducted in cooperation with the 
province, allows for a more thorough consideration of the impacts of a project under both 
jurisdictions’ EA legislation.284 Federal EA legislation, including opportunities for 
collaboration under the proposed Bill C-69, will be explored more fully in the subsequent 
section of this report. 
  
                                                 
280 Ibid at 14. 
281 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Canada-Ontario Agreement on Environmental 
Assessment Cooperation” (2004), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/environmental-
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3.2 CANADA’S LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
3.2.1 THE CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ACT, 2012 
 As outlined in the preceding section of this report, Ontario’s Environmental 
Assessment Act is fraught with gaps in relation to assessing the impacts of mining 
projects within the province, namely, that the legislation does not apply to private-sector 
projects, nor allow for a regional or cumulative effects assessment. Fortunately, as 
jurisdiction over the environment falls to both the provincial and federal government in 
Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK),285 projects that do not require an EA under 
provincial legislation may fall within the federal government’s authority if the project 
impacts areas of federal jurisdiction.  
Federal EA legislation has been the subject of much legislative amendment since 
2012. Presently, the CEAA, 2012 governs the federal EA process, although the future of 
this legislation remains uncertain. Bill C-69, introduced by Justin Trudeau’s Liberal 
government in February 2018, would replace CEAA, 2012 by enacting the Impact 
Assessment Act, should it receive royal assent. Bill C-69 is currently before the Standing 
Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources. The following 
subsections of this report will outline the current EA process in place under CEAA, 2012 
and critique its application in relation to mining projects, briefly identify recent debates 
and political developments in the field which led to the introduction of Bill C-69, and 
unpack potential changes in Bill C-69 which may impact EA in the Ring of Fire.  
 
3.2.1.1 The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 
 Canada’s current federal EA regime was first introduced by the Conservative 
government under then Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s “Responsible Resource 
Development Plan” outlined in Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the 
budget tabled in Parliament on March 29, 2012 and other measures.286 Bill C-38 entered 
Canada’s policy sphere in the economic climate following the global recession of 2008. 
                                                 
285 Ss 91, 92, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5. 
286 Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 29, 2012 
and other measures, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011-2012 (assented to 29 June 2012, SC 2012, c 19) [Bill C-
38]. 
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Following this recession, the Conservative government identified the pursuit of economic 
growth and job creation as the single most important priority for the government and 
emphasized the importance of Canada having “the right conditions to attract global 
capital” to the country so that Canada could “compete with other resource-rich countries 
around the world for these job-creating investment dollars.”287 The primary goal of the 
Responsible Resource Development Plan was to streamline the EA process by 
implementing a “one project, one review” process, eliminating regulatory burdens, and 
making the assessment process more timely and predictable for proponents.288 While the 
Conservative government claimed that CEAA, 2012 would strengthen environmental 
protections and promote development of Canada’s resources, making the country more 
attractive for foreign investment, the reality is that much of Canada’s lands and waterways 
were suddenly left vulnerable to harm due to a lack of requisite EA for many proposed 
projects.  
 
3.2.1.2 Projects Subject to an EA under CEAA, 2012 
 Perhaps the most significant amendment enacted through Bill C-38 were the 
changes to which projects were subject to the Act, thus requiring a federal EA. Under the 
original CEAA, which was repealed by Bill C-38, a “trigger approach” was used, based on 
a federal authority’s involvement in a project.289 Projects required an EA if a federal 
authority exercised one of several enumerated powers under s.5(1) of the Act, including 
where a federal authority “issues a permit or licence, grants an approval or takes any 
other action for the purpose of enabling the project to be carried out in whole or in part” 
under any Act of Parliament.290 This provision caught all projects requiring federal permits 
or approvals such as: a permit for the harmful alteration of fish habitat under s.35(1) of 
the Fisheries Act,291 a permit for the deposit of a deleterious substance in water 
frequented by fish under s.36(3) of the Fisheries Act, and an approval for construction 
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that would be “built or placed in, on, over, under, through or across any navigable water” 
under s.5(1) of the former Navigable Waters Protection Act.292 The former CEAA  strictly 
limited projects excluded from assessment to those enumerated on an exclusion list 
under the Exclusion List Regulations,293 and select other instances identified in s.7 of the 
Act.294  
In contrast, CEAA, 2012 implemented a “project list” approach, where an EA is 
only contemplated for projects included on the list of “designated projects”. “Designated 
projects” are those that “have the greatest potential for significant adverse environmental 
effects in areas of federal jurisdiction.”295 The discretion to designate projects has been 
given to the Minister of the Environment.296 Designated projects that have been listed by 
the Minister are found in the Regulation Designating Physical Activities297. Select mining 
activities have been included on the Project List, although the requirement for an 
assessment is dictated by a threshold daily production capacity of the mine.298 The 
Minister also retains the discretion to designate a physical activity that is not prescribed 
by regulations if “in the Minister’s opinion, either the carrying out of that physical activity 
may cause adverse environmental effects or public concerns related to those effects 
warrant the designation.”299  
Despite the fact that a project is “designated” in the regulations, an EA is not 
necessarily required. Under sections 8 to 10 of CEAA, 2012, the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency (the “Agency”) must decide if an EA of the designated project is 
required. This screening decision is made based on a number of factors, including: a 
review of the project description provided by the proponent, the possibility that carrying 
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out the project may cause adverse environmental effects, comments received from the 
public within 20 days of posting the project description online, and any relevant studies 
conducted by a committee established by the Act.300 This discretion is broad, and the Act 
“offers no clear direction on how this discretion is to be exercised.”301 The Agency has 45 
days to make this screening decision for assessments completed both by the Agency as 
well as by a review panel.302 However, EAs for designated projects under the authority of 
the National Energy Board (“NEB”) and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
(“CNSC”) are mandatory.303  
 
3.2.1.3 Structure of the EA Process under CEAA, 2012 
There are two types of EA under CEAA, 2012: an EA by a responsible authority, 
and an EA by a review panel. A graphic depicting the process for each type of EA has 
been attached to this report as Appendix 5. Both types of assessments may be 
conducted by the federal government alone, or in cooperation with another jurisdiction 
such as a province,304 and both processes begin when a notice of the commencement of 
the EA process is posted on the Agency Registry internet site.305  
An EA conducted by a responsible authority is conducted by either the Agency, 
the NEB, or the CNSC, all three of whom are designated as responsible authorities under 
the Act.306 A responsible authority “ensures that an environmental assessment of a 
designated project is conducted in accordance with CEAA, 2012, including ensuring the 
public is provided with an opportunity to participate in the environmental assessment.”307 
This type of EA must be completed within 365 days from when the notice of 
commencement is posted on the Registry, subject to Ministerial extension of up to three 
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months.308 The time spent by the proponent to fulfill its obligations in the process does 
not count towards the 365 days. Assessments conducted by the NEB and CNSC look 
much different than those completed by the Agency.309 This report will focus on the EA 
process completed by the Agency, as this process has the most relevance to the Ring of 
Fire.  
An EA conducted by a review panel is conducted by a panel of independent 
experts appointed by the Minister of the Environment, or in cooperation with another 
jurisdiction in the case of a Joint Review Panel (“JRP”).310 A JRP may be established 
where “a proposed project requires an environmental assessment by both the federal 
government and a province or another jurisdiction.”311 The goal of the JRP process is to 
avoid duplication. An EA by a review panel or JRP must be completed within 24 months 
from when the proposed project is referred to a review panel, subject to Ministerial or 
Cabinet extension of up to three months.312 Again, the time spend by the proponent to 
provide information requested by the panel does not count towards the time limit.313  
An EA may be referred to a review panel by the Minister within 60 days of the 
notice of commencement of the assessment.314 This decision is made based on several 
factors, including: “whether the designated project may cause significant adverse 
environmental effects; public concerns related to the significant adverse environmental 
effects that the designated project may cause; and opportunities for cooperation” with 
another jurisdiction.315 Designated projects for which the NEB or the CNSC are the 
responsibly authority may not be referred to a review panel.316 
The job of the review panel is to “assess whether the environmental impact 
statement prepared by the proponent is sufficient to proceed to public hearings.”317 Once 
                                                 
308 CEAA, 2012, supra note 134, s 27(2).  
309 For example, the NEB holds its own hearing process to meet the requirements of CEAA, 2012. A 
description of the hearing process can be found at: <www.neb-one.gc.ca/prtcptn/hrng/hndbk/index-
eng.html>.  
310 CEAA, 2012, supra note 134, s 42.  
311 Government of Canada, “Basics of EA,” supra note 303. 
312 CEAA, 2012, supra note 134, s 38(3).  
313 Ibid, s 48.  
314 Ibid, s 38(1).  
315 Ibid, s 38(2).  
316 Ibid, s 38(6).  
317 Government of Canada, “Basics of EA,” supra note 303. 
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the hearing begins, interested parties are allowed to “present evidence, concerns, and 
comments regarding the potential environmental impacts of the designated project.”318 A 
review panel has the authority to summon witnesses, and to order witnesses to present 
information or produce records related to the EA.319 Again, an EA by a review panel for 
projects where the responsible authority is the NEB or CNSC is conducted differently than 
those under the authority of the Agency, and so the focus of this report will solely be on 
EAs conducted by a review panel where the Agency is the responsible authority.  
CEAA, 2012 mandates the consideration of a specific list of factors when 
completing any type of EA for a designated project, which are enumerated in s.19(1) of 
the Act. These factors include: the environmental effects of the designated project and 
the significance of those effects, defined only in relation to effects on matters of federal 
justification320, comments from the public, mitigation measures that are technically and 
economically feasible, the purpose of the designated project, and alternative means of 
carrying it out that are technically and economically feasible.321  
 
The EA process for a review completed by the Agency and review by a Review 
Panel where the responsible authority is the Agency follows similar key stages, although 
there are unique requirements for each EA. The following table provides a side-by-side 
comparison of each type of EA, identifying where the stages of each overlap, and where 
they diverge.322 
Key Stage 
Environmental Assessment by the 
Agency (365 days) 
Environmental Assessment by a 
Review Panel or JRP (24 months) 
Project description 
submitted to the 
Agency and accepted 
If a physical activity is described in the Regulations Designating Physical 
Activities and the Agency is the Responsible Authority, the proponent must 
provide the Agency with a description of the designated project. 
Screening decision by 
the Agency on the 
requirement for an EA 
The Agency must decide within 45 days whether an EA is required for the 
project. If an EA is required, the Agency will post a notice of commencement on 
the Registry internet site.  
                                                 
318 Ibid. 
319 CEAA, 2012, supra note 134, s 45(1) 
320 See ibid, s 5(1) for a list of environmental effects that are to be taken into account. These include: 
impacts on components of the environment that were within the legislative authority of Parliament (fish 
and fish habitat, aquatic species, migratory birds), impacts to federal lands, projects with effects that 
would occur outside of Canada, and impacts to Aboriginal peoples.  
321 Ibid, s 19(1).  
322 These key stages are taken from: Government of Canada, “Basics of EA,” supra note 303. 
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Development of 
Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) 
Guidelines 
If an EA is required, the Agency will prepare and post a draft of the EIS 
Guidelines on the Registry internet site for public comment on the proposed 
studies, methods and information required in the EIS. The Agency will consider 
the public comments, and then issue final EIS Guidelines to the proponent.  
Decision whether to 
refer the EA to a 
review panel 
Within 60 days of the commencement of an EA, the Minister may decide to refer 
the EA to a review panel.  
Participant funding 
application period 
Eligible individuals, incorporated not-for-profit organizations and Aboriginal 
groups may apply to the Participant Funding Program323 for financial support to 
participate in the federal EA process.  
Comment period on 
draft review panel 
Terms of Reference 
(“TOR”) and JRP 
Agreement 
Not Applicable for EAs conducted by 
the Agency.  
For a review panel, the Agency will 
prepare draft TOR324 for the review 
panel and conduct a public comment 
period. 
 
For a JRP, the Agency will work with 
the other jurisdiction to draft a JRP 
Agreement, including TOR, and 
conduct a public comment period. 
 
After considering public comments, the 
Minister (along with the other 
jurisdiction for a JRP) will issue final 
TOR and post them on the Registry 
internet site. 
Proponent completes 
environmental studies 
and submits EIS to 
the Agency 
The proponent is required to prepare 
an EIS that identifies and assesses 
the environmental effects of the 
project and the measures proposed to 
mitigate those effects. This is 
prepared in accordance with the EIS 
Guidelines issued by the Agency, and 
is submitted to the Agency for review.  
The proponent prepares its EIS 
according to the EIS guidelines 
provided by the Agency and submits it 
to the Agency (and in the case of a 
JRP, to the other jurisdiction) for 
review. 
Determination on 
Completeness of the 
EIS: 
The Agency will review the EIS for 
completeness to verify that it 
contains all the information required 
by the EIS Guidelines.  
 
The Agency will review the EIS for 
completeness to verify that it contains 
all the information required by the EIS 
Guidelines.  
 
                                                 
323 Information and the application package for the Participant Funding Program may be found at: 
<www.canada.ca/en/environmental-assessment-agency/services/public-participation/participant-funding-
application-environmental-assessment.html>.  
324 Terms of Reference establish the mandate and authorities of the review panel, as well as the 
procedures and timelines for the review panel.  
 66 
The Agency may require the 
proponent to provide additional 
information prior to starting the 
sufficiency review. 
The draft EIS is posted on the Registry 
internet site in the language in which it 
was produced. The Agency will solicit 
comments from the public on the draft 
EIS. The Agency may request 
additional information from the 
proponent based on the comments 
received. 
 
The Agency will then determine 
whether the EIS contains enough 
information to allow the review panel, 
once appointed, to begin its sufficiency 
review.  
Review Panel 
Appointed 
Not Applicable for EAs conducted by 
the Agency. 
Before the end of the completeness 
review of the draft EIS, the Minister 
(along with the other jurisdiction in the 
case of a JRP) will appoint the review 
panel. They may be appointed from a 
roster of candidates established and 
maintained by the Agency. The Agency 
will identify and assess candidates for 
relevant knowledge, expertise and 
determine if any bias exists. Once 
membership is finalized by the Minister, 
appointments are made public on the 
Registry internet site. 
Determination on 
Sufficiency of the EIS, 
including a Public 
Comment Period: 
The Agency will review the draft EIS 
for sufficiency and accuracy. The 
Agency may require the proponent to 
provide clarification or additional 
information to understand the 
potential environmental effects and 
the proposed mitigation measures.  
The proponent revises the draft EIS 
based on direction from the government 
following the completeness review.  
 
The final EIS is submitted to the review 
panel for a sufficiency review: the 
review panel will review the EIS to 
determine if the information provided is 
sufficient to proceed to public hearings. 
If it is not sufficient, it may require 
additional information from the 
proponent. 
 
The review panel will also hold a public 
comment period on the proponent’s EIS 
to assist in determining the sufficiency 
of the EIS. 
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Agency Process: 
Comment Period on 
the EIS  
 
Review Panel 
Process: Public 
Hearings Held 
A summary of the EIS and the EIS 
Report is posted on the Registry 
internet site in the language in which it 
was produced. The public can 
comment on the potential 
environmental effects of the project 
and the proposed measures to 
prevent or mitigate those effects 
 
The proponent revises the EIS based 
on public comment, and submits the 
revised EIS to the Agency for 
subsequent sufficiency review. 
Once the review panel determines that 
it has sufficient information, it will 
provide notice prior to the start of public 
hearings. 
 
The review panel has a duty to hold 
public hearings in a manner that offers 
any interested parties an opportunity to 
participate. 
 
The hearing process will allow the 
review panel to obtain the information 
required to complete its assessment of 
the potential environmental effects of 
the proposed project.  
Agency prepares draft 
EA report 
The Agency drafts the EA report that 
includes the Agency’s conclusions 
regarding the potential environmental 
effects of the project, the mitigation 
measures that were taken into 
account and the significance of 
remaining adverse environmental 
effects and follow-up program 
requirements. 
Not Applicable for EAs conducted by a 
Review Panel. 
Comment period on 
draft EA report 
The public may comment on the draft 
EA report. 
Not Applicable for EAs conducted by a 
Review Panel. 
EA report submitted The Agency finalizes the EA report 
and submits it to the Minister of the 
Environment to inform his or her EA 
decision.  
The review panel prepares its report 
containing conclusions, rationale and 
recommendations, and submits the 
report to the Minister of the 
Environment.  
 
The report will contain a summary of 
the comments received from the public, 
recommended mitigation measures and 
follow-up program requirements. A JRP 
Report will also contain 
recommendations to the other 
jurisdiction. 
 
The Minister will use the review panel’s 
report to determine whether adverse 
environmental effects are likely to be 
significant.  
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Determination of 
whether significant 
adverse 
environmental effects 
are justified 
If the Minister’s decision is that the project is likely to cause significant adverse 
environmental effects, the matter is referred to the Governor in Council (Cabinet) 
who will then decide if the likely significant adverse environmental effects are 
justified in the circumstances.  
Minister issues the EA 
decision statement 
with enforceable 
conditions 
The EA decision statement includes the determination of whether the project is 
likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects. Conditions with respect 
to mitigation measures and a follow-up program that the proponent must comply 
with for the proposed project to be carried out are set out in the decision 
statement by the Minister. 
 
** For JRPs, the other jurisdiction will follow its own decision-making process 
upon receiving the review panel report. Each jurisdiction retains its independent 
decision-making responsibility. **  
Regulatory decision 
making 
If required, decisions on regulatory permits and approvals from federal 
departments and agencies that would permit the project to proceed can only be 
made after EA is complete. 
Implement mitigation 
measures and follow-
up program 
Mitigation measures identified in the EA decision statement are incorporated in 
the EA decision statement and incorporated into the design plans and 
implemented with the project. A follow-up program is also implemented to verify 
that the EA was accurate and the mitigation measures were effective. 
 
3.2.1.4 Collaboration with Other Jurisdictions under CEAA, 2012 
 CEAA, 2012 allows for collaboration with other jurisdictions throughout the EA 
process in limited ways. One option for collaboration is through the statutory requirement 
for consultation and cooperation with other jurisdictions. S.18 of the Act stipulates that 
“the responsibility authority with respect to a designated project – or the Minister if the 
environmental assessment of the designated project has been referred to a review panel 
under section 38 – must offer to consult and cooperate with respect to the environmental 
assessment of the designated project.”325 This requirement is limited to certain 
jurisdictions, including provincial governments, bodies established under a land claims 
agreement referred to in s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, governing bodies established 
under legislation that relate to the self-government of Indians, and foreign states.326   
 CEAA, 2012 also allows for substitution of the EA process “if the Minister is of the 
opinion that a process for assessing the environmental effects of designated projects that 
                                                 
325 CEAA, 2012, supra note 134, s 18.  
326 Ibid, s 2(1).  
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is followed by the government of a province […] would be an appropriate substitute.”327 
However, this substitution is precluded where the EA proceeds by way of a review panel, 
or where the responsible authority is the NEB or the CNSC.328 As evident in the text of 
s.32(1), this option for substitution is only open to provinces, effectively enabling a 
province to take over the EA of a project that would otherwise require assessment 
federally. As will be evident in the subsequent discussion of Bill C-69, the range of 
possibilities for collaboration and completion of the EA process is one aspect of the EA 
process that has been subject to discussion and amendment, and a broader range of 
actors may have authority to conduct aspects of an EA should the new Bill receive Royal 
Assent.  
 
3.2.2 FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT REFORM 
 
3.2.2.1 Political Developments resulting in EA Reform 
The past two years has brought yet another flurry of debate about the trajectory of 
federal EA within Canada. The reforms implemented through Bill C-38 under former 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper sparked fierce public outcry and concern over the state 
of environmental governance in Canada, and major project approvals such as the 
Northern Gateway Pipeline, the Site C Dam, and the Muskrat Falls Hydroelectric Project 
became hotly contested political issues, as the public perceived the EA process to have 
lost legitimacy. These issues brought on by Harper fed directly into the 2015 federal 
election, as Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Government ran on an election platform of 
delivering “Real Change” to Canadians – change that would reduce these political 
conflicts by making EAs “credible again.”329  
Following the Liberal Government’s majority election in October, 2015, Minister of 
Environment and Climate Change Catherine McKenna was assigned the mandate of 
bringing this “real change” to Canada’s EA laws with the goal of regaining public trust, 
getting resources to market, and restoring “robust oversight and thorough EAs of areas 
                                                 
327 Ibid, s 32(1). 
328 Ibid, s 33.  
329 Liberal Party of Canada, “Real Change: A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class” (2015) at 42, online 
(pdf): <www.liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/A-new-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf>. 
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under federal jurisdiction.”330 In addition, the Government immediately introduced five 
principles to guide its decision-making on major natural resource projects, which included 
the Trans Mountain Pipeline and Energy East Pipeline projects at that time.331 The interim 
principles were intended to ease the controversy over these major projects and govern 
project EA while the Government undertook the necessary work to reform the legislative 
scheme.332  
Minister McKenna established a four-person Expert Panel in August 2016, tasked 
with conducting a review of federal EA processes and associated regulatory processes.333 
The Expert Panel travelled across the country, and heard from more than 1,000 
participants in-person, received 520 written submissions, and 2,673 responses to an 
online survey to gain feedback from the public about the EA process that were left in place 
from Harper, and of what they hoped to see in a new package of legislation.334 The 
findings of the Expert Panel, released in their Final Report in March, 2017, revealed that 
Canadians across the country felt that a new assessment process was needed, one which 
would move beyond consideration of just the bio-physical environment towards a full 
sustainability assessment, and would be “transparent, inclusive, informed, and 
meaningful.”335 The Expert Panel recommended moving from EA to a more broad IA, and 
                                                 
330 Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Environment and Climate Change Mandate Letter” (12 November 2015), 
online: Prime Minister of Canada <pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-environment-and-climate-change-mandate-
letter>. 
331 See: Charles J Birchall & Giselle Davidian, “Federal Government Releases New Interim Principles for 
Natural Resource Development Projects Currently Under Regulatory Review” (28 January 2016), online 
(blog): Willms & Shier LLP <www.willmsshier.com/docs/default-source/articles/article---federal-
government-releases-new-interim-principles-for-natural-resource-development-projects-currently-under-
regulatory-review---cjb-gd---january-28-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=2>. The five “interim” principles were: “1) The 
views of the public and affected communities will be sought and considered; 2) Indigenous People will be 
consulted and their rights and interests accommodated; 3) Both direct and upstream greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions of projects under review will be assessed; 4) Decisions will be based on science, 
traditional Indigenous knowledge and other relevant evidence; and 5) No project proponent will be asked 
to return to the starting line – project review will continue within the current legislative framework [that left 
in place by Harper] and in accordance with treaty provisions, under the auspices of relevant responsible 
authorities and Northern regulatory boards.”  
332 Ibid.  
333 Expert Panel Review of Environmental Assessment Processes, Building Common Ground: A New 
Vision for Impact Assessment in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2017) 
at 9, online (pdf): Government of Canada 
<www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/building-
common-ground/building-common-ground.pdf>. 
334 Ibid at 87.  
335 Ibid at 2.  
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envisioned a new governance model under a single authority to restore legitimacy and 
trust to the EA process, removing the roles of the NEB, the CNSC, and the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency as responsible authorities.336 The Expert Panel also 
captured the importance of land and water to Indigenous peoples across the country, 
which is “the source of all life and Aboriginal rights and title, but also the source and 
keeper of their history, their future and their laws.”337 The Expert Panel recommended 
that “Indigenous peoples be included in decision-making at all stages of EA, in 
accordance with their own laws and customs”, in alignment with the principles of 
UNDIRP.338  
Following the Expert Panel Review Process and Final Report, the Government 
released a Discussion Paper, which outlined the changes it was considering for Canada’s 
new EA and regulatory processes.339 The goals of the Government in implementing 
changes were to: “regain public trust; protect the environment; advance reconciliation with 
Indigenous peoples; ensure good projects go ahead, and resources get to market.”340 To 
much disappointment, the Discussion Paper, released in June, 2017, did not adopt the 
sweeping and necessary changes presented by the Expert Panel in their Final Report, 
but opted to maintain the existing EA regime, making several minor improvements. The 
overall governance structure was to remain the same, with the aims of: addressing 
cumulative effects assessment; increasing early engagement and planning; improving 
transparency and public participation; incorporating science, evidence, and Indigenous 
knowledge; partnering with Indigenous peoples; and, cooperating with jurisdictions.341 
While adopting the recommendation to transition to IA, the Discussion Paper was 
decidedly vague with regards to the specifics of what the assessment process would look 
like, leaving much up in the air while the drafting of new legislation took place. 
 
                                                 
336 Ibid at 52.  
337 Ibid at 26.  
338 Ibid at 30.  
339 Government of Canada, “Environmental and Regulatory Reviews: Discussion Paper” (2017), online 
(pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/share-
your-views/proposed-approach/discussion-paper-june-2017-eng.pdf>. 
340 Ibid at 3.  
341 Ibid at 8.  
 72 
3.2.3 BILL C-69 AND THE PROPOSED IMPACT ASSESSMENT ACT  
The Government released its new IA regime, contained in Part I of Bill C-69 on 
February 8, 2018, after more than 18 months of consultation. In many ways, Bill C-69 
introduces a shift in Canada’s approach to project assessment, although the Bill also 
hangs tightly to the existing framework within CEAA, 2012. Most notably, the Bill 
represents a shift from the concept of EA to IA, putting sustainability at the forefront of 
the assessment process. This is reflected in the Preamble and Purpose provisions of the 
proposed Act, as well as within the enumerated factors that must be taken into account 
when conducting an IA. Under the new regime, all IAs must now consider a broad list of 
environmental, social, health and economic factors, including cumulative effects, the 
impact of designated projects on Indigenous groups, the purpose and need for the 
designated project, impacts on Canada’s international climate obligations, and the 
project’s contribution to sustainability.342 
 
3.2.3.1 Structure of the IA Process under Bill C-69 
While Bill C-69 largely maintains the structure of IA as established in CEAA, 2012, 
the proposed Impact Assessment Act would introduce a new early planning phase to the 
assessment process which aims to facilitate multijurisdictional collaboration and early 
public engagement. An image depicting the proposed new IA process is attached to this 
report as Appendix 6. The early planning phase begins with the proponent of a 
designated project providing the new Impact Assessment Agency (“IAA”) with an initial 
description of the project, which is also posted online for public access.343 During this 
phase, which lasts up to 180 days, five deliverables are developed: 1) an IA Cooperation 
Plan; 2) an Indigenous Engagement and Partnership Plan; 3) a Public Participation Plan; 
4) Tailored Impact Statement Guidelines; and 5) a Permitting Plan (if required).344 This 
early planning and engagement has the goal of providing “early identification and 
engagement with potentially impacted Indigenous groups, regulators, departments, 
                                                 
342 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 22(1).  
343 Ibid, cl 1, s 10. 
344 Government of Canada, “Better Rules for Major Project Review to Protect Canada’s Environment and 
Grow the Economy: A Handbook” (5 September 2018) at 5, online (pdf): 
<www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/ia-handbook-
e.pdf> 
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stakeholders, and the public,” and would allow for project design to benefit from this early 
community input by adapting to issues that are raised early.345 Funding would be available 
for Indigenous communities at this stage of the IA process.346 At the end of the early 
planning phase, the IAA must decide whether an IA of the designated project is 
required.347 This means that, despite the fact that a project may be designated and listed 
on the project list, an IA is not automatically required for all projects, and the government 
retains discretion. Should an IA be required, the IA process begins with a notice of 
commencement issued by the IAA. This must be issued within 180 days from the begging 
of the early planning phase.348 The notice of commencement sets out the information or 
studies that the IAA considers necessary for it to conduct the IA, and also includes any of 
the five deliverables, identified above.349 
Following this early planning phase, the IA process largely mirrors the current 
process under CEAA, 2012. If an IA is required for a project, the proponent then begins 
to prepare a draft Impact Statement in accordance with the Impact Statement Guidelines 
issued in the notice of commencement at the completion of the early planning phase. The 
proponent has three years to gather this information and complete necessary studies, 
subject to extension by the IAA. Once this information gathering stage is completed, the 
IA review begins. There are three options for conducting an IA: 
1) IA led by the IAA: The IAA assesses the Impact Statement and prepares a draft 
Impact Assessment Report, which is posted online for public comment.350 The 
report must set out the effects that are likely to be caused by carrying out the 
designated project, including indication of adverse effects that are within federal 
jurisdiction.351 In finalizing the report, the IAA must take into account any 
comments received from the public, as well as Indigenous knowledge provided 
with respect to the project, and must set out the IAA’s conclusions, including any 
mitigation measures and follow-up programs.352 This type of IA may take up to a 
                                                 
345 Ibid at 7.  
346 Ibid.  
347 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 16; This decision is based on the following factors: the potential for 
adverse effects, impacts on Indigenous rights, public comments, and any relevant regional or strategic 
assessments that have been conducted, or studies or plans for the region. 
348 Ibid, cl 1, s 18. 
349 Ibid.  
350 Ibid, cl 1, s 28(1). 
351 Ibid, cl 1, s 28(3). 
352 Ibid, cl 1, ss 28(2), 28(3.1), 28(3.2). 
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maximum of 300 days.353 In conducting the IA, the IAA may delegate to a 
jurisdiction defined within the Act any part of the IA of the project and the 
preparation of the report with respect to the IA.354 The Minister may also approve 
a substitute IA process of a qualifying jurisdiction to meet the requirements under 
the Act is they are satisfied that particular conditions are met.355 As will be 
discussed in Part 4 of this report, “jurisdiction” includes “Indigenous governing 
bodies,” allowing for Indigenous-led assessment of the impacts of a project where 
the delegation or substitution powers have been engaged. 
 
2) IA led by a Review Panel or JRP: Within 45 days of the notice of commencement 
of an IA, the Minister may refer the IA to a review panel if it is in the public 
interest.356 The Minister must establish the Panel’s terms of reference and appoint 
one or more members “who are unbiased and free from any conflict of interest 
relative to the designated project and who have knowledge or expertise relevant 
to the designated project’s anticipated effects or have knowledge of the interests 
and concerns of the Indigenous peoples of Canada that are relevant to the 
assessment.”357 If this option is pursued, the review panel must complete the IA 
an submit an IA report to the Minister within 600 days from the appointment of the 
panel, subject to Ministerial or Cabinet extension.358 The Minister may also decide 
to establish a JRP with another jurisdiction, including an Indigenous governing 
body, except where the designated project includes physical activities that are 
regulated under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act or the Canadian Energy 
Regulator Act.359 
 
3) IA led by an Integrated Review with Lifecycle Regulators: The Minister is 
required to refer the IA of a designated project to a review panel if the project 
includes physical activities that are regulated under the Nuclear Safety and Control 
Act or the Canadian Energy Regulator Act.360 These review panels are subject to 
unique appointment rules, with at least one of the persons appointed coming from 
a roster on the recommendation of the regulator.361 Despite the time limit 
provisions for other review panels, IAs for activities falling within this category are 
subject to a stricter time limit of 300 days.362 This time limit may be extended to a 
                                                 
353 Ibid, cl 1, s 28(2) 
354 Ibid, cl 1, s 29. 
355 Ibid, cl 1, ss 31(1), 33(1). 
356 Ibid, cl 1, s 36(1).  
357 Ibid, cl 1, s 41(1). 
358 Ibid, cl 1, ss 37(1), 37(3), 37(4).  
359 Ibid, cl 1, s 39.  
360 Ibid, cl 1, s 43.  
361 Ibid, cl 1, ss 44, 47.  
362 Ibid, cl 1, s 37.1(1). 
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maximum of 600 days if the Minister issues an order, with reasons for the 
extension, prior to the notice of commencement of the IA.363 Substitution is not 
allowed for this category of IA.364 
 
For IAs conducted by a review panel within categories 2 and 3, the review panel has 
statutorily mandated duties. These include ensuring that the information that it uses when 
conducting the IA is made available to the public, and “holding hearings in a manner that 
offers the public an opportunity to participate meaningfully.”365 The review panel also has 
the power to summon any person to appear as a witness before it, and may order the 
witness to give evidence either orally or in writing, and to produce records necessary for 
conducting the IA.366 The review panel may also require the proponent of the designated 
project to collect information and undertake studies that are necessary for the IA by the 
review panel.367 
The fourth stage in the IA process is decision-making. Under Bill C-69, decision-
making for an IA remains with the Minister and Cabinet. For IAs conducted by the IAA 
under category 1, including substituted processes approved under this stream, the 
Minister must take into account the IA report compiled at the completion of the IA process 
and determine if the effects within federal jurisdiction, including adverse direct or 
incidental effects, are in the public interest.368 The Minister may also refer this 
determination to Cabinet.369 The decision for projects subject to an IA by a review panel 
within categories 2 and 3, identified above, goes directly to Cabinet which must then make 
the same public interest determination, having taken into account the IA report as well as 
the effects of the project.370 In making this public interest determination for all types of 
IAs, both the Minister and Cabinet must base their decision on the following factors: 
• The extent to which the designated project contributes to sustainability; 
 
                                                 
363 Ibid, cl 1, s 37.1(2). 
364 Ibid, cl 1, s 32.  
365 Ibid, cl 1, s 51(1). 
366 Ibid, cl 1, s 53(1).  
367 Ibid, cl 1, s 38.  
368 Ibid, cl 1, s 60(1)(a). 
369 Ibid, cl 1, s 60(1)(b). 
370 Ibid, cl 1, s 62. 
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• The extent to which the adverse effects within federal jurisdiction and the adverse 
direct or incidental effects that are indicated in the IA report in respect of the 
designated project are adverse; 
 
• The implementation of the mitigation measures that the Minister or Cabinet, as the 
case may be, considers appropriate; 
 
• The impact that the designated project may have on any Indigenous group and 
any adverse impact that the designated project may have on the rights of the 
Indigenous peoples of Canada recognized and affirmed by s.35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982; and 
 
• The extent to which the effects of the designated project hinder or contribute to the 
Government of Canada’s ability to meet its environmental obligations and its 
commitments in respect of climate change.371 
 
Despite these enumerated factors guiding decision-making, Bill C-69 does not include 
any requirement preventing the Minister or Cabinet from approving a project that is 
inherently unsustainable, or that violates international commitments such as UNDRIP.372 
There is also no barrier to the decision-maker giving economic benefits more weight than 
environmental impacts, nor any requirement that the Minister or Cabinet justify how they 
reached the public interest determination or justified environmental trade-offs.373  Once a 
decision is reached, the Minister must issue a decision statement to the proponent of the 
project that outlines: the determination reached by the Minister or Cabinet, including 
reasons for the determination, and conditions established that must be complied with, the 
time period within which the proponent must substantially begin to carry out the project, 
and a description of the project.374 There is no right of appeal for this decision. 
There is no option for joint decision-making within Bill C-69 with jurisdictions such 
as Indigenous governing bodies, despite the fact that delegation or substitution is an 
option within the proposed Act. Other jurisdictions are limited to assessing the impacts of 
                                                 
371 Ibid, cl 1, s 63.  
372 Anna Johnston, “Questions and Answers about Canada’s Proposed New Impact Assessment Act” 
(2019) at 4, online (pdf): West Coast Environmental Law 
<www.wcel.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019-02-wcel-revisedqanda-iaaact.pdf>.   
373 Ibid at 5, 8.  
374 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 65.  
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the project and providing a report outlining findings and recommendations to the IAA, but 
cannot exercise decision-making power over the project. This represents a derogation 
from the government’s commitment to fully implement UNDRIP, and also contradicts the 
recommendations from the Expert Review Panel which called for recognition of 
Indigenous laws and inherent jurisdiction through a collaborative framework, including the 
requirement for FPIC.375 
Finally, there is an increased possibility for Indigenous involvement through the 
implementation of follow-up programs following the completion of an IA. The IAA has the 
power to establish research and advisory bodies related to IA, and monitoring committees 
for the implementation of follow-up programs and adaptive management plans, “including 
with respect to the interests and concerns of Indigenous peoples or Canada.”376 Details 
surrounding these bodies have not been established.  
 
3.2.3.2 Projects Subject to an IA under Bill C-69 
Presently, there is a lack of clarity about which projects will be subject to 
assessment under Bill C-69, although the Bill largely maintains the CEAA, 2012 approach 
to what receives an assessment. The Government has indicated its intentions to maintain 
the existing Regulations Designating Physical Activities, which contains the Project List 
that was gutted by Harper, and has asked the public to bring suggestions for amendment 
through a Consultation Paper.377 As outlined in the description of the early planning 
phase, designated projects do not necessarily require an IA. Designated projects must 
undergo in initial screening, wherein the IAA must consider whether an IA is required, 
based on a list of factors enumerated in clause 1, s.16(2). Projects that are not included 
on the project list may be designated by the Minister if they determine that potential 
adverse effects or public concerns warrant an assessment.378 Anyone may request that 
a project be designated, and the Minister has an obligation to respond to this request, 
                                                 
375 Expert Panel Review of Environmental Assessment Processes, supra note 333 at 29. 
376 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 156(2).  
377 Government of Canada, “Consultation Paper on Approach to revising the Project List: A Proposed 
Impact Assessment System” (2018), online (pdf): 
<www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/consultation-
paper-approach-revising-project-list.pdf>. 
378 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, ss 9(1), 9(2). 
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with reasons, within 90 days.379 Ministerial designated projects remain subject to the IAA 
screening process. 
 
3.2.3.3 Public Participation Under Bill C-69 
A notable change within Bill C-69 is the elimination of restrictions on who may 
participate in an assessment. Under CEAA, 2012, standing for participation was limited 
to “interested parties” who were “directly affected” by the designated project.380 This has 
been eliminated from Bill C-69. While Bill C-69 highlights “meaningful participation” as a 
goal of the proposed Act, there is a lack of clarity around that this will look like in practice, 
as the term is not defined. Bill C-69 does mandate the establishment of participant funding 
programs at three key points in the IA process. These include: 1) the early planning 
phase, 2) during the IA process where the designated project is referred to a review panel, 
including during the design or implementation of follow-up programs in relation to these 
assessments, and 3) for regional and strategic assessments.381 However, where the 
Minister approves the substitution of an IA process, these participant funding obligations 
do not apply.382  
 
3.2.3.4 Regional and Strategic IA Under Bill C-69 
The necessity for regional and strategic IAs was one point that was heavily 
advocated for during the consultation process leading up to Bill C-69. Regional IA is “used 
to assess baseline conditions and the cumulative impacts of all projects and activities 
within a defined region” and strategic IAs are used to evaluate the implications of 
government plans, programs and policies on project IAs.383 The Expert Review Panel 
recommended that future IA legislation require regional IAs “where cumulative impacts 
may occur or already exist on federal lands or marine areas, or where there are potential 
consequential cumulative impacts to matters of federal interest.”384 The Panel suggested 
the creation of a Schedule to any proposed legislation identifying priority areas. With 
                                                 
379 Ibid, cl 1, s 9(4). 
380 CEAA, 2012, supra note 134, s 2(2). 
381 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 75(1). 
382Ibid, cl 1, s 75(2). 
383 Expert Panel Review of Environmental Assessment Processes, supra note 333 at 76, 81 
384 Ibid at 80. 
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regards to strategic IA, the Panel recommended that “IA legislation require that the IA 
authority conduct a strategic IA when a new or existing federal policy, plan or program 
would have consequential implications for federal project or regional IA” and that 
“strategic IA [should] define how to implement a policy, plan or program in project and 
regional IA.”385 
Bill C-69 enables regional and strategic assessments but does not require them – 
initiation of a regional or strategic assessment is left to the discretion of the Minister. 
Regional assessment may be done on federal lands, partly on federal lands, or outside 
federal lands, and anyone may make a request for a regional or strategic assessment, to 
which the Minister must respond within a prescribed time limit.386 In conducting regional 
and strategic assessments, the Minister may direct the IAA to complete the assessment, 
or may establish a committee with associated terms of reference to complete the 
assessment.387 For regional assessments of areas partly or entirely outside federal lands, 
the Minister may enter into an agreement with another jurisdiction to conduct the 
assessment.388 To date, the federal government has indicated a commitment to conduct 
a strategic assessment in respect of climate change.389 
The conclusions of a regional or strategic assessment under Bill C-69 are not 
binding on project-level IA. As per clause 1, s. 22(1), the results of regional and strategic 
assessments are among a long list of factors to be taken into consideration during an IA. 
They are not listed as a factor requiring consideration during the Ministerial or Cabinet 
public interest determination on a project under clause 1, s.63. Additionally, there is little 
detail respecting how regional and strategic assessments are to be conducted. As Lawyer 
Anna Johnston outlines  
There are no requirements regarding participation on [regional] or [strategic] 
terms of reference, no direction that [regional assessments] consider 
alternative scenarios for development and protection in a region, and no 
provisions requiring the application or [regional and strategic assessment] 
outcomes in project assessment or regulatory decision-making.390 
                                                 
385Ibid at 82-83. 
386 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, ss 92, 93, 97(1). 
387 Ibid, cl 1, ss 92, 93, 95. 
388 Ibid, cl 1, s 93(1)(a). 
389 Government of Canada, “Strategic Assessment of Climate Change” (2018), online: 
<www.strategicassessmentclimatechange.ca> 
390 Johnston, supra note 372 at 20. 
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3.2.3.5 Application of Bill C-69 to the Ring of Fire 
As Bill C-69 is still before the Senate and has not yet received Royal Assent nor 
come into force, Bill C-69 will not apply to any EA processes that have already been 
initiated under current or former EA legislation. Transitional provisions within the Bill 
address the continuation of comprehensive studies started under CEAA as well as EAs 
initiated under CEAA, 2012, including projects such as Noront’s “Eagle’s Nest” project, 
which was initiated as a comprehensive study under CEAA in 2011.391 The EAs for both 
the Marten Falls Community Access Road and the Webequie Supply road are currently 
awaiting filing of a project description, and Bill C-69 will not apply to these assessments 
once these project descriptions are filed and the EA formally initiated. 
 
3.3 CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.3.1 SECTION 35 OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982 
 
3.3.1.1 Origins and Components of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
Overlaid on top of all of the aforementioned legislative requirements are 
constitutional obligations imposed on the Crown, including the DTCA. The DTCA arises 
from section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states 
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
 
(2) In this Act, “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit and 
Métis peoples of Canada. 
 
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) “treaty rights” includes rights that 
now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.392 
 
 The DTCA is both a legal and constitutional obligation. As a legal obligation, the 
DTCA is “based on the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty over lands and resources 
                                                 
391 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, ss 178-183. 
392 Constitution Act 1982, supra note 14, s 35. 
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formerly held by Indigenous peoples.”393 The constitutional dimension of the DTCA is 
grounded in the honour of the Crown and enshrined in s.35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.394 The honour of the Crown is always at stake in dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples.395 “In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty 
to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act 
honourably”396 in order to achieve the “reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal 
societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”397 Reconciliation is a core goal of the 
process of the DTCA, which flows from the honour of the Crown and “arises in turn from 
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of 
land and resources that were formerly in control of that people.”398 More specifically, the 
honour of the Crown may give rise to a fiduciary duty in instances where the Crown has 
assumed discretionary control over specific Aboriginal interests.399 In relation to treaty-
making and treaty interpretation, the Crown must avoid the appearance of “sharp 
dealings,”400 as the recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in s.35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 represents a promise of rights recognition.401  
The case of Haida Nation is the foundational and leading case articulating 
principles related to the Crown’s DTCA with Aboriginal peoples. First, the DTCA “arises 
when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the 
Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.”402 This 
means that the DTCA arises not only where there is an established right, but also where 
there is a credible but unproven claim.403  
                                                 
393 Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at para 19, [2017] SCJ No 40 
[Clyde River]. 
394 Ibid at para 19.  
395 Throughout this subsection of the report, the term “Aboriginal” is used to mirror the statutory language 
under s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
396 Haida Nation v BC (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511 (SCC) at para 17, [2004] SCJ No 70 [Haida 
Nation]. 
397 Delgamuukw, supra note 36 at para 31.  
398 Haida Nation, supra note 396 at para 32. 
399 Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, [2002] 4 SCR 245 at para 79, [2002] SCJ No 79. 
400 Badger, supra note 216 at para 41.  
401 Haida Nation, supra note 396 at para 20. 
402 Ibid at para 35.  
403 Ibid at para 37.  
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Second, the scope and content of the DTCA may vary, and is “proportionate to a 
preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right 
or title.”404 The scope of the DTCA also varies with the “seriousness of the potentially 
adverse effect upon the right or title claimed.”405 The DTCA exists along a spectrum, and 
different duties are owed according to the strength of the claim. At one end of the 
spectrum are instances where a claim to Aboriginal title is weak, the Aboriginal right is 
limited, or the potential for infringement is minor. In these cases, the only duty on the 
Crown may be to “give notice, disclose information, and discuss any issues raised in 
response to the notice.”406 At the other end of the spectrum lie instances “where a strong 
prima facie case for the claim is established, the right and potential infringement is of high 
significance to the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk of non-compensable damage is 
high.”407 In these cases, the DTCA requires deep consultation, which may include the 
opportunity to make submissions, formal participation in the decision-making process, 
and the provision of written reasons.408 The scope of the DTCA and duties owed by the 
Crown are assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
Third, legal responsibility for the DTCA remains with the Crown, as it is a positive 
constitutional duty placed on the Crown. While the Crown may delegate procedural 
aspects of consultation to proponents or may rely on steps undertaken by a regulatory 
agency (i.e. the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency or the NEB) to fulfill the 
DTCA in whole or in part, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the DTCA is met lies with 
the Crown. The honour of the Crown cannot be delegated to proponents, and the Crown 
may need to take further measures upon completion of a regulatory process in order to 
ensure the DTCA was adequate.409 
Finally, the DTCA has been described as a “two-way street,” and good faith is 
required on both sides.410 Obligations are imposed on both parties to the consultation. 
This means that the Crown must have the intention of substantially addressing the 
                                                 
404 Ibid at para 39.  
405 Ibid at para 39.  
406 Ibid at para 43.  
407 Ibid at para 43.  
408 Ibid at para 44.  
409 Ibid at para 53; Clyde River, supra note 393 at para 22.  
410 Haida Nation, supra note 396 at para 42. 
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Aboriginal community’s concerns through the process of the DTCA. The specific 
obligations of the Crown in each instance of consultation vary with the strength of the 
claim, as outlined above. Aboriginal complainants who are parties to consultation “must 
not frustrate the Crown’s reasonable, good faith attempts” nor “take unreasonable 
positions to thwart government from making decisions or acting in cases where, despite 
meaningful consultations, agreement is not reached.”411 Other obligations imposed on 
Aboriginal communities include defining the elements of their claim with clarity.412  
 
3.3.1.2 Challenges with the Application of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate in 
Resource Development Projects 
The requirement to fulfill the DTCA arises frequently in relation to resource 
development projects, and disputes over the requirement and scope of this constitutional 
duty often spark litigation between Indigenous communities and the Crown. Where an 
Indigenous community has an established or asserted Aboriginal or treaty right, the 
Crown is required to consult with the communities whose rights could be impacted by the 
development. When consultation goes awry, whether because impacted communities 
were overlooked and not consulted or where the parties disagree on the necessary scope 
of consultation, and a project approval or licence is issued despite this potentially 
inadequate consultation, Indigenous communities may commence a judicial review of the 
project approval. As the goal of the DTCA is to achieve reconciliation between the parties 
to the consultation, litigation is an unsatisfactory result, which does not often does not 
promote this ultimate goal. Courts have explicitly said that “true reconciliation is rarely, if 
ever, achieved in courtrooms.”413 The cost of litigation also makes this a prohibitive option 
for many Indigenous communities. Many communities face frequent infringement of their 
rights through multiple resource development projects within their traditional territory and 
cannot afford to pursue litigation for each instance of inadequate consultation. 
Communities often do not even have the capacity or funding to support their meaningfully 
engagement in the consultation process in the first place, as participant funding programs 
                                                 
411 Ibid at para 42.  
412 Ibid at para 36.  
413 Clyde River, supra note 393 at para 24. 
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through provincial and federal EA processes are inadequate or non-existent and 
development proposals numerous.414 As a result, communities may be left with no 
remedy for infringements of their rights due to the inaccessibility of the justice system. In 
response to this challenge, Indigenous communities have issued documents such as 
Consultation Protocols, which set out the requirements for an adequate consultation 
process that the Crown or project proponents must abide by, including the provision of 
funding for the Indigenous community to meaningfully participate in the consultation 
process. This issue is explored further in Part 4 of this report.  
A second challenge inherent in the DTCA is that the DTCA is primarily aimed at 
providing procedural rights rather than substantive rights. While regulatory processes 
such as the EA process may work to fulfill the requirements of the DTCA, the existing 
framework, as well as the proposed framework under Bill C-69, does not envision a joint 
decision-making process for resource development projects within the traditional 
territories of Indigenous communities. The DTCA provides Indigenous communities with 
the right to be consulted and may result in project amendments and accommodations 
with respect to established or asserted Aboriginal or treaty rights. However, the DTCA 
does not give Indigenous communities the right to veto a development project, as outlined 
above, and does not require that the Crown obtain FPIC from Indigenous communities 
for all projects. FPIC is a requirement mandated by the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and is discussed below in the subsequent subsection of 
this report. This lack of requirement for consent has been one factor giving rise to an 
increase in Indigenous-led IA processes, as communities have sought to evaluate the 
impacts of proposed projects and exercise decision-making authority in accordance with 
their own governing practices and Indigenous legal traditions. A full review of Indigenous-
led IA practices can be found in Part 4 of this report.  
 
3.4 INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
                                                 
414 Expert Panel Review of Environmental Assessment Processes, supra note 333 at 31-32.  
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3.4.1 THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES  
 
3.4.1.1 Overview of the Development of UNDRIP 
In addition to the domestic legal obligations and statutes outlined above, 
international legal obligations also shape and influence the actions of Canada. A final 
factor of the legislative framework impacting development of the Ring of Fire is UNDRIP. 
UNDRIP was adopted into international law by the UN General Assembly in 2007, where 
it received support from 144415 States, with 4 States voting in opposition (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States of America), 11 States abstaining from the 
vote, and 34 absences.416 UNDRIP represented a “major turning point for the promotion 
and protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights,”417 and, today, is the  
most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of Indigenous 
peoples. It establishes a universal framework of minimum standards for the 
survival, dignity and well-being of the Indigenous peoples of the world and it 
elaborates on existing human rights standards and fundamental freedoms as 
they apply to the specific situation of Indigenous peoples.418  
 
UNDRIP “addresses both individual and collective rights; cultural rights and identity; rights 
to education, health, employment, language and others”, and “affirms the rights of 
Indigenous peoples to remain distinct and to pursue their own priorities in economic, 
social, and cultural development.”419  
                                                 
415 Official records from the UN General Assembly indicate that 143 States voted in support of UNDRIP. 
However, “subsequently the delegation of Montenegro advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote 
in favour” of UNDRIP. As a result, some sources list 143 votes in favour of UNDRIP while others indicate 
144. See: United Nations, General Assembly, Press Release, GA/10612, “General Assembly Adopts 
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says 
President” (13 September 2007), online: <www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm>. 
416 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples” (2007), online: United Nations 
<www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-
peoples.html>. 
417 Brenda L Gunn, “Overcoming Obstacles to Implementing the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in Canada” (2013) 31 Windsor YB Access Just 147 at 148.  
418 Ibid. 
419 Council for International Development, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP): Understanding New Zealand’s responsibilities under UNDRIP” (2019), online (pdf): 
<www.cid.org.nz/assets/Key-issues/Human-development/Convention-Series-8-UNDRIP.pdf>. 
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UNDRIP is unique in that it is the “only declaration in the UN which was drafted 
with the rights-holders, themselves, the Indigenous peoples.”420 Development of the 
Declaration took several decades and moved slowly, as several States, particularly those 
who voted in opposition, expressed concerns with core elements of the document, 
“namely the right to self-determination of Indigenous peoples, and the control over natural 
resources existing on Indigenous peoples’ traditional lands”421 including provisions 
related to free, prior and informed consent. Throughout the negotiation of UNDRIP, many 
concessions and amendments were made to the original text, although the final 
Declaration largely achieves the goals of Indigenous peoples. These concessions 
included the language around self-determination, as oppositional states feared that its 
inclusion in the Declaration would undermine State sovereignty, giving Indigenous 
peoples’ unbridled rights over lands, territories and self-government. As a result, the final 
version of UNDRIP adopted by the UN General Assembly includes language stating its 
commitment to State sovereignty with an emphasis on individualistic and liberal human 
rights, as the principles of UNDRIP are to be implemented according to domestic laws 
and policies.422 In practice, this means that UNDRIP is to be implemented through the 
settler laws of signatory States, a point which has been largely critiqued by scholars as 
this limits the overall effectiveness and power of the Declaration.423 Despite these 
concessions, UNDRIP “challenges or at least pushes the liberal human rights paradigm 
by explicitly referring to the right to self-determination, embracing the collective rights and 
expressing an understanding of the interrelationship between the right to heritage, land 
and development” and represents a positive development in the realization of many of 
these fundamental rights for Indigenous peoples around the world.424 
 
                                                 
420 Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, “Statement of Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Chair of the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, on the Occasion of the Adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
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422 Karen Engle, “On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the 
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3.4.1.2 Key Articles in UNDRIP Relevant to Land and Land Governance 
There are several key articles of UNDRIP that relate directly to land, and the 
governance of land of Indigenous peoples, which are directly applicable to natural 
resource extraction and development. First, the principle of FPIC is central within UNDRIP 
and gives Indigenous communities the right to offer or withhold consent to developments 
that may have an impact on their territories or resources. Several criteria must be met in 
order for FPIC to exist: 
• Free: consent must be obtained without force, coercion, intimidation, manipulation, 
or pressure from the government or company seeking consent; 
 
• Prior: there must be sufficient time to review and consider all relevant factors, 
starting at the inception stage, in advance or any authorization for, and 
continuously throughout the planning and implementation of activities; 
 
• Informed: consent must be granted based on an understanding of adequate, 
complete, understandable, and relevant information relative to the full range of 
issues and potential impacts that may arise from the activity or decision; and 
 
• Consent: consent can only be given by the legitimate representatives of the 
peoples affected, with any caveats or conditions stipulated by the people whose 
consent is given.425 
 
UNDRIP provides specific examples of instances where FPIC is required from 
Indigenous peoples, “specifically, though not only, in situations where a development 
project may affect Indigenous lands and territories or the resources therein.”426 Article 
32 is particularly relevant to the Ring of Fire. It reads:  
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities 
and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other 
resources. 
  
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to 
obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project 
                                                 
425 Ginger Gibson & Gaby Zezulka, “Understanding Successful Approaches to Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent in Canada. Part I” (2015), online (pdf): Boreal Leadership Council <borealcouncil.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/BLC_FPIC_Successes_Report_Sept_2015_E.pdf> at 8. 
426 Ibid at 9. 
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affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or 
other resources.427  
 
UNDRIP calls for FPIC from Indigenous peoples in several other circumstances, 
including: relocation from their lands and territories,428 in implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect Indigenous communities,429 the taking of their 
cultural, intellectual, religious, or spiritual property,430 and the storage of hazardous 
materials on Indigenous lands.431  
FPIC imparts a different standard on resource development projects than 
Canada’s current constitutional requirement of the DTCA. Under the duty to consult and 
accommodate, Indigenous communities cannot exercise a veto over decisions about 
what can be done with the land in cases where their Aboriginal rights or title claims have 
not yet been proven.432 The standard of consent exists only where established rights has 
been made out, such as Aboriginal title, and even then, the Crown can infringe on these 
rights in certain circumstances.433 In contrast, FPIC cannot exist where an Indigenous 
community does not have the option to meaningfully withhold consent.434 As Professor 
Shin Imai points out, while the standard of consent has not been adopted by governments 
or the courts, “industry practice has largely moved to the consent standard in the form of 
Impact Benefit Agreements” which are negotiated directly between proponents and 
Indigenous communities.435 It is arguable whether Indigenous communities in can truly 
offer meaningful consent in situations where there are vast power and economic 
imbalances between themselves and the Crown or project proponents. 
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Second, and directly intertwined with FPIC, UNDRIP also addresses the issue of 
governance and decision-making authority over lands and resources. Article 18 of 
UNDRIP reads: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters 
which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves 
in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop 
their own indigenous decision-making institutions.  
 
In combination with Part 1 of Article 32, outlined above, UNDRIP stresses the importance 
that Indigenous communities should be able to determine what uses are made of their 
lands, and that these decisions be made by the communities themselves, in accordance 
with their customary decision-making methods. As UNDRIP is to be applied through the 
domestic laws of signatory nations, these articles may manifest themselves through 
independent or joint decision-making models within the EA regime. This point was 
articulated by the Expert Review Panel report in relation to EA processes. The Expert 
Review Panel stated that 
Explicitly acknowledging the ability of Indigenous Peoples to be directly 
involved in decision-making also allows for the recognition of their right to self-
determination and their inherent jurisdiction, and enables them to protect and 
uphold a suite of other rights – basic human rights as expressed through 
UNDRIP, as well as their s.35 Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
 
UNDRIP is clear that all decision-making processes that impact the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples must be in accordance with the distinctive governance 
institutions, laws and customs of the relevant Indigenous Peoples. 
Accordingly, Indigenous Peoples must have the ability to select their own 
representatives to participate on their behalf within EA processes, and 
maintain and develop internal decision-making institutions and distinctive 
customs.436   
 
Indigenous governance over land is not currently recognized under CEAA, 2012, and is 
also absent from the proposed Impact Assessment Act, as Bill C-69 does not suggest a 
model for joint decision-making, nor the requirement for Indigenous consent prior to 
project approval. As a result, Indigenous governance over lands and resources has been 
exhibited by communities opting to engage in their own IA processes, which will be 
explored thoroughly in the subsequent section of this report.  
                                                 
436 Expert Panel Review of Environmental Assessment Processes, supra note 333 at 29.  
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3.4.1.3 The Adoption of UNDRIP in Canada 
Canada has a contested history with UNDRIP, being one of only four Nations that 
initially voted in its opposition. Along with the United States of America, Australia and New 
Zealand, Canada has a settler-colonial history, and had initial reservations about 
endorsing the document. At that time, Canada publicly stated the country had significant 
Concerns with respect to the wording of the current text, including provisions 
on lands, territories and resources; on free, prior and informed consent when 
used as a veto; on self-government without recognition of the importance of 
negotiations; on intellectual property; on military issues; and on the need to 
achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of 
Indigenous peoples, Member States and third parties.437 
 
Canada also stated that “the provisions in the Declaration on lands, territories and 
resources [were] overly broad and unclear and are susceptible of a wide variety of 
interpretations, discounting the need to recognize a range of rights over land and possibly 
putting into question matters that have already been settled by treaty in Canada.”438  
Canada initially gave a qualified Statement of Support under the minority 
Conservative government of Stephen Harper in November, 2010, but it wasn’t until 2016, 
nearly a full decade after the adoption of UNDRIP, Canada announced its adoption of the 
Declaration with no reservations or qualifications.439 Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Minister Carolyn Bennett stated at the UN’s Plenary Session on May 10, 2016 that “by 
adopting and implementing the Declaration, we [the Canadian government] are excited 
that we are breathing life into s.35 [of the Constitution] and recognizing it as a full box of 
rights for Indigenous Peoples in Canada.”440 This announcement came shortly after the 
2015 election of Justin Trudeau and his Liberal majority government, a government that 
has continually expressed commitment to rebuilding relationships with the country’s First 
Nation, Métis and Inuit peoples.441 Trudeau campaigned on an election platform that 
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439 Tim Fontaine, “Canada Officially Adopts UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” CBC News 
(10 May 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/canada-adopting-implementing-un-rights-
declaration-1.3575272>. 
440 Ibid. 
441 The Aboriginal and treaty rights of First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples are recognized and affirmed 
by s.35 of the Constitution.   
 91 
promised “a renewed, nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous Peoples, based on 
recognition, rights, respect, co-operation and partnership.”442 Adoption and 
implementation of UNDRIP was one of the Calls to Action under the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which the Government has also committed to implementing, 
and is seen by many as a necessary step in achieving reconciliation with Indigenous 
peoples.443 
 
3.4.1.4 Implementation of UNDRIP in Canada 
The decision of Canada to implement UNDRIP through s.35 of the Constitution 
may have limiting effects on the power of the Declaration to achieve its objectives, causing 
an implementation gap, particularly in the area of environmental assessment.  Many EA 
disputes that have found their way to the judiciary have revolved around disputes over 
lands and resources on traditional territories of Indigenous communities. Often, these 
disputes are among the most controversial, and the political nature of these disputes was 
one reason the Liberal government vowed to reform EA processes to better involve 
Indigenous communities and implement the principles of UNDRIP. Rather than achieve 
reconciliation, EA processes have exacerbated conflict and increased the burden on 
Indigenous communities. There is a widespread belief that current EA processes fail to 
adequately account for Indigenous rights, resulting in a lack of trust in EA processes, lack 
of confidence in EA decisions, and decisions from Indigenous communities to either not 
participate in EA processes, or to create their own parallel and independent assessment 
frameworks, as outlined in the subsequent section of this report.444  
Implementation of UNDRIP was a core focus of the Expert Review Panel process, 
with both the Expert Panel report and numerous participants putting forward suggestions 
for reforming Canada’s current EA processes, which have caused increasing conflict in 
                                                 
442 Liberal Party of Canada, supra note 329 at 46. 
443 See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2012, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada: Calls to Action (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) at 4; Call to 
Action No. 43 from the TRC states: “We call upon federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal 
governments to fully adopt and implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples as the framework for reconciliation.” Call to Action No. 44 states: “We call upon the Government 
of Canada to develop a national action plan, strategies, and other concrete measures to achieve the 
goals of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”  
444 Expert Panel Review of Environmental Assessment Processes, supra note 333 at 26.  
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recent years. Two key areas of focus were: participation in decision-making in accordance 
with Indigenous Peoples’ own institutions, laws and customs (Article 18 of UNDRIP); and 
the principle of FPIC (Article 19 of UNDRIP).445 The Panel stated that 
Explicitly acknowledging the ability of Indigenous Peoples to be directly 
involved in decision-making also allows for the recognition of their right to self-
determination and their inherent jurisdiction, and enables them to protect and 
uphold a suite of other rights – basic human rights as expressed through 
UNDRIP, as well as their s.35 Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
 
UNDRIP is clear that all decision-making processes that impact the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples must be in accordance with the distinctive governance 
institutions, laws and customs of the relevant Indigenous Peoples. 
Accordingly, Indigenous Peoples must have the ability to select their own 
representatives to participate on their behalf within EA processes, and 
maintain and develop internal decision-making institutions and distinctive 
customs.446   
 
Despite the Government of Canada’s strong discourse around the implementation of 
UNDRIP, Bill C-69, which sets out the government’s proposed new IA regime, fails to 
adopt these key recommendations from the Expert Panel. Rather than making 
transformative changes to address the numerous shortfalls of the existing EA process, 
the government opted to begin its work by making incremental changes to the existing 
broken model, a model which has failed to give life to UNDRIP in the past. 
 
3.4.1.5 The Legal Status of UNDRIP in Canada as an Instrument of International Law 
Finally, it is important to note that UNDRIP is a Declaration rather than a 
Convention. Canada has argued that this distinction means that UNDRIP is not legally 
binding under international law, and that it is “only political in nature, that it does not create 
any procedural or substantive rights, and that it is not customary international law,” as 
UNDRIP is merely an aspirational document.447 However, several arguments can be 
made against this position taken by Canada. First, the presumption of conformity 
“requires that Canadian law be interpreted consistent with Canada’s international 
                                                 
445 Ibid at 27. 
446 Ibid at 29.  
447 Yvonne Boyer, “Using the UN Framework to Advance and Protect the Inherent Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in Canada” in Terry Mitchell, ed, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights: UNDRIP in the 
Canadian Context (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014) 11 at 13. 
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obligations.”448 As “declarations are part of the development of international legal norms 
and by voting in favour of the Declaration, states have indicated a commitment to uphold 
the rights contained in it.”449 As an international human rights declaration, the minimum 
standards for Indigenous rights as set out in UNDRIP should inform domestic law, and 
domestic law should conform to these international norms.450 Second, Canadian courts 
have generally taken the approach that customary international law is adopted into 
Canadian law, provided there is no express conflict, where Canada has not taken the 
position as a persistent objector.451 Given Canada’s endorsement of UNDRIP, along with 
other positive actions taken in the international forum, Canada clearly recognizes and 
accepts a core set of Indigenous peoples’ rights, and this it can be argued that rights 
contained in UNDRIP “reflect customary international law [and] should be incorporated 
into Canadian law.”452 Despite these arguments, UNDRIP has yet to be successfully cited 
and fully endorsed by the SCC, limiting Canada’s action on UNDRIP to being primarily 
within the political realm, through federal government announcements such as the ten 
“Principles respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous 
Peoples”453 and the creation of a “Recognition and Implementation of Rights 
Framework”.454  
Domestically, a Private Member’s Bill from New Democratic Party NDP MP Romeo 
Saganash was introduced in the House of Commons in April 2016, and received support 
from the federal Liberal government in November 2017. 455  Bill C-262, titled the United 
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Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act,456 would require the 
Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples in 
Canada, to “take all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent 
with the UNDRIP”457 and would recognize UNDRIP “as a universal international human 
rights instrument with application in Canadian law.”458 The Bill would also require the 
Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples, to 
“develop and implement a national action plan to achieve the objectives of UNDRIP.”459 
Bill C-262 has passed all three readings in the House of Commons, and is currently before 
the Senate, where it has passed First Reading. It will be crucial to follow any amendments 
to this Bill, as changes in the mandatory language would derogate from the government’s 
perceived duties to uphold and implement UNDRIP under domestic law. 
 
  
                                                 
456 Bill C-262, An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2016, (as passed by the House of 
Commons 30 May 2018) 
457 Ibid, cl 4 
458 Ibid, cl 3.  
459 Ibid, cl 5. 
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4 REVIEW OF INDIGENOUS-LED APPROACHES TO IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 
 
 The recent political and legal climate in Canada has led to a robust re-evaluation 
of the current settler EA process. As outlined in the preceding section of this report, this 
re-evaluation largely began at the federal level with the election of Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau’s Liberal government. Trudeau’s campaign platform responded to existing 
dissatisfaction with the laws that were repealed and enacted by Stephen Harper through 
Bill C-38, and included a promise to restore lost protections to the environment and initiate 
a review of Canada’s environmental assessment and associated regulatory processes.460  
Through the Expert Review Panel process and culminating with the introduction of the 
proposed Impact Assessment Act in Bill C-69, a breadth of discussion over new 
approaches to EA has gained momentum across the country. In addition to proposed 
federal legislative changes, these discussions have also led to legislative changes at the 
provincial level, with British Columbia recently modernizing their provincial legislation with 
the introduction of Bill 51.461 Conversations have centred around moving towards 
approaches labelled by environmental groups as “next-generation” EA and sustainability 
assessment,462 with a strong emphasis on the need for strategic and regional assessment 
in order to properly address cumulative effects, and the need for joint decision-making 
between settler governments and Indigenous governing bodies.463 
                                                 
460 Liberal Party of Canada, supra note 329 at 41-42.  
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 Parallel to these discussions regarding the reform of settler EA law, there has been 
a recent rise in alternative models to the conventional state-led approach. Indigenous-led 
IAs of resource development proposals within their traditional territories are one example 
of a response directly addressing the perceived deficiencies within the current settler 
approach.464 Anishinaabe scholar Wapshkaa Ma’iingan (Aaron Mills) argues that both 
intense conflict with development companies, such as the conflict endured by KI First 
Nation and the Ardoch Algonquin First Nation, and legal disempowerment by the Crown 
has inspired Indigenous communities to manifest parts of their law in a positivist form. 
This has been initiated through a revitalization of their traditional laws, with the goal of 
facilitating outsider understanding of these laws.465 As a result of this initiative, “First 
Nations and other affected communities are more organized, informed, and willing to act 
in civil and legal ways to ensure their rights and voices are respected, including requiring 
consent for development and demanding negotiations directly with governments.”466 As 
Indigenous communities have historically not had meaningful voices nor an active role in 
decision-making within the settler EA process, Indigenous-led approaches seek to 
remedy these shortcomings by grounding assessments in the legal traditions and values 
of respective communities. 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF INDIGENOUS-LED IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 A 2018 report titled “Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of 
Indigenous-Led Review” submitted to the Gwich’in Council provides a working definition 
of Indigenous-led IA, which will be adopted for the purposes of this report. The authors 
describe Indigenous-led IA as: 
A process that is completed prior to any approvals or consent being provided 
for a proposed project, which is designed and conducted with meaningful input 
and an adequate degree of control by Indigenous-parties – on their own terms 
and with their approval. The Indigenous parties are involved in the scoping, 
                                                 
464 The tern IA is used throughout this part of the report when referring to Indigenous-led assessment 
models, as these assessments signal a broader approach to assessment than conventional EA models. 
465 Wapshkaa Ma’iingan (Aaron Mills), “Aki, Anishinaabek, Kaye Tahsh Crown” (2010) 9 Indigenous LJ 
107 at 142. 
466 Chetkiewicz & Lintner, supra note 8 at 39. 
 97 
data collection, assessment, management planning, and decision-making 
about a project.467 
 
The authors of this report point to a number of developments and factors in recent years 
that have led to changes in conventional EA processes, particularly in relation to the level 
of engagement of Indigenous peoples in the process, and their role in decision-making. 
These factors include: 
• Court cases challenging the EA approach, leading to integration of Indigenous 
culture, rights and knowledge in project decisions; 
 
• The landmark Aboriginal title case of Tsilhqot’in Nation which highlighted the 
growing power of Indigenous communities in relation to land and resource use 
decision-making; 
 
• Recent commitments towards reconciliation and the adoption of UNDRIP which 
require a re-visioning of Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples; 
 
• Modern land claims settled between Canada and Indigenous groups which require 
that Indigenous culture and rights and decision-making powers are central to 
effective IA; and 
 
• The increased use of Indigenous-led IA both outside of and alongside the colonial 
system that more closely match their priorities, worldviews, and legal customs.468 
 
Indigenous-led IAs are unique in that they grounded in the legal traditions each individual 
community or Nation. As a result, they have an enhanced ability to highlight local realities, 
capacities, challenges, priorities, practices, and cultural values, so as to inform 
community decision-making moving forward. These types of assessments “often look and 
work very differently from the existing legislated processes, in part because they are tied 
to very different goals and aspirations – indeed, entirely separate worldviews.”469 A 
number of goals that are common for a Nation opting to engage in an Indigenous-led 
approach to IA include: 
                                                 
467 Ginger Gibson et al, “Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of Indigenous-led Review” 
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• Recognition of its inherent rights to govern in its territory and steward its lands and 
waters; 
 
• Embedding of own governance and decision-making processes into land and 
resource decision-making; 
 
• Protection of areas in which a specific project is proposed, because it is highly 
important for cultural, spiritual, or environmental reasons (and concern that the 
state system may not protect these values); 
 
• Formalizing more deeply engaged planning process than the existing legislated 
system allows for, which will lead to the nation being able to accept, reject, or 
change the major project in order to accommodate the particular interests of the 
nation; and 
 
• Engaging its members and leadership more meaningfully into the impact 
assessment process than the current system allows for.470 
 
Common characteristics that distinguish Indigenous-led IA include: 
• A process derived from and steeped in the culture, traditional knowledge, and 
stewardship approach of the nation; 
 
• Explicit assertion that the process and decisions that come out of it are legally 
binding as legitimate elements of an Indigenous group’s overall governance [and] 
stewardship rights and responsibilities within its territory […]; 
 
• A process that meaningfully engages Indigenous group members and their values 
at many different points, [including] the use of culturally appropriate information 
sharing and decision-making mechanisms to increase community engagement 
and understanding of the project and its potential impacts; 
 
• Indigenous laws and norms are at the centre of the process and decision-making; 
 
• Indigenous knowledge is often central to the decisions and brought in systemically 
through every phase of decision-making. This leads to increased support for the 
process and ability to socialize information at the community level, and increases 
the “defensibility” of the findings at the community level; 
 
                                                 
470 Ibid at 12. 
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• Cultural values tend to be more broadly defined in Indigenous-led assessment […] 
and are often at the core of Indigenous-led IA […] There is typically a widely shared 
intent to ensure that the culture, language and way of life are protected throughout 
a review; 
 
• More timeline and process flexibility than the legislated IA frameworks; 
 
• More focus on oral discussion of issues and less on paper-driven process steps; 
 
• More emphasis on proponents as information providers, and less on them as 
estimators of impact of impact significance or acceptability; 
 
• Less separation of valued components into separate silos, and more openness to 
decision-making on projects as a whole (holistically) against cultural laws and 
norms, sustainability, effects on future generations, and net gains to Indigenous 
values; and 
 
• A greater willingness to consider a future without the project if costs are deemed 
to outweigh benefits, as determined using Indigenous priority criteria and 
weighting. In other words, Indigenous-led IAs have led to withholding of consent 
for a major project more often (to date) than is the norm in the legislated EA 
process.471 
 
Indigenous-led approaches to IA completed to date can be broadly categorized 
into three categories: i) Indigenous-led IAs conducted for particular projects; ii) IAs 
conducted in partnership with the Crown or project proponent; and, iii) Indigenous-
developed IA models, such as cumulative effects management programs and 
consultation protocols, that are not project-specific, but rather govern development in 
traditional territory more broadly. Through a case study approach examining selected 
examples falling within each of these three categories, it will become evident how these 
Indigenous-led approaches fill a number of the gaps left by the settler legislative regime 
through the application of the principles identified above, and how they enable Indigenous 
communities to exercise their inherent jurisdiction over their traditional lands and 
resources. This case study approach also includes an analysis of how these models, or 
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components of these models, might articulate with Canada’s current settler legal regime 
for EA, where Indigenous authorities support that integration. 
 
4.2 CASE STUDIES OF INDIGENOUS-LED APPROACHES TO IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 
 
4.2.1 INDIGENOUS-LED IAs CONDUCTED FOR PARTICULAR PROJECTS 
In recent years, there has been a rise of Indigenous-led IAs conducted for 
particular projects, which have arisen as a result of a number of controversial, large-scale 
resource development projects that have been proposed in the province. This category 
of Indigenous-led IA features strongly in British Columba, as many Indigenous 
communities have not signed historic or modern treaties with the Crown. Projects situated 
on their traditional territories should rightfully require FPIC before they move forward, 
although this requirement does not reflect the current state of the settler legal regime. 
The following case studies seek to outline how different approaches to Indigenous-led IA 
have been used to grant or withhold consent for particular projects, and address how 
these assessment models differ from the settler approach to EA. 
 
4.2.1.1 Tsleil-Waututh Nation Assessment of the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain 
Pipeline Project 
The Tsleil-Waututh Nation (“TWN”), known as the “People of the Inlet,” is one of 
the many groups of Coast Salish peoples living in the Pacific Northwest. The Nation 
currently has a population of about 500 people, and their traditional territory, which they 
have occupied since time immemorial, includes the land around the Burrard Inlet in British 
Columbia, and the waters draining into it.472 The territory includes approximately 1,900 
km2 of land, encompassing watersheds northwards to Mount Garibaldi, eastwards to 
Coquitlam Lake, and westward to Howe Sound.473 The TWN holds Aboriginal title over 
                                                 
472 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, “Our Story” (2019), online: <twnation.ca/our-story/> [Tsleil-Waututh Nation, “Our 
Story”]. 
473 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, “About Tsleil-Waututh Nation” (2019), online: <twnation.ca/about/> [Tsleil-
Waututh Nation, “About”]. 
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part of this land in the eastern Burrard Inlet.474 Historically, the TWN relied heavily on 
cycles of hunting, harvesting and preserving foods, and on trade with neighbouring 
Nations. Today, their primary community is located on the north shore of the Burrard Inlet 
in North Vancouver.475 The Nation is not party to any treaty with the Crown and has never 
ceded or relinquished their responsibility to their territory.476 They have been in 
negotiations for a treaty agreement with Canada and British Columbia since 1994.477 
The TWN has a “sacred trust, a responsibility to care for and restore [their] 
traditional territory to its former state,” as they understand that the health of their peoples 
is interconnected with the land, air and waters of their territory.478 This is a sacred and 
legal obligation to “protect, defend and steward the water, land, air, and resources in their 
territory” and to “maintain or restore conditions that provide the environmental, cultural, 
spiritual, and economic foundation for the community to thrive.”479 Their “birthright and 
obligation as Tsleil-Waututh people is to care for the lands and waters of [their] territory 
to ensure future generations can thrive.”480  
In exercising their sacred trust to the land, the TWN established the Sacred Trust 
Initiative, whose mandate is to stop the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline project 
that was approved by the federal government to run through their territory without their 
consent. The Kinder Morgan pipeline project would increase tanker traffic in the Burrard 
Inlet, and oil spills resulting from the project as well as the construction of the project itself 
would directly impact their community and irreparably harm their environmental and 
cultural values.481 Through the Sacred Trust Initiative, the TWN developed a 
comprehensive strategy to stop the proposed pipeline, including direct engagement with 
the federal and provincial governments, legal action in the courts, and public and First 
Nation outreach. One aspect of this strategy was the completion of an independent IA 
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under the community’s Stewardship Policy, which is an expression of TWN jurisdiction 
and law, mandating a review of any proposed development inside the TWN’s Consultation 
Area, pictured below in Figure 5.482 Released in May 2015, the Assessment of the Trans 
Mountain Pipeline and Tanker Expansion Proposal483 (“the Assessment”) highlighted the 
reasons why the TWN has decided to withhold support for the Kinder Morgan project. 
Figure 5: Map Depicting the TWN’s Consultation Area484 
 
                                                 
482 Clogg et al, supra note 33 at 12. 
483 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, Treaty, Lands & Resources Department, supra note 474. 
484 Ibid at 7.  
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 The goal of the Assessment was to examine the potential impacts of the Kinder 
Morgan project on the TWN’s title, rights, and interests. These include: archaeological 
and cultural heritage sites, contemporary economy, environmental stewardship, resource 
access and harvest or use, title and governance, and the water.485 A table listing and 
describing the nature of all TWN interests that were relevant in the Assessment is 
included as Appendix 7. With regard to the scope and process of completing the 
Assessment, the TWN assessed the Kinder Morgan project proposal as it was described 
in the materials filed with the NEB, who was the responsible authority for the purposes of 
the federal EA process. The Assessment focused on the impacts within the TWN 
Consultation Area, which is delineated on the map in Figure 5, above.486 In completing 
the report, the TWN engaged five experts to provide technical advice about the project 
proposal, and also relied on the traditional knowledge of TWN members.487 The 
Assessment was completed using a two-lens approach, as set out in the TWN 
Stewardship Policy. The first lens looks at the potential negative effects of the project and 
seeks to “determine whether the project is a good land-use decision from the perspective 
of the potential effects in the Consultation Area and under the terms of the Stewardship 
Policy.”488 If the project proposal passed the first lens, the second lens asks whether the 
project proposal “will provide benefits to the community that outweigh its negative 
effects.”489 While community feedback was sought to review and discuss potential effects 
of the project, ultimate decision-making authority rested with the elected Chief and 
Council to either grant or withhold consent for the project.490 
 The Assessment itself was grounded in TWN legal principles, which are reflected 
in the Stewardship Policy. Three principles are outlined in the Assessment report: 
1) TWN has a sacred obligation to protect, defend, and steward the water, land, air, 
and resources of the territory; 
 
                                                 
485 Ibid at 25. 
486 Ibid at 50. 
487 Ibid; The five experts retained by TWN provided technical advice on: oil spill risk assessment, oil spill 
trajectory analysis, the behaviour, fate and consequences of spilled dilbit, and an oil spill air quality 
assessment.  
488 Ibid at 51. 
489 Ibid at 51. 
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 104 
2) TWN’s stewardship obligation includes maintaining and restoring conditions in our 
territory that provide the environmental, cultural, spiritual and economic foundation 
for (i) cultural transmission and training, (ii) spiritual preparation and power, (iii) 
harvest and consumption of safe, abundant wild foods to feed the present 
community, our ancestors, and other beings, and (iv) control over sharing of 
resources; and 
 
3) Failure to be “highly responsible” in one’s actions toward the people, the Earth, the 
ancestors, and all beings has serious consequences, which may include (i) loss of 
physical sustenance, (ii) loss of access to resources or social status, and (iii) loss 
of the tools and training that allow TWN members to reach their full potential.491 
 
The Assessment sought to consider the impacts of the project on TWN title, rights, and 
interests from a holistic perspective, including interconnected environmental issues as 
well as cultural, spiritual, legal and governance rights and responsibilities of the TWN.492 
The TWN “combined TWN legal principles, traditional knowledge and community 
engagement with state of the art expert evidence including expert reports related to oil 
spill risk, spills and cleanup, human and biophysical health impacts, anthropology and 
archaeology.”493 The TWN compiled a table listing each of the TWN rights and interests 
with the corresponding impacts that marine shipping and oil spills would have on each. 
The TWN also assessed potential cumulative effects of each risk, and the effects that 
would result for the TWN community.494 This table is attached to this report as Appendix 
8. Ultimately, after applying the two-lens approach, the TWN concluded that the project 
failed at the first lens and recommended that Chief and Council continue to withhold the 
TWN’s support for the project.495 On the basis of the recommendations, the Chief and 
Council passed a resolution confirming disapproval of the project under TWN law. The 
Assessment as well as the resolution were filed as evidence in the NEB’s review of the 
project.496 
A core component of the TWN assessment was the use of maps. Extensive 
mapping work was completed as a part of the Assessment in order to outline the TWN’s 
                                                 
491 Ibid at 53-55.  
492 Sacred Trust Initiative, supra note 479. 
493 Clogg et al, supra note 33 at 12.  
494 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, Treaty, Lands & Resources Department, supra note 474 at 80-81.  
495 Ibid at 86. 
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rights and interests across their traditional territory. Additionally, these maps were used 
to outline pre-contact baseline conditions to assist in measuring cumulative effects, and 
to outline the current conditions of the TWN’s territory as a result of industrial development 
throughout the 20th century. Land-use maps were used to outline: TWN village sites,497 
the defensive network historically employed by the TWN,498 archaeology sites,499 pre-
contact resource use,500 seasonal movement patterns where the TWN access resources 
including berries, salmon and other fish, duck, deer, elk, shellfish and mountain goat,501 
the locations of current resource harvesting camps,502 important bird and fish 
conservation areas,503 the locations of marine mammal sightings,504 major salmon-
bearing rivers and streams,505 and current shellfish gathering sites.506 Additional mapping 
was used to show the potential impacts that the project would have on TWN territory. 
These maps included: the increase in tanker and tug traffic on the Burrard Inlet,507 oil spill 
scenario locations,508 and the location of sensitive habitat in relation to potential oil spill 
spread.509   
This TWN Assessment embodies numerous characteristics and goals of 
Indigenous-led approaches to IA enumerated above. By grounding the assessment in 
their sacred obligation to their traditional territory, the TWN was able to evaluate the risks 
and impacts of the Kinder Morgan project against these core community rights and 
interests using a clear an authoritative assessment process which represented an 
exertion of their inherent right to govern over their territories. 
While the TWN withheld consent for the Kinder Morgan project after completing 
their IA process, the project was initially approved by the federal government, and the 
TWN had to resort to litigation as a part of their strategy to advocate against the project’s 
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approval. Following the initial EA conducted by the NEB, the federal government granted 
approval of the Kinder Morgan pipeline, stating that the project was in the national interest, 
and that if mitigation measures and conditions were implemented, the project would not 
cause significant adverse environmental effects.510 TWN was one of several applicants 
who swiftly launched a successful judicial review of Cabinet’s approval of the project, 
arguing that the NEB’s “process and findings were so flawed that [Cabinet] could not 
reasonably rely on the Board’s report” and that Canada failed to fulfil the DTCA owed to 
Indigenous peoples.511 The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the Cabinet approval and 
remitted the project to Cabinet for redetermination, who directed the NEB to reconsider 
aspects of the project, particularly the impacts of marine shipping on wildlife species and 
critical habitat identified in the Species At Risk Act. After reconsideration, the NEB 
recommended approval of the project for a second time, and the project decision now 
rests with Cabinet, who has 90 days to issue a decision on the project that is now federally 
owned.512    
 
4.2.1.2 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation Assessment of the KGHM Ajax Gold 
Mine Project  
A second example of a uniquely completed Indigenous-led IA is the 
Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation (“SSN”) Assessment of the KGHM Ajax Gold Mine 
Project. The SSN is a governance group of the Secwépemc Nation, and consists of two 
Indian Bands – the Tk’emlúps te Secwépemc and the Skeetchestn.513 Also known as “the 
people of the confluence,” the SSN are members of the interior British Columbia Salish 
Secwépemc peoples, located in the Secwépemc traditional territory at the confluence of 
                                                 
510 Government of Canada, “Minister Carr Issues Statement regarding Trans Mountain Expansion” (8 
April 2018), online: <www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2018/04/minister-carr-issues-
statement-regarding-trans-mountain-expansion.html>. 
511 Tsleil-Waututh Nation v Canada (AG), 2018 FCA 153 at para 4, [2018] 3 CNLR 205. 
512 National Energy Board, “Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC: Application for the Trans Mountain Expansion 
Project – National Energy Board reconsideration of aspects of its OH-001-2014 Report as directed by 
Order in Council PC 2018-1177” (2019), online (pdf): <www.neb-
one.gc.ca/pplctnflng/mjrpp/trnsmntnxpnsn/trnsmntnxpnsnrprt-eng.pdf>; Department of Finance Canada, 
Agreement Reached to Create and Protect Jobs, Build Trans Mountain Expansion Project” (29 May 
2018), online: Government of Canada <www.fin.gc.ca/n18/18-038-eng.asp>. 
513 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “About” (2019), online: <stkemlups.ca/about/> [SSN, “About”]. 
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the two Thompson Rivers and Kamloops Lake.514 The SSN has approximately 1,000 
members living both on and off reserve, and their traditional territory spans approximately 
180,000 km2.515 In 2007, the two bands decided to re-unite through a Resource Sharing 
Protocol Memorandum of Understanding in order to protect their collective interests and 
strengthen their socio-economic situations.516 By joining together, they were better 
positioned to be able to manage the conservation, negotiation and management of 
resources in their shared territory, as they have done since time immemorial.517 
KGHM Ajax Mine was one of many resource development project proposals 
situated within the SSN’s territory. Located approximately 2 kilometres southwest of 
Kamloops, BC, the project was a proposed open pit copper and gold mine, that would 
have a lifetime of approximately 23 years.518 The Ajax Mine was situated within an area 
of significant cultural importance to the SSN, which they refer to as Pípsell, or, Jacko 
Lake.519 Oral histories associated with this land, recounted in the Trout Children Story, 
are foundational to Secwépemc law, and deal with the reciprocal and mutually 
accountable relationships between humans and the environment.520 The SSN have 
asserted Aboriginal rights and title over Secwepemcúlecw (Secwépemc traditional 
territory), including over Pípsell and the project area, which they assert has never been 
surrendered or extinguished.521 In addition to the Trout Children Story, the assessment 
was grounded in the Memorial to Sir Wilfred Laurier (1910), where the Chiefs of the 
                                                 
514 Pull Together, “Meet the Nations: Stk’emlupsemc te Secwépemc” (2019), online: <pull-
together.ca/tkemlups-te-secwe̓pemc/> 
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519 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “SSN Pípsell Report: For the KGHM Ajax Project @ Pípsell” 
(2017) at 22, online (pdf): <drive.google.com/file/d/0B92rPs-T5VkGWVpacENEWTM5MDA/view> [SSN, 
“Pípsell Report]. 
520 Ibid at 25. 
521 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “Decision of the SSN Joint Council on the Proposed KGHM 
Ajax” (2017) at 3, online: <stkemlups.ca/files/2013/11/3-2017.03.04-SSN-Joint-Council-Decision-
Document-.pdf> [SSN, “Decision of the SSN Joint Council”]. 
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interior of British Columbia asserted their title and sovereignty over their respective 
territories, UNDRIP, and the laws of Canada.522 
Aspects of the Ajax Mine were assessed under both provincial and federal EA 
processes through a joint comprehensive assessment under CEAA. While the SSN 
requested to collaborate in carrying out these processes, their request was denied. Due 
to the inadequacies of the settler approach, the SSN was required to develop their own 
project assessment process for the Ajax Mine. In doing so, their objective was “to facilitate 
informed decision-making by the SSN communities in a manner which [was] consistent 
with [their] laws, traditions, and customs and assess project impacts in a way that 
respect[ed] [their] knowledge and perspectives.”523 Their review process was: 
• Founded on [their] laws and traditional governance structures that transcend time; 
 
• Centred on [their] rich cultural perspectives, collective knowledge and history that 
goes back millennia; 
 
• Built on the Principle of Walking on Two Legs – Secwépemc and Western 
information was provided in both oral and written format; 
 
• A long view that delved into long-term intergenerational impacts as well as the pre-
contact past to address the legacy of wrongs that [their] people have faced since 
Canada and British Columbia’s foundation; and 
 
• In-depth, examining aspects that are currently lost in the BC and Canadian 
environmental processes and inclusive of information regarding the “intangible” 
impacts to spirit, culture and immeasurable impacts.524 
 
The SSN established a Review Panel, the first Indigenous-led panel review 
process in North America, bringing together 26 representatives from each of their two 
communities. The Review Panel consisted of youth, elders, and other family members 
                                                 
522 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “SSN Review Process: Impacts and Infringement Report, 
Decision and Recommendations” (2016), online (pdf): MiningWatch Canada 
<miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/2016march30-ssnreviewprocessoverview.pdf>. 
523 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “Honouring the Vision of Our Ancestors” (2017) at 2, online 
(pdf): <stkemlups.ca/files/2013/11/SSN_4Pager-v13-12.02-WEB.pdf> [SSN, “Honouring the Vision of our 
Ancestors”]. 
524 SSN, “Decision of the Joint Council,” supra note 521 at 6.  
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who were appointed by their families, as well as the elected Chiefs and Councillors.525 
The question the Review Panel was asked to answer was: “In recognition to the 
Declaration of Title to Pípsell […] does the Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation give 
their free, prior and informed consent to change the land use objective to allow for 
development of the lands and resources for the purposes of the Ajax Mine Project?”526 
The Review Panel received evidence and submissions from over 80 presenters, both oral 
and written, and deliberated over 9.5 months, culminating in the release of the Pípsell 
Report in February 2017.527 After analyzing this report, the Review Panel provided 
recommendations in a second report528 to the SSN Joint Council, who held the final 
decision-making authority for the project. The Joint Council withheld their consent for the 
project in accordance with the Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation’s laws, traditions, 
customs, and land tenure systems, recognizing that Pípsell was a cultural keystone area 
with fundamental significance for the Nation.529 
By conducting their own review panel process, the SSN sought to address several 
inadequacies of the settler approach to EA. One of these inadequacies that they sought 
to remedy was the tendency for the settler approach to independently assess individual 
“value components.” The SSN believe that “an impact on one part will impact all the parts 
of [their] world, as [they] are all connected.”530 They also saw the settler approach to EA 
as “a perpetuation of imbalance which exists between First Nations, governments and 
proponents.” As “government and industry both having greater resources to undertake 
studies and review [there is] an imbalance of information before, during and after 
environmental assessments.”531 By holding a review panel process and employing the 
Principle of Walking on Two Legs, the SSN sought to level this imbalance by gathering 
                                                 
525 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “Honouring our Sacred Connection to Pípsell” (2017) at 3, 
online (pdf): <stkemlups.ca/files/2013/11/2017-03-ssnajaxdecisionsummary_0.pdf>. 
526 SSN, “Decision of the Joint Council,” supra note 521 at 7. 
527 SSN, “Pípsell Report,” supra note 519.   
528 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “SSN Panel Recommendations Report: For the KGHM Ajax 
Project @ Pípsell” (2017), online (pdf): <drive.google.com/file/d/0B92rPs-
T5VkGZVNlbzhuZ0VhMk0/view>. 
529 Stk’emlúpsemc Te Secwépemc Nation, “The Pípsell (Jacko Lake & area) Decision” (2017), online: 
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knowledge and hearing from both traditional knowledge holders within the  community as 
well as those experienced in methods of Western science.  
In the final report of the review panel, SSN acknowledged that capacity was a 
constant challenge both for SSN to engage in consultation on the proposed Ajax Mine 
project through the settler regime, as well as to complete their own review process. They 
were able to negotiate some capacity funding once they made their Declaration of Title 
at Pípsell and notified Canada and British Columbia of their intention to proceed with their 
own assessment process for the proposed project, although the amount received was 
only a portion of the amount projected by SSN to conduct the entire process with 
certainty.532    
The Ajax Mine project was ultimately rejected by the federal government in June 
2018, as the federal Cabinet determined that the project was likely to cause significant 
environmental effects that could not be justified in the circumstances.533 
 
4.2.1.3 Squamish Nation Assessment of the Woodfibre LNG Pipeline and Plant Project 
A final example of an independent Indigenous-led IA is the Squamish Nation’s 
assessment of the Woodfibre liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) pipeline and plant project. The 
Squamish Nation are a Coast Salish people who reside in the lower mainland of British 
Columbia. Their traditional territory is approximately 6,730 km2, including the present-day 
cities of Vancouver, Burnaby, and New Westminster, North and West Vancouver, the 
District of Squamish, and the Municipality of Whistler.534 With more than 3,600 members, 
over 60% of the Squamish Nation population now live on reserve, including several urban 
reserves in Vancouver and Squamish.535 The Squamish Nation have existed and 
prospered within their traditional territory since time immemorial, and have never ceded 
or surrendered title to their lands, rights to their resources, or the power to make decisions 
within their territory.536 
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533 Government of Canada, “Decision Statement” (2018), online: Canadian Environmental Assessment 
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In recent years, there has been an increase in LNG development within British 
Columbia. In 2013, Woodfibre LNG and FortisBC proposed to build an LNG plant at the 
site of the former Squamish Nation village of Swiy’a’at, seven kilometres southwest of 
Squamish. The proposal also included a 52-kilometre twinned pipeline to supply the plant, 
running from Indian Arm to Squamish, and would necessitate two to four LNG tankers 
travelling up Howe Sound each month to and from the plant.537 The project was subject 
to an EA under both provincial and federal legislation, a process the Squamish Nation felt 
was inadequate, for several reasons. First, they felt that the settler process was 
inadequate when it came to identifying Squamish Nation Aboriginal title and rights and 
the corresponding impacts the pipeline and LNG plant would have on the Squamish 
Nation’s interests, including culturally significant and sacred areas, environmentally 
sensitive land, and aquatic habitats.538 Second, they felt the settler process did “not 
consider Squamish Nation governance over lands and waters that may be impacted by 
the project or the economic component of Aboriginal title.”539 Finally, they believed that 
the settler process could not obtain Squamish consent. They believed that consent 
required an informed decision by the Squamish Nation, and shared decision-making with 
the Crown.540 As a result, the Squamish Nation opted to conduct their own IA process 
beginning in 2014, parallel to the settler process.541 
This Squamish Nation assessment was conducted using yet another unique 
method, different from the prior two examples. Named the “Squamish Process,” the 
Squamish Nation’s IA process is “a comprehensive program designed to protect sensitive 
marine and land environments in and near the Squamish Estuary, Howe Sound and 
beyond – all in traditional Squamish Nation territory.”542 The process “allows the Nation 
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to make an informed decision based on the best information available from its 
perspective, feedback from its members, and advice from independent consultants and 
scientists.”543 Once an assessment is completed through the Squamish Process, the 
Nation will have significant certainty that thorough consideration has been given to the 
proposed project, and they will be in a position to give consent for the project.544 
In engaging in their own independent assessment process, the Squamish Nation 
was conscious about their lack of recognized jurisdictional authority to engage in an IA 
off-reserve, as there was no authorizing legislation under setter law enabling them to do 
so. In order to overcome this, and to “create a process outside of the typical EA process 
that respects the inherent rights to govern,” the Squamish Nation had to “create a 
contractual arrangement with project proponents to set the terms and conditions of 
participating in its legal process.”545 This “Framework Agreement,” which may vary with 
each individual project, highlights deviations from the standard settler approach to EA. 
These include: 
• The Squamish Process is confidential – the proponent must agree not to provide 
any information regarding Squamish Nation rights, title, or other interests to the 
provincial or federal government without their consent; 
 
• The Squamish Nation does not formally participate in the EA, but agrees to use 
technical information submitted in the Crown process in its assessment of the 
process to avoid duplication and to make the Squamish nation process efficient 
and less costly; 
 
• The proponent agrees to provide supplemental information to the Squamish Nation 
through an information request process, even if the information is not required 
under the Crown EA process; 
 
• The proponent agrees to pay process fees that will fully fund the Squamish 
Process; and 
 
• If the conclusions of the Squamish Process point to approval, the Nation will issue 
an Environmental Certificate setting out the conditions of the approval. This takes 
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the form of a legally binding agreement, but is not the same as, and is separate 
from, any form of impacts and benefits agreement.546 
 
The Squamish Process differs from the settler approach to EA in several ways, including 
how the project is defined, how issues are scoped, how impacts are measures, and how 
a decision is made. Fundamentally, the Squamish Process relies heavily on community 
engagement to make each of these determinations, as it is the cornerstone of the 
independent review process. The Squamish Process follows six steps: 
1. Introduce Proposed Project: the proponent introduces the project in a neutral 
way to the community in a way that does not assume that the all community 
members know that the proposed project is, what natural resources it will be 
extracting or selling, or the business the company is engaged in. The community 
provides initial views, and outlines the Squamish Process so that members 
understand the process moving forward.547 
 
2. Technical Information Collection: The Squamish Nation participates in the 
Crown EA on a purely technical level through an independent consultant, who does 
not represent or speak on behalf of the Squamish Nation’s Aboriginal rights or title. 
Participation is limited to obtaining studies and seeking clarity from the proponent 
on these studies. The Squamish Nation will review the proponent’s reasoning to 
determine whether they agree or disagree with their conclusions on issues such 
as potential effects of the project. If the proponent’s conclusions are not supported 
by data, the Squamish Nation may request supplemental information, shifting from 
the Crown process to the Squamish Process, as this information is shared with the 
Nation confidentially, outside the Crown process.548 
 
3. Defining Interests and Scoping Assessment: The Squamish Nation reviews the 
information collected to determine which Squamish Nation values may be 
impacted. The Squamish Process has adopted the valued component concept 
used by the Crown in order to maintain consistent language, but has defined it in 
their own unique way to reflect its perspective of land management. Definition of 
the values are heavily influenced by community input, with community hall 
meetings, focus group meetings, email and phone accounts, and direct dialogue 
used to inform these values. Land use plans, ethnographies, and traditional use 
and occupancy studies are also used.549 
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4. Assessment: In determining the significance of the effects of the project, the focus 
is placed on ensuring that the ecosystem can bear whatever impacts might occur 
due to the project. The Squamish Process assessment report avoids the use of 
definitive terms for measuring the importance of impacts (i.e. very significant or not 
significant) as this is subjective to each individual, but expresses what the review 
team understands to be impacts of highest concern and identifies potential 
mitigation/ In assessing impacts on valued components, the Squamish Process 
incorporates technical information, traditional use and occupancy studies, and 
community engagement, knowledge and cultural history.550 
 
5. Present Results to Community and Chiefs and Council: The results of the 
Squamish Process are presented to the Squamish Nation community for their 
review at an open community meeting, where they have the opportunity to develop 
with the review team potential conditions of project approval.551 
 
6. Final Squamish Decision Making and Conditions: The impacts of the project 
are set out in the assessment report and submitted to Chiefs and Council. The 
Chiefs and Council will vote to either reject or accept the recommended draft 
conditions on the project. If Council approves the conditions, the proponent will be 
required to enter into a legally binding agreement that sets out the process to 
satisfy the conditions, mechanisms for enforcing compliance and remedies for non-
compliance. If Council rejects the conditions, the Squamish Nation will either re-
engage with the proponent and Crown to improve the conditions or will pursue 
legal options available to it. The conditions are the basis for the discussion with the 
proponent and the Crown regarding a shared decision on the project and 
reconciliation of interests.552 
 
In applying the Squamish Process to the Woodfibre LNG project, the Squamish 
Nation retained Pottinger Gaherty (PLG) consultants to commission an extensive 
independent environmental review. This review addressed both technical aspects of the 
project, information for which was obtained primarily through the Crown EA process, and 
also addressed specific concerns raised by Squamish Nation community members.553 
This report was submitted to the Squamish Nation Council in June 2015. After review, the 
Council developed a list of “25 Conditions” which formed the basis for negotiating 
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agreement for the project.554 The Squamish Nation would not give consent for the project 
unless all 25 Conditions were met. This list of 25 Conditions was released publicly, and, 
five days later, as a direct result of the announcement of the 25 Conditions, “Woodfibre 
LNG requested suspension of the formal environmental process, asking for more time to 
study the conditions. That delay was granted.”555 
The Squamish Process enabled the Squamish Nation to directly influence the 
settler EA approach, directly influence the design of the project, exercise their governance 
authority over the land, and to ensure that the project would be enforced in a way that 
addressed the impacts that they were concerned about. This was done through 
contractual, binding agreements with the project proponent, rather than the Crown. In 
November 2018, the Squamish Nation Council voted 8 to 6 to approve the Woodfibre 
LNG project, entering into three agreements with Woodfibre LNG, FortisBC, and the 
Province of British Columbia, and making the project the first to be awarded an 
environmental certificate by an Indigenous government. As part of the approval, the 
proponent must remain compliant with the Squamish Nation’s legally binding conditions 
issued under the Squamish Process.556 Benefits were also negotiated for the community, 
including $225-million in cash over 40 years, the opportunity for qualified Squamish 
Nation businesses be awarded up to $872-million in contracts for the project, and the 
option for the Nation to buy 5% of the project.557 
It is important to note that one risk inherent in this model is that the reluctance to 
fully participate in the Crown EA process may preclude the Squamish Nation from 
successfully launching a claim against a project approval on the basis that the Crown 
failed to uphold the DTCA  in the event that the Crown opts to approve a project for which 
the Squamish Nation has withheld consent. As per Haida Nation and subsequent litigation 
on the DTCA, the DTCA is a “two-way street.”558 Indigenous communities must not thwart 
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the government’s attempt to engage in discussions and must articulate their claims with 
clarity. Under the Squamish Process, the Squamish Nation only engages in the Crown 
EA process through a consultant on a purely technical basis and does not share any 
information about rights or title with the government. This level of engagement may be 
looked on unfavourably in subsequent litigation, and may rule out judicial review on the 
basis of inadequate execution of the DTCA as an available legal option.   
 
4.2.1.4 Opportunities for Recognition of Indigenous-led IA in Bill C-69 
Following the SCC’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, some have viewed these 
independent Indigenous-led IAs as an example of communities exercising the right to 
proactively use and manage the land, consistent with the bundle of rights associated with 
Aboriginal title and the exercise of each Nation’s sovereign law-making authority. 
However, none of these assessments have received recognition by a Canadian court as 
a valid expression of law within the Canadian legal system. Several lawyers from West 
Coast Environmental Law “envision future ‘conflict of laws’ litigation where the courts are 
called on to reconcile a Canadian legal decision [i.e. approval of the Kinder Morgan 
pipeline project] with an Indigenous legal decision [i.e. the IAs outlined above] in the 
context of Canadian constitutional protection for Aboriginal title and rights.”559 They 
suggest that “these questions could extend beyond Canadian borders through complaint 
resolution mechanisms at the UN Human Rights Committee, or through the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, grounded in the UNDRIP.”560 
More recently, Bill C-69 has opened some space for recognition of independent 
Indigenous-led IA within the settler regime. Section 22(1) of the proposed Impact 
Assessment Act sets out the factors that the IAA or a Review Panel must take into account 
when carrying out an IA. Section 22(1)(r) requires that “any study or plan that is conducted 
or prepared by a jurisdiction – or an Indigenous governing body not referred to in 
paragraph (f) or (g) of the definition jurisdiction in section 2 – that is in respect of a region 
related to the designated project and that has been provided with respect to the project” 
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must be considered in the course of an impact assessment.561 This provision presumably 
mandates the consideration of independent Indigenous-led IAs, such as the examples 
outlined above, and may also include the findings from models such as the Metlakatla 
First Nation’s Cumulative Effects Program, described below. However, as will be explored 
in succeeding portions of this paper, joint decision-making authority, which is at the core 
of the requirement for FPIC under UNDRIP, remains absent from the proposed IA regime 
in Bill C-69. 
 
4.2.2 INDIGENOUS-LED IAs CONDUCTED IN PARTNERSHIP THE WITH CROWN 
OR PROJECT PROPONENT 
A second general category of Indigenous-led IAs that have been completed are 
those conducted in partnership between an Indigenous body and the Crown, such as an 
environmental assessment agency, or with a project proponent. There is a wide variety 
of possible processes falling within this category, “ranging from the legislated requirement 
for joint decision-making at a nation-to-nation level, to bilateral engagement of Indigenous 
groups with the Crown at key steps in an impact assessment.”562  As the following 
examples will outline, this type of assessment has typically occurred in cases where there 
is a unique legislative framework in place, such as a modern treaty. However, it may be 
possible for Indigenous governing bodies to play a more active role in the assessment 
process under other legislative frameworks, such as the IA process envisioned in Bill C-
69’s Impact Assessment Act.  
 
4.2.2.1 The Tłı̨chǫ Government and the Fortune Minerals NICO Poly-Metallic Mine 
Situated in the Northwest Territories (“NWT”), the Tłı̨chǫ, also known as the 
Dogrib, are a group of Dene people who live in the lands east of the Mackenzie River 
between Great Slave Lake and Great Bear Lake.563 There are four main Tłı̨chǫ 
communities within their traditional territory, Behchoko, Whatì, Gamètì, and Wekweètì, 
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and many others live in the urban centre of Yellowknife.564 The Tłı̨chǫ are signatories to 
Treaty 11, signed with the Government of Canada on August 22, 1921.565 The 
Government of Canada was interested in signing treaties with the Nations in this territory 
due to oil and gas prospects in the Mackenzie Valley region, and they wanted to have 
some certainty over title to the land and access to the resources in the area. The promises 
and terms of Treaty 11 have been highly disputed, as Indigenous communities did not 
view the treaties as having been land cessations. In 1973, the case of Re Paulette and 
Registrar of Titles (No 2), (1973)566 was decided by the NWT Supreme Court, holding that 
the Treaty “could not legally terminate Indian land rights. The Indian people did not 
understand or agree to the terms appearing in the written version of the treaties, only the 
mutually understood promises to wildlife, annuities, relief and friendship became legally 
effective commitments.”567 This decision, which was affirmed by the SCC,568 highlighted 
the uncertainties of Treaty 11, and gave rise to the modern treaty process in the territory.  
The Tłı̨chǫ submitted a regional claim to the Government of Canada in 1992, which 
led to the signing of a modern treaty in August 2003. The Tłı̨chǫ Land Claims and Self-
Government Agreement569 (“Tłı̨chǫ Agreement”) was negotiated by the Dogrib Treaty 11 
Council, the Government of the NWT, and the Government of Canada, and is the “first 
combined comprehensive land claim and self-government agreement in the NWT.”570  
The Agreement created the Tłı̨chǫ Government, which is the governing authority 
on Tłı̨chǫ lands, and has the power to pass laws, enforce its own laws, and establish its 
own government structure and manage its affairs.571 This includes: use, management, 
administration and protection of Tłı̨chǫ lands and renewable and non-renewable 
                                                 
564 Executive and Indigenous Affairs, “Concluding and Implementing Land Claim and Self-Government 
Agreements: Tłı̨chǫ” (2019), online: Government of Northwest Territories 
<www.eia.gov.nt.ca/en/priorities/concluding-and-implementing-land-claim-and-self-government-
agreements/tlicho>. 
565 Tłı̨chǫ Ndek’àowo Government, “Chronology of the Tłı̨chǫ Negotiation Process” (21017), online: 
<tlicho.ca/cec-assembly/our-story/chronology>. 
566 42 DLR (3d) 8, 9 CNLC 307 (NWTSC). 
567 Ibid at 30. 
568 [1977] 2 SCR 628, 72 DLR (3d) 161 aff’g (1973), 42 DLR (3d) 8, 9 CNLC 307 (NWTSC). 
569 Land Claims and Self-Government Agreement among the Tłı̨chǫ and the Government of the 
Northwest Territories and the Government of Canada, 25 August 2003, online (pdf): <www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-
text/ccl_fagr_nwts_tliagr_tliagr_1302089608774_eng.pdf>. 
570 Executive and Indigenous Affairs, supra note 564.  
571 Ibid.  
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resources, land use planning for Tłı̨chǫ lands, managing and harvesting of fish and wildlife 
on Tłı̨chǫ lands, and managing the rights and benefits provided under the Tłı̨chǫ 
Agreement.572 Each of the four Tłı̨chǫ communities also have Community Governments, 
which replaced the Indian Act band structure.573 The Tłı̨chǫ Agreement gave ownership 
of 39,000 km2 of land to the Tłı̨chǫ Government, including subsurface resources, $152-
million over 14 years in capital transfer payments, and a share of resource royalties 
collected by the government from resource development in the Mackenzie Valley.574 
The Tłı̨chǫ Agreement has been fundamental in restructuring the relationships 
between the Tłı̨chǫ Government and other regional authorities and resource development 
proponents. One example of how the Tłı̨chǫ Agreement has impacted the EA process is 
the Fortune Minerals NICO poly-metallic mine project. Fortune Minerals Limited first 
proposed to build the poly-metallic mine in 2009, which would be located approximately 
50 kilometers north of Whatì and 160 kilometers northwest of Yellowknife.575 The project, 
which would be an underground and open pit mine, anticipated to run for approximately 
20 years, is wholly surrounded by Tłı̨chǫ lands that are defined within the Tłı̨chǫ 
Agreement, although not directly located on them.576 In addition to the mine itself, a new 
27-kilometer all-season access road to the community of Whatì was required, which 
would cross directly through Tłı̨chǫ lands.577 
Under the Tłı̨chǫ Agreement and the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management 
Act,578 the to the Tłı̨chǫ Government was established as a legislative decision-maker in 
the EA process, and thus was able to exercise authority throughout the entirety of the 
assessment process.579 Under s.131 of the MVRMA, consent is required from the Tłı̨chǫ 
Government for approval of projects wholly or partly across Tłı̨chǫ Lands. In practice, this 
means that the Tłı̨chǫ Government “can provide comment on the final report of the Report 
                                                 
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid.  
574 Ibid.  
575 Mackenzie Valley Review Board, “Report of Environmental Assessment and Reasons for Decision: 
EA0809-004 Fortune Minerals Limited NICO Project” (2013) at 5, online (pdf): 
<reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-
004_NICO_Report_of_EA_and_Reasons_for_Decision.PDF>. 
576 Ibid at 6. 
577 Ibid at v.  
578 SC 1998, c 25 [MVRMA]. 
579 Gibson et al, supra note 467 at 20.  
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of the Environmental Assessment [issued by the Mackenzie Valley Review Board], and 
then accept, require additional review of, add of modify conditions (in consultation with 
the Review Board), or reject the recommendations.”580 In this case, the Tłı̨chǫ 
Government issued a decision to accept the Report of the Environmental Assessment 
issued by the quasi-judicial Review Board resulting in the project’s approval, with 
subsequent negotiations over benefit-sharing pending through an Impact-Benefit 
Agreement with the proponent.581   
In relation to the Nico mine project, the Tłı̨chǫ Government’s central role “assured 
the appropriate involvement of both traditional knowledge and western scientific methods 
in the assessment and conditions for project approval.”582 Under the MVRMA, traditional 
knowledge is given an equal role in guiding the EA. The Tłı̨chǫ Government was also 
“actively involved to ensure key issues related to scoping, traditional knowledge, and 
adequate Indigenous engagement were meaningfully dealt with.”583 Future permits and 
licences required by the project will also require consideration of traditional knowledge.584 
In order to support the review, the Tłı̨chǫ Government negotiated with both the 
proponent and the Crown for funding, which covered a portion of the cost of the 
assessment.585 The Tłı̨chǫ Government also has the ability to implement taxation and 
collect revenues through revenue-sharing agreements, ensuring they have a continuous 
source of income, and do not have to negotiate directly with proponents and the settler 
government for funding for each individual project. This regular revenue stream enables 
the Tłı̨chǫ Government to build internal capacity, as they do not have to rely on annual 
allocations which would otherwise constrain their ability to actively engage in all stages 
of the assessment process.586 In this case, the Tłı̨chǫ Government’s financial resources 
were used to hire technical reviewers, engage the community, and ensure community-
                                                 
580 Ibid.  
581 Tłı̨chǫ Ndek’àowo Government, News Release, “Tłı̨chǫ Government Approves Environmental 
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based capacity building. The steps that they used for the NICO assessment process “are 
now being used to manage subsequent reviews in Tłı̨chǫ lands.”587 
 
4.2.2.2 Opportunities for Partnership in the Proposed Bill C-69 
Bill C-69, which would enact the Impact Assessment Act if passed by Parliament, 
contemplates the possibility for partnership opportunities and collaboration between 
jurisdictions when carrying out an IA, thus creating a new legislative framework. While the 
provisions of the Act are discretionary rather than mandatory, there remains the possibility 
for partnership between an Indigenous community and the Crown. The Summary of Part 
1 of the Bill states that the Impact Assessment Act “provides for cooperation with certain 
jurisdictions, including Indigenous governing bodies, through the delegation of any part 
of an impact assessment, the joint establishment of a review panel or the substitution of 
another process for the impact assessment.”588  
An “Indigenous governing body” is defined in the body of the Act as “a council, 
government or other entity that is authorized to act on behalf of an Indigenous group, 
community or people that holds rights recognized and affirmed by section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.”589 An “Indigenous governing body” is also included within the 
definition of “jurisdiction.” “Jurisdiction” is defined as meaning  
(f) an Indigenous governing body that has powers, duties or functions in 
relation to an assessment of the environmental effects of a designated project  
 
(i) under a land claim agreement referred to in section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, or  
 
(ii) under an Act of Parliament other than this Act or under an Act of the 
legislature of a province, including a law that implements a self-
government agreement;  
 
(g) an Indigenous governing body that has entered into an agreement or 
arrangement referred to in paragraph 114(1)(e).590 
                                                 
587Ibid at 23. 
588 Bill C-69, supra note 135, at Summary.  
589 Ibid, cl 1, s 2.  
590 Ibid, cl 1, s 2; s 114(1)(e) allows the Minister, “if authorized by the regulations, to enter into 
agreements or arrangements with any Indigenous governing body not referred to in para (f) of the 
definition of jurisdiction in section 2 to (i) provide that the Indigenous governing body is considered to be a 
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These definitions suggest that the Impact Assessment Act would restrict collaboration 
activities only to those Indigenous governing bodies that are recognized as jurisdictions 
under Canadian law.591 If an Indigenous governing body does not fall within the definition 
under s.2 of the Act, they must receive recognition from Cabinet through a Governor in 
Council regulation before being eligible to enter into agreements with the Minister 
qualifying the body as a jurisdiction capable of carrying out a delegated part of an IA.592 
The requirement for Cabinet recognition creates a procedural barrier for Indigenous 
governing bodies who are not already recognized under federal statutes like the Indian 
Act,593 provincial legislation, or a treaty, as the Governor in Council regulatory process 
takes from 6 to 24 months.594 This statutory regime also reinforces the issue that the 
government does not recognize the legitimate governing authority of Indigenous 
governments such as hereditary chiefs.  
The provisions related to delegation and substitution raise the possibility for an 
Indigenous governing body to complete a portion of an IA, or to substitute their own 
process to assess the effects of a designated project, if the Minister believes that it would 
be an appropriate substitute. In approving a substitution, the Minister must be satisfied 
that the process to be substituted will consider the same mandatory factors set out in 
s.22(1) of the proposed Act, that federal authorities with relevant specialized or expert 
information will be able to participate, that the public will be given an opportunity to 
participate and access records in relation to the assessment, and that the substituted 
                                                 
jurisdiction for the application of this Act on the lands specified in the agreement or arrangement, and (ii) 
authorize the Indigenous governing body, with respect to those lands, to exercise powers or perform 
duties or functions in relation to impact assessments under this Act – except for those set out in section 
16 [the Impact Assessment Agency’s decision about whether an impact assessment is required] – that 
are specified in the agreement or arrangement.” 
591 Johnston, “supra note 372 at 18. 
592 Cl 1, s 109(3) of Bill C-69 states that “The Governor in Council may make regulations respecting 
agreements or arrangements referred to in paragraph 114(1)(d) or (e).” This means that, in order for the 
Minister to be able to enter into an agreement with an Indigenous governing body that falls outside the 
definitions within the proposed Act, Cabinet must first make a regulation recognizing the Indigenous 
governing body, and must delegate power to the Minister to enter into an agreement with the body for the 
purposes of the Act.  
593 RSC 1985, c I-5. 
594 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Guide to the Federal Regulatory Development Process” 
(2014), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/federal-
regulatory-management/guidelines-tools/guide-federal-regulatory-development-process.html>. 
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jurisdiction will submit a report to the Minister which will be made public.595 Additionally, 
where an assessment is to be completed by a Review Panel, s.39(1) of the proposed Act 
stipulates that the Minister may enter into an agreement with another jurisdiction, 
including an Indigenous governing body, to establish a JRP to conduct the IA.596 
However, this possibility is precluded where the project falls under the regulatory authority 
of the CNSC or the Canadian Energy Regulator.597 
 Should the Minister opt to collaborate with another jurisdiction, including an 
Indigenous governing body, Bill C-69 would give the Minister the authority to establish a 
longer time limit for the completion of the IA, both for assessment completed by IAA, and 
for those completed by a Review Panel.598 This time extension enables some flexibility 
from the settler approach to EA, as Indigenous communities often find the strict timelines 
prohibitive of their meaningful participation. The flexible time limit could take into 
consideration different methods of assessment or knowledge gathering used by 
Indigenous communities. 
Despite these provisions allowing for partnership and cooperation, the provisions 
of the proposed Act do not envision a true partnership model where each jurisdiction 
would have equal decision-making authority. One drawback of the proposed Act is that 
while the Act seeks to promote collaboration with Indigenous jurisdictions and also 
mentions UNDRIP, “it does not require the government to obtain the consent of 
Indigenous authorities on any decisions – process or final.599 Obtaining FPIC from 
Indigenous peoples is a core component of UNDRIP which Bill C-69 fails to adhere to. 
Under the proposed Act, decision-making authority rests solely with the Minister, and joint 
decision-making is not contemplated.600 
 
4.2.3 INDIGENOUS-DEVELOPED IA MODELS 
A core challenge with each of the preceding forms of Indigenous-led approaches 
to IA is the capacity of the Indigenous community to carry out an assessment on such a 
                                                 
595 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 33(1). 
596 Ibid, cl 1, s 39(1). 
597Ibid, cl 1, s 39(2). 
598Ibid, cl 1, ss 28(5), 37(2). 
599 Johnston, supra note 372 at 3. 
600 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 65(1). 
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scale. For many Indigenous communities, the funding to hire consultants and carry out a 
number of studies over several years is not realistic. In the case of full Indigenous-led IAs 
conducted for particular projects, these assessments are typically conducted by 
Indigenous nations in British Columbia, who are not parties to any treaties. These 
communities are far better resourced than remote, historic treaty communities, such as 
those within the Far North of Ontario. In the case of IAs conducted in partnership between 
Indigenous bodies and the Crown or a project proponent, unique legislative 
circumstances exist, enabling these types of assessments to take place. In some cases, 
there are modern treaties that mandate the existence of co-management boards and joint 
decision-making, and in other cases more specific pieces of provincial or territorial 
legislation govern the EA process.  
This third category of Indigenous-led IAs seeks to address some of these capacity 
issues by highlighting examples where Indigenous communities have either designed IA 
processes that are responsive to the capacities of the community, or where the 
community has developed a process designed to intersect with the settler approach to 
EA.  
 
4.2.3.1 Metlakatla First Nation Cumulative Effects Management Program 
 The Metlakatla First Nation is a coastal community located in northwestern British 
Columbia.  They are one of seven communities belonging to the Tsimshian First Nation, 
a unique group consisting of linguistically and culturally related people.601 The community 
of Metlakatla Village, located on one of the community’s ten reserves, is about 7 
kilometres northwest of Prince Rupert, and is accessible only by boat. The community 
has a total of approximately 985 registered members, with 90 residing on reserve, and 
the remainder off reserve.602  
The traditional territory of the Metlakatla encompasses an area of approximately 
20,000 square kilometers of land and sea on the northwest coast of British Columbia, in 
                                                 
601 Majorie M Halpin & Margaret Seguin, “Tsimshian Peoples: Southern Tsimshian, Coast Tsimshian, 
Nishga, and Gitksan” in Wayne Suttles, ed, Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 7: Northwest 
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602 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Registered Population: Metlakatla First Nation” (2019), 
online: Government of Canada <fnp-ppn.aandc-
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the area now known as the Great Bear Rainforest.603 The Metlakatla First Nation has 
relied on the ocean as well as the temperate rainforests in the region since time 
immemorial, and their culture and economy have always been linked to the lands and 
waters.604 Traditional harvesting, including fishing, still remains an integral component of 
the Metlakatla economy, culture and way of life.605  
The Metlakatla First Nation has been impacted by development in their territory 
since contact with the Europeans. The imposition of the reserve system affected their 
traditional ways of life and limited their ability to control planning and development 
throughout their traditional territory. Since 1876, approximately 40 canneries were 
established within their traditional territory, logging and fishing became large commercial 
industries, and mining, hydroelectricity, and port development have impacted their 
lands.606 They were not meaningfully consulted during the decision-making process for 
many of these past developments within their territory. 
Most recently, there has been an increase in proposals for LNG projects, pipelines 
and other developments within the traditionally territory of the Metlakatla First Nation. 
Given the magnitude of the proposed development and the uncertainty of its impacts in 
the region, the Metlakatla Development Corporation, an agency that oversees economic 
development initiatives for the Metlakatla First Nation, “entered into a collaborative 
research partnership with Simon Fraser University to study the potential cumulative 
effects of developments and to investigate management strategies to minimize impacts 
and maximize benefits to the community.”607 A key goal of this research collaboration was 
to develop the Cumulative Effects Management (“CEM”) program to track and manage 
Metlakatla values that are most likely to be impacted by future development and require 
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management attention as a result of past, present and future human actions.608 The goal 
of the CEM program is to inform decisions at two levels: “1) the individual project scale 
via the environmental assessment process and 2) at a territory-wide scale to guide 
broader land, marine, and community planning and establish parameters and key 
considerations for future development.”609 
The CEM program is an innovative and tailored approach to assessment that is 
particular to the territory of the Metlakatla First Nation and was “carefully designed to 
inform environmental assessment and treaty processes, investment choices, as well as 
a larger adaptive management focus.”610 The program is divided into the following 
phases: 
Figure 6: Phases of the Metlakatla First Nation CEM Program611 
 
Phase 1, titled “Develop CEM Values Foundation,” forms the basis for the CEM 
framework. A key component of the CEM program is the identification of “priority values” 
– “components or aspects of the biophysical and social environment that are of high 
importance to the Metlakatla people and that are considered most likely to be affected by 
current and future developments.”612 During Phase 1 of the CEM program, Compass 
Resource Management Ltd., (consultants to the Metlakatla First Nation) and Simon 
Fraser University researchers along with members of the Metlakatla First Nation worked 
                                                 
608 Metlakatla First Nation, “Metlakatla Cumulative Effects Management: Phase 1 Executive Summary” 
(2015) at ii, online (pdf): 
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together to develop a report that explained the methods of the CEM program, and the 
priority values and indicators identified by Metlakatla members.”613 In developing a list of 
priority values, Metlakatla community members and Metlakatla leadership participated in 
two workshops to produce a list of priority values that were important to the community. 
Compass Resources Management Ltd. “worked with experts and traditional knowledge 
holders to identify indicators for monitoring the condition of priority values over time.”614 
10 priority values and 12 indicators under the five pillars of Cultural Identity, Governance, 
Social/Health, Economic Prosperity, and Environment were prioritized.615 They include:616 
Pillar Priority Values Indicators 
Environment Chinook Salmon - Abundance  
- Critical juvenile habitat 
Butter Clams - Population density 
Social and 
Health 
Adequate Housing - Number of households in core 
housing need 
Access to Health 
Services 
- Ambulatory Care Sensitive 
Conditions rates 
Chronic Health 
Conditions 
- Diabetes prevalence 
- Hypertension prevalence 
Personal Safety - Crime severity 
Economic 
Prosperity 
Wealth Distribution - Income equality 
Economic Self-
sufficiency 
- High school completion rate 
Governance Governance of 
Metlakatla 
- Stewardship ability 
Cultural Identity Food, Social, and 
Ceremonial Activities 
- Food, Social, and Ceremonial 
activity participation rates 
 
Community members were made aware that when prioritizing cultural values, they 
should be attuned to the specific context of resource development and the cumulative 
effects within their traditional territory.617 Another factor taken into consideration when 
developing the list of priority values was the capacity for the community to monitor the 
value, or the opportunity for the Metlakatla First Nation to enter into partnerships with 
other organizations in order to do so. For example, while the Metlakatla do not have the 
                                                 
613 Ibid. 
614 Compass Resource Management Ltd, supra note 610.  
615 Hutchinson, supra note 603 at 72. 
616 Metlakatla First Nation, supra note 608 at i.  
617 Hutchinson, supra note 603 at 71.  
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capacity to monitor the abundance of Chinook salmon, they were able to partner with the 
federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans in order to do so.618 Other potential priority 
values identified in the community workshops, such as Red Laver Seaweed and 
Dungeness Crab, were excluded from the final list due to the lack of capacity to collect 
necessary data.619 
“Managing the condition of these priority values necessitates the identification of 
management triggers, zones, actions, and goals.”620 As such, Phase 1 of the CEM 
program also requires measuring the condition of each indicator using metrics in order to 
determine which actions to take as a result. For example, the priority value “Butter Clams” 
is evaluated based on the indicator “population density.” The metric used to measure 
“population density” is the “# of individuals per m2 (per beach).”621 Both Indigenous 
knowledge and Western science are used in measuring these indicators. The metrics for 
socio-economic priority values are evaluated against “Comparative Benchmarks” (the 
metrics of other geographic regions), while the metrics of biophysical priority values are 
used to trigger management actions, if necessary.622 A table setting out the CEM Values 
Foundation developed by Metlakatla First Nation is included as Appendix 9. 
Phase 1 of the CEM program also requires development of “interim management 
triggers and or benchmarks for each indicator.” In doing so, the CEM program applies a 
tiered management system, outlined below in Figure 7, which works to prioritize the most 
impacted values and identify actions to take to mitigate impacts thereby bringing the value 
back into an “acceptable zone.” 
Figure 7: CEM Tiered Management System623 
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619 Ibid.  
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623 Ibid at ii. 
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Each “zone” requires a tailored approach in order to manage the priority value. 
Values within the green “acceptable” zone may warrant standard procedures and routine 
monitoring.624 Values in the yellow “cautionary” zone trigger restorative action, or, “in 
cases where the cost of restorative measures outweigh the benefits (from a societal 
perspective), offsets that benefit other priority values or are acceptable to the 
stakeholders can be implemented in lieu.”625 Values in the red “critical” zone require 
“stringent measures intended to quickly restore a value’s condition.”626 The goal of the 
CEM is to ensure that priority values never reach the red “critical zone” as effective 
cumulative effects management and responses should be in place to manage the value 
before it reaches that level.627 Phase 1 also works to identify implementation pathways 
and implementation partners to assist in implementing management actions for each 
priority value.628  
Phase 2 of the CEM program involves conducting a pilot project and developing a 
broader implementation plan to the expand the program to include other candidate priority 
values. The Metlakatla First Nation has identified 4 priority values on which to pilot the 
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CEM program: Butter Clams, Adequate Housing, Food, Social, and Ceremonial Activities, 
and Employment. Meanwhile, CEM collaborators are currently working to gather baseline 
data for the indicators, assessing their condition, and defining management triggers and 
actions for each of the priority values.629 
One need that was identified for implementation of the CEM program was the need 
to collect community-specific baseline socio-economic data. While the National 
Household Survey gathers demographic, social and economic information about all 
people in Canada, including Aboriginal peoples, there was little data available about the 
Metlakatla First Nation due to low participation rates.630 As a result, a Metlakatla 
Membership Census was developed for use in the community in order to support the data 
needs of the CEM program. The census was targeted at community members over the 
age of 15 who resided in the Metlakatla traditional territory.631 The census aimed to gather 
information related to the priority values identified for the CEM program.632 In order to 
administer the census, survey administers went door-to-door, giving participants the 
option to complete either a computer-assisted questionnaire using an iPad that the 
administrator carried, or a paper-based questionnaire.633 A pilot census was administered 
in 2015, with a second census administered in 2016. In order to gather a robust set of 
baseline data and to properly track and manage changes to priority values over time, 
consistent data need to be collected over time.634  
Overall, the CEM program focuses on the cumulative effects of multiple projects 
within the Metlakatla First Nation’s traditional territory, rather than focusing on project-
specific effects. Currently, the impacts of development are “managed in large part by 
project-based federal and provincial assessment processes. Although project-based 
impact assessment can help mitigate some adverse effects, it is a narrowly focused, 
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reactive process that fails to adequately incorporate community goals and address long-
term cumulative effects of past, present, and future projects and activities.”635  
This program was developed independently of any regulations or legislation, which 
allowed the Metlakatla First Nation the freedom to develop a program attuned to the 
realities of their territory. While the CEM program is still in its initial development stages, 
it represents a model that other Indigenous communities may be able to adopt in order to 
assess and address cumulative effects as a result of development in their territory. The 
CEM program was uniquely tailored to the capacities and needs of the community, and it 
embodies several of the common characteristics of Indigenous-led IA, notably the 
meaningfully engagement of community members, the use of Indigenous knowledge, and 
the broad definition of cultural values.  
 
4.2.3.2 Opportunities for Intersection and Recognition within Settler Approaches to EA 
Despite the fact that the CEM program was designed to operate outside the settler 
EA process, there may be opportunity for the model to intersect with and influence the 
settler regime at various stages.  
First, the baseline data collected through the CEM program may be beneficial in 
assessing environmental impacts of proposed projects. This fact was also highlighted by 
the Tsleil-Waututh Nation’s independent assessment of the Kinder Morgan pipeline 
project. Proponents generally assess baseline data using the conditions of the 
environment at the time of the project proposal, ignoring the cumulative impacts of 
numerous developments already existing on a Nation’s traditional territory. Integrating 
Indigenous knowledge, including the types of data collected through the CEM program 
that are tracked over numerous years, would be beneficial in showing baseline 
information that a project proponent would otherwise not have access to as part of their 
assessment. This information may date back several years, or several generations to the 
pre-contact era as was the case in the Tsleil-Waututh Nation’s assessment.  
Second, the proposed Impact Assessment Act outlined in Bill C-69 mandates 
consideration of a number of factors during an IA. These include direct, cumulative and 
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interactive effects, impacts on Indigenous peoples, Indigenous and community 
knowledge, and any assessments by Indigenous jurisdictions.636 An Indigenous 
community with a model such as the CEM program in place would be in a better position 
to advocate against a particular project as they would be able to directly point to 
impacts that the project would have within their traditional territory on their priority 
values, as measured using indicators and metrics. A community may be able to point 
to past development and pinpoint how those developments have impacted community 
values, thus providing a comparison against which to measure the potential impacts of 
proposed projects.  
Third, having a solid foundation of data may also help in advocating for certain 
enforceable conditions to be placed on the project upon approval, and may help shape 
an appropriate monitoring and follow-up program to assess cumulative or regional 
impacts of the project in a more proactive manner.  
Finally, the proposed Impact Assessment Act also contemplates the possibility for 
the Minister to enter an agreement with another jurisdiction, including an Indigenous 
governing body, to conduct “a regional assessment of the effects of existing or future 
physical activities carried out in a region that is comprised in part of federal lands or in a 
region that is entirely outside federal lands.”637 This raises the possibility for a community 
such as Metlakatla First Nation, who has a CEM program in place, to collaborate with the 
federal government to assess the cumulative and regional impacts of development in 
spaces such as their traditional territory. 
 
4.2.3.3 Saugeen Ojibway Nation Consultation Protocol 
 A second example of an Indigenous-developed model that intersects with the 
settler approach to EA is the Consultation Protocol developed by the Chippewas of 
Nawash Unceded First Nation and the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation, two 
Anishinaabe communities collectively referred to as the Saugeen Ojibway Nation 
(“SON”). The Chippewas of Nawash occupy the Neyaashiinigmiing Reserve on the east 
shore of the Saugeen (Bruce) Peninsula, with a registered population of 2,720 members, 
                                                 
636 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 22(1) 
637 Ibid, cl 1, s 93(1).  
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approximately 725 of whom reside on reserve.638 The Saugeen First Nation occupy a 
reserve north of the Saugeen River on the western shore of the Bruce Peninsula, with a 
registered population of 1,636 members, 755 of whom reside on reserve.639  
The Anishinaabe Nation historically occupied the region around the Great Lakes, 
travelling seasonally following the animals and plants that nourished them.640 The SON 
traditional territory comprises an area of land approximately 6,500 km2, pictured below in 
Figure 8, and encompasses much of the Bruce Peninsula in southwestern Ontario, 
extending south of Goderich, and east of Collingwood.641 Their traditional territory also 
includes more than 500 km of shoreline, and 10,000 km2 of Lake Huron.642 The SON 
have occupied these lands since time immemorial, and have a duty to be stewards of the 
land.643 
Figure 8: SON Traditional Territory644 
                                                 
638 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Registered Population - Chippewas of Nawash First Nation” 
(2019), online: Government of Canada <fnp-ppn.aandc-
aadnc.gc.ca/fnp/Main/Search/FNRegPopulation.aspx?BAND_NUMBER=122&lang=eng>. 
639 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Registered Population – Saugeen” (2019), online: 
Government of Canada <fnp-ppn.aandc-
aadnc.gc.ca/fnp/Main/Search/FNMain.aspx?BAND_NUMBER=123&lang=eng>. 
640 Hadley Friedland, Maegan Hough & Renée McBeth, eds, “Accessing Justice and Reconciliation: 
Anishinabek Legal Traditions Report – Community Partner: Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation 
#27” (2012) at 6, online (pdf): University of Victoria Faculty of Law, Indigenous Bar Association, The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 
<www.cerp.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_clients/Documents_deposes_a_la_Commission/P-265.pdf>. 
641 Chantel M LaRiviere & Stephen S Crawford, “Indigenous Principles of Wild Harvest and Management: 
An Ojibway Community as a Case Study” (2013) 41:6 Hum Ecology 947 at 948. 
642 Ibid.  
643 Saugeen Ojibway Nation Environment Office, “About Us” (2018), online: 
<www.saugeenojibwaynation.ca/about/>. 
644 Ibid.  
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 Before the arrival of the British, the SON occupied and utilized a land base of about 
8,090 km2. However, colonization has drastically reduced this land base, and much of the 
land was opened to settlement, leaving the SON without enough lands to support 
themselves. Five main treaties were signed with the British Government in the 1800s, 
which opened up the traditional territory of SON for sharing with the settlers. These 
treaties, which the Crown viewed as land surrenders, are: Treaty 41 ½ (1836), Treaty 67 
(1851), Treaty 72 (1854), Treaty 82 (1857) and Treaty 93 (1861).645  The first treaty, 
Treaty 41 ½, opened up approximately 6,500 km2 of Anishinaabe land south of Owen 
Sound for shared use. In signing the Treaty, the SON was promised that, “in return, the 
                                                 
645 Friedland, Hough & McBeth, supra note 640 at 10. 
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Saugeen Peninsula would be protected forever for Anishinaabe use, including the land of 
Manitoulin Island (a sacred settlement site).”646 However, the terms of the Treaty were 
not followed by the Crown, resulting in the need for Treaty 67 a mere 15 years later.647 
Treaty 72, signed in 1854, resulted in the establishment of reserves for SON, the land for 
which was exempted from the Treaty. “The Crown told the Anishinaabe that despite their 
promises, they could not prevent the Peninsula’s settlement” and told the Anishinaabe 
that “their rights would be better protected if they moved to smaller reserves.”648 In Treaty 
72, the SON ceded just less more 2,020 km2 of the Saugeen Peninsula, and the proceeds 
of sale were to be held in trust.649 Despite the move to these reserves, the Anishinaabe 
still viewed the treaties as giving them access to their broader traditional territory.650 As 
settlement continued, the Anishinaabe’s land continued to diminish, including some of the 
land that had been set aside for reserves.651  
 The SON did not view these treaties as land surrenders, but rather as “means of 
building a nation-to-nation relationship and protecting the relationship that First Nations 
had with their land.”652 One way they have sought to maintain and assert this nation-to-
nation status is through the development of a document titled “Principles for Proponents 
working in the Traditional Territories of the Saugeen Ojibway Nations” (“Consultation 
Protocol”).653 The Consultation Protocol is a set of principles and assertions from SON 
that must be adhered to by any proponent who wishes to engage in development within 
the traditional territories of SON. Along with an accompanying document titled “SON 
Consultation Process,”654 which sets out a step-by-step guide to the consultation process 
as envisioned by SON, these documents are aimed at directing how proponents should 
                                                 
646 Ibid.  
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid.   
649 Saugeen Ojibway Nation Environment Office, supra note 643.  
650 Friedland, Hough & McBeth, supra note 640 at 10.  
651 Ibid.   
652 Saugeen Ojibway Nation, “Claims Update Newsletter” (2016) at 3, online (pdf): 
<www.saugeenojibwaynation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Claims_Newsletter_2016.pdf> [SON, 
“Claims Update Newsletter”]. 
653 Saugeen Ojibway Nation, “Principles for Proponents working in the Traditional Territories of the 
Saugeen Ojibway Nations” (2018), online (pdf): <www.saugeenojibwaynation.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/SON_Consult_Principles_for_Proponents.pdf> [SON, “Consultation Protocol”]. 
654 Saugeen Ojibway Nation, “SON Consultation Process” (2018), online (pdf): 
<www.saugeenojibwaynation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/SON-Consultation-Process-Flowchart.pdf> 
[SON, “Consultation Process”]. 
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fulfil the DTCA, as the procedural elements of this duty are often delegated to proponents 
by the Crown. The Consultation Protocol is heavily premised on environmental protection 
at its core, as the principles of consultation and accommodation arise primarily within the 
sphere of EA and project approval. Even where a project does not require a full EA but 
merely an approval, licence, or permit from the Crown, the DTCA will still be engaged if 
the project falls within the traditional territory of SON, and the Consultation Protocol and 
Consultation Process will apply. 
  The basis for SON’s assertions in the Consultation Protocol is the historic 
occupation of their territory, including their current occupation of reserve lands, and the 
existence of subsistence fisheries and land-based harvesting practices throughout their 
territory. The document states that “the SON’s traditional territories have been their home 
long before contact and will continue to be their home for generations to come. The full 
expression of SON’s rights depends on healthy, biologically diverse ecosystems.” The 
Consultation Protocol requires that SON have a strong presence throughout the EA 
process. These assertions include: 
• SON must have full participation in any environmental screening or assessment 
process; 
 
• SON is entitled to share and have access to all necessary information relating to 
environmental screening or assessment reports and processes, especially those 
that might reveal potential impacts on SON’s rights, claims and way of life; 
 
• SON must have full participation in the ongoing monitoring of the project; and 
 
• A separate Environmental Agreement will be required, which will include any terms 
and conditions identified by SON in their environmental review of the project, 
delivery of environmental monitoring data for SON evaluation, periodic 
independent evaluation of the proponent’s environmental performance, collection 
of baseline data for use as environmental health indicators, regular environmental 
reporting to SON, review and approval by SON of environmental management 
plans, and endorsement of the precautionary principle.655  
 
                                                 
655 Saugeen Ojibway Nation, “Consultation Protocol,” supra note 653 at s 3(a)-(d).  
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The Consultation Protocol also stresses the importance of the vitality of the First 
Nation as a whole. As many projects, legislation, policies and practices have been 
incompatible with SON’s rights, interests, and way of life in the past, SON requires that: 
• The proponent must accommodate the rights and interests of the SON such that 
the project contributes to the SON’s well-being and does not undermine it; 
 
• Any adverse impact or infringement upon SON’s rights and way of life and the 
sustainability of these interests within their traditional territories must be fully 
addressed and mitigated by the proponent; and 
 
• The proposed project must be consistent with SON’s vision for the land and waters 
of their traditional territories, respectful of their rights and interests and it must 
contribute to the cultural, economic and social vitality of their people.656 
 
Finally, the Consultation Protocol also addresses the issue of capacity and funding 
for SON, particularly around the issue of hiring experts to review information provided by 
proponents, and the requirement that SON be able to conduct its own expert reviews of 
projects so that they can have a proper conversation with the proponent about any 
potential impacts of a project. SON has always taken the view that they should not have 
to pay anything for consultation as the DTCA does not rest with them, and they have 
nothing to gain from it. As such, the Consultation Protocol states that “the proponent must 
provide the SON with sufficient funding to ensure that SON can participate fully in the 
negotiation of a Protocol Agreement and in the consultation process itself, which includes 
the various studies, and stages of the assessment process.”657 This funding includes 
costs related to technical review by SON experts, consultation process costs for meetings 
including travel costs for staff, research and logistical support by SON’s environmental 
office staff, and for the preparation of agreements and other information.658 
This particular issue was recently litigated by SON in the case of Saugeen First 
Nation v Ontario (MNRF).659 In this case, the proponent, T & P Hayes Ltd, submitted an 
application for a license to build a limestone quarry on the Saugeen Peninsula in 2008, 
                                                 
656 Ibid at s 4(a)-(c). 
657 Ibid at s 9(a). 
658 SON, “Consultation Process,” supra note 654 at 2.  
659 2017 ONSC 3456 (Div Ct), [2017] 4 CNLR 213. 
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within the traditional territory of the SON. While the parties agreed that the Crown had a 
DTCA with SON in determining whether to approve the license, the parties disagreed on 
the scope of the duty, and whether it was discharged.660 From the perspective of the 
proponent and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (“MNRF”), the impact of 
the limestone quarry on SON’s traditional territories would be minimal or non-existent, as 
there were already hundreds of small limestone quarries within southern Ontario.661 
However, SON saw the project as a part of a broader issue – since there are over 500 
quarry and aggregate projects within their territory, the cumulative impact of these 
projects place strain on both the human and financial resources of SON that could 
otherwise be put to beneficial use within their communities. Instead, SON struggles to 
keep pace with the numerous requests for consultation, and they lack the resources to 
hire expert advice to properly assess each project.662 At any given time, there were 
dozens of licence applications pending, and SON did not have the resources to track 
each and every application. They did not hear of the project in question in this litigation 
until 2011, three years after the application had been submitted by the proponent to the 
MNRF.663  
When engaging in the DTCA for the limestone quarry, SON provided the proponent 
with a proposed consultation process, and also requested funding in order to meaningfully 
participate in the consultation process. SON wished to hire their own technical experts to 
peer review studies and other information, estimating funding at a modest $13,000 for 
initial site assessments and peer review reports, and also requested funding for SON staff 
participation in meetings, arguing that these costs should be borne by the Crown and the 
proponent.664 These requests were initially rejected by the MNRF, although they 
eventually agreed to provide $8,514 for peer review of technical reports and $2.400 for 
hydrogeological expertise.665 However, this funding was never provided. The MNRF 
                                                 
660 Ibid at para 2. 
661 Ibid at paras 30-31. 
662 Ibid at paras 32, 46. 
663 Ibid at para 45. 
664 Ibid at para 67.  
665 Ibid at para 109. 
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approved the project in March 2016 after numerous failed attempts at consultation, and 
SON was not informed about this approval until July 2016.666  
Ultimately, the Court held that the scope of the DTCA in this case fell in the middle 
of the spectrum.667 This required the Crown to give formal notice to SON about the project, 
give information ton SON about the project, provide SON with funding to hire expert 
assistance, communicate with SON about SON’s concerns regarding the project after 
SON has the benefit of its expert evidence, and follow a reasonable process thereafter to 
complete adequate consultations, and, where appropriate, accommodation.668 The Court 
held that none of these steps required to discharge DTCA were met in a timely way in 
this case.  
Additionally, the Court recognized that SON’s disinclination to spend community 
resources to review someone else’s project was a reasonable position.669 The findings in 
this case are “vital to First Nations, who often have countless requests to participate in 
consultation with few resources. Where projects aren’t going to financially benefit First 
Nations at all, the financial demands of participating in consultation in order to protect 
First Nations’ rights drain a community’s ability to provide other necessary community 
services.”670  
Finally, it is key to recall that the question of whether or not the DTCA has been 
discharged is evaluated by the courts on a reasonableness standard. This gives 
Indigenous communities some leverage over determining the process of consultation 
through developing their own consultation protocol and process, as SON has done. As 
evidenced in the Consultation Process from SON, attached to this report as Appendix 
10, the community has set out requirements regarding: information sharing, required 
meetings between the community and the proponent, including necessary topics of 
discussion, confirmation of funding, independent expert review of information, internal 
consultation between the two SON communities, negotiation of a consultation and 
                                                 
666 Ibid at para 114. 
667 Ibid at para 141. 
668 Ibid at para 141.  
669 Ibid at para 158. 
670 Maggie Wente, “Consultation Funding and a Fair Process Required to Meet Consultation Obligations” 
(2017), online (blog): Olthuis Kleer Townshend LLP <www.oktlaw.com/consultation-funding-fair-process-
required-meet-consultation-obligations/>. 
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accommodation agreement with the proponent, and participation in long-term 
environmental monitoring. The goal of SON in setting out this Consultation Protocol was 
to exercise their governance over their territory. The development of a Consultation 
Protocol is a common step that has been taken by other treaty communities in Ontario, 
including Alderville First Nation,671 Brunswick House First Nation,672 Curve Lake First 
Nation,673 KI First Nation,674 Mitaanjigamiing First Nation,675 Taykwa Tagamou Nation,676 
and Webequie First Nation,677 among others. Where these community-developed 
processes are reasonable, it is advisable for proponents and the Crown to abide by them 
when discharging their DTCA. The court appreciates a good and reasonable process, 
and so derogation from a reasonable consultation protocol may result in a finding against 
the Crown. 
In addition to the Consultation Protocol and Consultation Process, SON has 
asserted their rights and jurisdiction over land by way of two assertions of Aboriginal title. 
In 2003, SON filed an Aboriginal title claim to parts of Lake Huron and the Georgian Bay 
watersheds, which is the first Aboriginal title claim to land under navigable waters. They 
argue that their ancestors had exclusive occupation of the area before the assertion of 
British sovereignty in the 1760s, that their land rights in the territory have never been 
surrendered, and that the treaties between the Crown and SON do not include or mention 
lakes or waterbeds in the territory claimed, and so SON still owns that land.678 If 
successful, they will hold an absolute right to the lakebed, including control over harbours 
                                                 
671 Alderville First Nation, “Alderville First Nation Consultation Protocol” (2015), online (pdf): 
<caid.ca/AFNConPro2015.pdf>. 
672 Brunswick House First Nation, “Consultation Policy: Draft v.5” (2016), online (pdf): 
<brunswickhousefirstnation.com/download/BHFN%20Consult%20Policy_DRAFT_rev5_Nov25_2015.pdf>
. 
673 Curve Lake First Nation, “Consultation and Accommodation Standards” (2016), online (pdf): 
<www.curvelakefirstnation.ca/documents/CLFN%20Consultation%20and%20Accommodation%20Standa
rds%202016.pdf>. 
674 Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, “Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug protects watershed and 
sets consultation protocol through referendum” (6 July 2011), online: <kilands.org/2011/10/14/ki-protects-
watershed-and-sets-consultation-protocol-through-referenduml/>. 
675 Mitaanjigamiing First Nation, “Manito Aki Inaajimowin - Consultation Protocol” (2013), online (pdf): 
<www.mitaanjigamiing.ca/sites/default/files/Manito%20Aki%20Inaajimowin%20signed%20copy%20April
%204%2C%202013.pdf>. 
676 Taykwa Tagamou Nation, “Consultation and Accommodation Protocol” (2011), online (pdf): 
<taykwatagamounation.com/ttn/images/ttnconsultationprotocol.pdf>. 
677 CNW Newswire, “Webequie First Nation Reaffirms Community Rights in Ring of Fire” (23 November 
2011), online (pdf): <ringoffirenews.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/webequie-rof-statement-23nov11.pdf>. 
678 SON, “Claims Update Newsletter,” supra note 652 at 6. 
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and fishing quotas.679 The Aboriginal title claim has been scheduled for a three-year trial 
and will be heard by the court in the near future. SON has also filed an Aboriginal title 
claim to the entirety of the Saugeen Peninsula, including land under navigable rivers and 
lakes.680 
 
 As these examples of Indigenous-led IA display, there are numerous unique and 
effective ways for an Indigenous community to assert their rights and advocate within, 
parallel to, or independently from the settler EA process. While the model chosen by each 
community was dependent on their own legal traditions and obligations, their capacity, 
available funding, and the nature of the project in question, the foundational goals of each 
Indigenous community’s work has been the protection of their rights and interests, and 
the desire to safeguard the values that are important to the community. As such, 
Indigenous-led IAs look different across the country, and they are grounded in the 
obligations that communities have to their traditional territory. While each of these models 
share similar underlying goals and rationales, there is no single model that can be taken 
and applied uniformly to each and every resource development project. Rather, the 
underlying principles from each model may be drawn out and adapted to reflect the 
realities faced by individual communities. The final portion of this research report will 
recall and apply the lessons learned from these case studies to the Neskantaga First 
Nation’s situation in the Ring of Fire.  
 
  
                                                 
679 Joan Taillon, “Saugeen Ojibway go to Trial” (2004), online: Aboriginal Multi-Media Society 
<ammsa.com/publications/ontario-birchbark/saugeen-ojibway-go-trial>. 
680 SON, “Consultation Protocol,” supra note 653 at 1. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
NESKANTAGA FIRST NATION 
 
This report has set out the numerous complex and intertwined factors that have 
come to bear on the Ring of Fire development, outlining why, more than ten years after 
the first discovery of minerals in the region, the Ring of Fire remains an inaccessible and 
undeveloped area in the Far North of Ontario. This challenges that exist in relation to the 
Ring of Fire region, particularly from an EA perspective, are not entirely unique, and 
similar challenges have surfaced in relation to other natural resource development 
projects across the country. Current approaches to EA, both within Ontario and across 
the rest of Canada, have proven to be an unacceptable approach to assessing 
development for many Indigenous communities, and the review of Indigenous-led 
approaches to IA has worked to unpack the numerous alternative approaches Indigenous 
communities have taken to exercise inherent governance authority over the lands and 
resources within their traditional territories. The final section of this report will pull together 
all of the lessons learned, and provide a targeted analysis of central considerations that 
must be worked through to help guide an Indigenous community, such as Neskantaga 
First Nation, towards making an informed decision about how to engage with the 
assessment process for the Ring of Fire.  
This analysis is broken into three general sections. First, this analysis will cover 
some preliminary framing questions and considerations that any Indigenous community 
should turn their attention to before deciding whether to either go down the route of 
conducting an independent IA participate strategically in the Crown EA process. Second, 
this analysis will work through issues unique to a decision to conduct an independent, 
Indigenous-led IA, drawing from the case studies explored in the first and second 
categories of Indigenous-led IA within the preceding section of this report – Indigenous-
led IAs conducted for particular projects, and IAs conducted in partnership with the Crown 
or project proponent. Finally, this analysis will outline key opportunities for strategic 
engagement with the conventional EA framework, drawing from the third category of 
Indigenous-led approaches to IA explored in the subsequent portion of this report – 
Indigenous-developed IA models.  
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To preface this analysis, it is important to note that “there are no best practices in 
Indigenous-led project assessment; it is about what emerging options and choices work 
best for the individual Indigenous community, nation, or cultural group.”681 There is no 
“one size fits all” approach for Indigenous communities, which is why each of the case 
studies explored in the preceding section of this report all look unique, and respond to the 
nuanced challenges and opportunities available to each community and nation.  
 
5.1 PRELIMINARY FRAMING QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The decision of whether and how to engage in the assessment process for any 
particular project is a challenging and crucial decision for any Indigenous community, as 
each possible avenue for engagement may lead to different opportunities of influence and 
different ways to exercise inherent governance rights. A number of preliminary 
considerations can help guide the decision-making, enabling Neskantaga First Nation to 
reflect on which approach may be within their means when advocating in relation to the 
Ring of Fire developments.   
 
5.1.1 COMMUNITY GOAL AND VISION 
 A preliminary consideration that should feature early on in any community 
discussions is the overall goal of Neskantaga First Nation in engaging in the assessment 
process. Joan Kuyek, a sessional instructor at Carlton University and former National 
Coordinator of MiningWatch Canada, has emphasized the importance that the community 
have a vision in place for what they want their future to look like, and an understanding of 
core values that are of priority importance for the community.682 This includes making the 
positions of the community regarding any mining development known upfront. Kuyek 
highlighted the benefit that can flow from community declarations, pointing to the example 
of the KI First Nation Watershed Declaration, which was adopted in 2011 after a 
community referendum.683 It applies to a 13, 025 km2 area of lakes, rivers forest, and 
wetlands in KI First Nation’s traditional territory, and it provides the community with a 
                                                 
681 Gibson et al, supra note 467 at 47.  
682 Interview with Joan Kuyek, 13 March 2019, Toronto, ON (telephone).  
683 Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, supra note 674. 
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mandate when engaging in discussions with the government and corporations.684 The 
Watershed Declaration states 
We declare all waters that flow into and out of Big Trout Lake, and all lands 
whose waters flow [to] those lakes, rivers, and wetlands, to be completely 
protected [by] our continued care under KI’s authority, laws and protocols…No 
industrial uses, or other uses which disrupt, poison, or otherwise harm our 
relationship to these lands and waters will be permitted.685 
 
As a part of the community visioning process, Kuyek suggested that the development of 
documents such as a Watershed Declaration, which represent an articulation of 
Indigenous law and governance authority, would help to build the community’s pride in 
the land, as well as invigorate the role the community can play in protecting the land.686 
This renewed sense of pride and obligation can flow into any route for IA that Neskantaga 
First Nation opts to pursue. 
 As a part of this visioning process, the community should also consider at an early 
stage what sorts of values and priorities they might hope to protect through the IA process, 
such as certain species of fish, particular areas of land, or other socioeconomic activities 
that are core to the community. A discussion around priority values within the community 
may form an integral component of whichever approach to IA is chosen. For example, 
both the Squamish Nation Process, as well as the Metlakatla CEM Program included 
elements of information gathering and focus group discussion to help gain an 
understanding about the concerns each community hoped to address through the IA 
process. The Squamish Nation implemented these discussions within their IT process 
itself, the Squamish Process, using community input to shape the scope of their 
assessment and define the valued components to be assessed. The Metlakatla First 
Nation implemented a community census in order to support the development and 
implementation of the CEM program, which helped to identify and narrow a list of priority 
values they wished to be addressed through the CEM Program. Defining these core 
values helps to develop a vision and desired outcomes of the IA process, and definition 
of these values at an early stage can help to shape the IA process itself. 
                                                 
684 Ibid.  
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686 Interview with Joan Kuyek, supra note 682. 
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5.1.2 DESIRED OUTCOMES OF AN INDIGENOUS-LED IA PROCESS 
Indigenous communities should also think about the goals they hope to achieve 
through the IA process as part of this early visioning work. Ugo Lapointe, the Canada 
Program Director with MiningWatch Canada, has emphasized that the Indigenous-led IA 
process may be a means to several different ends.687 Outcomes of an Indigenous-led IA 
progress can include:  
• Control over the process, leading to the integration of Indigenous values as 
a fundamental starting point for any review:688 This outcome is inherent in the 
examples of Indigenous-led IAs conducted for particular projects. For example, 
through the development and implementation of their own IA processes, the TWN, 
the SSN, and the Squamish Nation were able to ensure their IAs were grounded 
in the legal traditions of their communities, and respected the values that were of 
core importance to them. This outcome is also inherent in the examples of 
Indigenous-developed IA models, including the Metlakatla CEM Program and the 
SON Consultation Protocol. The Metlakatla CEM Program is an articulation of the 
exercise of the community’s inherent governing authority over the land, taking into 
account a number of “priority values” that the community had the capacity to 
monitor. The SON Consultation Protocol, designed to influence the fulfilment of the 
DTCA, dictates the community’s stance on development within their traditional 
territory, setting out the process they expect to be followed should the government 
or a proponent wish to develop a project on their lands.  
 
• Changes to the project and unique mitigations:689 This outcome is most 
strongly evident through the Squamish Nation’s assessment process, the 
Squamish Process, as contractual obligations were set in place with the project 
proponent to ensure that binding conditions established by the Squamish Nation 
were implemented in order for the proponent to obtain the consent of the Nation. 
This led to alterations to the project, directly mandated by the Squamish Nation.  
 
• Increased local benefits:690 In the traditional sense, this outcome is most strongly 
evident through the Squamish Nation’s assessment process. Upon granting 
consent and approval for the Woodfibre LNG project within their traditional territory, 
the Squamish Nation negotiated benefits for the community, including cash 
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benefits, the option to buy a percentage of the project, as well as the opportunity 
for Squamish Nation businesses to bid on contracts for the project. However, 
benefits should not be thought of strictly in monetary terms, as Indigenous-led IA 
processes benefit the communities involved in other ways. Indigenous-led IA 
processes may also lead a revitalization of traditional knowledge, and an increased 
sense of obligation to the land. For example, the SSN process brought together 26 
representatives from two communities, and over 80 presenters shared their 
knowledge and concerns about the project.  
 
• The opportunity to re-use any newly developed processes for future 
projects:691 “While setting up an Indigenous-led IA process for the first time is the 
hard part, […] future assessments start to benefit from lessons learned and 
economies of scale and effort.”692 Where the assessment process is project-
specific, each can be adapted to apply to different projects in different contexts. 
Each process is an exercise of Indigenous law and governing authority over the 
land, based on principles and values core to each community, and the processes 
developed can be adapted to different types of resource development projects 
within their traditional territory. The examples of the Metlakatla CEM Program and 
the SON Consultation Protocol are also examples of processes designed to 
operate on a long-term basis, and processes such as the Squamish Process and 
the TWN’s Stewardship Policy are applicable to any development within the 
territory.  
 
This list of outcomes is not exhaustive, nor are the outcomes mutually exclusive. As 
communities have the power to determine the manner and method through which they 
chose to engage, whether through an independent IA process or through the settler EA 
process, Indigenous-led IA processes can be developed and tailored to achieve 
whichever outcomes are most important to the community. A community vision can help 
identify the desired outcomes of the process, as the community can work to ensure the 
process selected works to protect the values most important to them and is responsive to 
the limited capacities of the community, both financial and human resource-related.  
 
                                                 
691 Ibid.  
692 Ibid.  
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5.1.3 COMMUNITY CAPACITY 
Capacity is perhaps the most crucial consideration for Indigenous communities 
when deciding whether and how to engage in an Indigenous-led IA process. There are 
three elements to capacity: funding, human resources, and relationship building.693 This 
core issue will be discussed below in relation to each category of Indigenous-led IA 
process, as the community capacity, and funding requirements and opportunities vary 
greatly according to each unique model. At a preliminary stage, it may be beneficial to 
identify and “define a core internal team [within the community], with a mixture of technical 
(e.g. lands department) and leadership capacity and legal advisors, to identify the 
appropriate approach.”694 This core team can work to assess what external capacity may 
be required for each possible option, and begin to assess the associated costs, and 
determine which IA strategies may be feasible for the community.  
 
5.1.4 EARLY CONSIDERATION OF ENABLING FACTORS 
The report titled “Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of 
Indigenous-Led Review” prepared for the Gwich’in Council International in 2018 provides 
a comprehensive overview of considerations, aptly termed “enabling factors,” that an 
Indigenous community should keep in mind when beginning to think about possible 
avenues for engagement in an IA process. Communities considering whether to shoulder 
the burden and opportunity of intense engagement, either through an Indigenous-led IA 
or through strategic engagement with the conventional EA process, should “conduct an 
early community assessment of which of the enabling factors they have in place and what 
the implications may be of their presence or absence.”695 The report categorizes these 
enabling factors into three sections, and the authors suggest that communities think 
through each of these factors, and conduct a “readiness assessment,” noting which are 
in place, and which may be absent:, and considering what level of responsibility the 
community may be ready to take on 
1. External Context:  
• Is there legislation or anther legal instrument in place? 
                                                 
693 Ibid at 38.  
694 Ibid at 54.  
695 Ibid at 34.  
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• Is the proposed project large or complex? 
• Is the proposed project in a strategically important location? 
 
2. Nation Characteristics and Context: 
• Does the community have a strong connection to the area? Is the area of high 
importance? 
• Does the community have high leverage? 
• Is there high pre-existing internal capacity? 
• Is there a high degree of internal intra- or inter-community cohesion? 
• Is there an opportunity to shadow the conventional EA process? 
• Does the community have history with or knowledge of this type of project? 
• Is there an Indigenous-endorsed land use plan in place? 
 
3. Proponent and External Government Characteristics: 
• Is there an existing contractual agreement or relationship with the project 
proponent? 
• Is the proponent and/or the government supportive or willing to engage in an 
Indigenous-led process? 
• Is the proponent and the government willing to fund the process? 
• Is the proponent and the government willing to endorse and implement the 
outcomes of an Indigenous-led process?696 
 
Careful consideration of these enabling factors may help an Indigenous community to 
narrow and focus their discussions about which avenue to pursue – an independent IA, 
an IA in partnership with the project proponent or the Crown, or to engage directly within 
the conventional EA process. The presence or absence of any number of enabling factors 
will help an Indigenous community weigh these various options, and focus their resources 
on the process that is within their capacity, and accomplishes the goals they hope to 
achieve. It is important that Indigenous communities turn their minds to this analysis at 
the earliest possible opportunity. A number of these enabling factors are subjective, and 
can best be discussed within Neskantaga First Nation by leadership and community 
members, taking into consideration their history and past involvement with the Ring of 
Fire development. However, others, notably those falling into the first and third categories 
above, require a more detailed an in-depth examination, as their implications may vary 
                                                 
696 Ibid at 36.  
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depending on the type of IA process selected. The following subsections of this report will 
work to unpack a number of these enabling factors in the context of both an independent, 
Indigenous-led IA, as well as in the context of the conventional EA process. 
 
5.2 MAKING A DECISION TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT, INDIGENOUS-LED 
IA 
Before determining whether to engage in an independent IA process, there are 
several risks and opportunities that Indigenous communities should be aware of before 
making a commitment. The two most crucial considerations include: the legislative 
environment within which the independent IA process would operate, and capacity and 
funding limitations and opportunities.  
 
5.2.1 EXTERNAL CONTEXT: THE LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT 
The case studies explored throughout this report have worked to outline some of 
the reasons that Indigenous communities have opted to engage in the IA process in the 
ways that they did. A core rationale for most communities is the desire to exercise 
governance authority and jurisdiction over lands and resources within a community’s 
traditional territory. Most fundamentally, the settler legislative context has a foundational 
impact on whether a community needs to develop and implement their own process, or 
whether they can engage and exercise governing authority through an alternative, pre-
existing legislative regime that provides a framework to obtain FPIC. 
 Within the case studies, two unique legislative environments for EA were present 
– projects falling within the conventional EA process, and those located within modern 
treaty territory. Modern treaties often set out co-management regimes, and Indigenous 
communities may never need to develop their own independent process for IA.697 This 
was the case for the Tłı̨chǫ Government, who are party to the Tłı̨chǫ Agreement. 
However, this is not the context that exists within northern Ontario. The Ring of Fire sits 
within historic Treaty 9 territory, and conventional EA processes govern any project 
development in the area. In places where the existing legislative model and conventional 
EA processes do not require the FPIC of the Indigenous peoples, communities have 
                                                 
697 Ibid at 34.  
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generally opted to engage in their own independent IA processes, or a joint process with 
a project proponent. This is evident through the case studies of the TWN, the SSN, as 
well as the Squamish Nation. Each of these communities, located in British Columbia, 
hold Aboriginal rights and title over lands that stood to be impacted by the respective 
developments. Additionally, they have not signed modern treaties with the Crown, and 
thus no unique co-management or other legislative regime is in place. By developing and 
implementing their own IA processes, these communities were able to assess the projects 
based on their own legal traditions and obligations to the land, taking into account values 
that were of core importance to their respective communities.  
 
5.2.1.1 Current Legislative Environment for the Ring of Fire 
 Presently, the legislative environment within the Ring of Fire does not require that 
the Crown or project proponent obtain the FPIC of Indigenous communities within the 
region, nor does the legislation envision joint decision-making for project approval. Where 
a project has the potential to impact established or asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights, 
the Crown only has a DTCA with impacted communities, which is typically fulfilled through 
the conventional EA process. The requirements of this DTCA vary with the strength of the 
claim to the Aboriginal or treaty rights, although even where there is a very strong rights 
claim in combination with a high potential for adverse impacts elevating the DTCA to a 
consent standard, the Crown may still infringe on these rights for pressing and substantial 
purposes. Despite the fact that the Government of Canada has endorsed UNDRIP, the 
requirement for true FPIC has not yet become a part of the legal reality within Canadian 
law. Additionally, the current EA framework under Ontario’s Environmental Assessment 
Act and the federal CEAA, 2012 does not contemplate the possibility for joint decision-
making with Indigenous communities for proposed projects. Decision-making authority 
remains solely with the Minister or Cabinet. 
 
5.2.1.2 Legislative Environment under Bill C-69: Delegation and Substitution 
The proposed new federal IA framework set out in Bill C-69 also falls short of 
requiring joint decision-making for designated projects, and the final decision-making 
authority remains with either the Minister or Cabinet. However, Bill C-69 does allow for 
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the possibility for a portion of an IA to be delegated to an Indigenous governing body 
under clause 1, s.29, and the government may also substitute the IA process for that of 
an Indigenous governing body under clause 1, s.31(1). Should this delegation or 
substitution take place, the responsible Indigenous governing body must have an 
appropriate assessment framework in place that can address the same legislative 
requirements that the proposed Impact Assessment Act would examine under clause 1, 
s.22(1) of the Bill. There are very few limitations within Bill C-69 dictating the precise 
methods of carrying out a substituted assessment and no provisions addressing the 
method for a delegated assessment, which may allow for a more culturally appropriate 
method of assessment. A substituted process must include consultations with Indigenous 
communities that would be affected by the project, it must ensure the public can 
meaningfully participate, and the public must have access to the records used in the 
assessment.698  
Should an Indigenous community opt to conduct an independent IA, some 
elements of these IAs are also recognized to a limited extent within Bill C-69. Clause 1, 
s.22(1) of the proposed Act requires that assessments conducted by the IAA or a review 
panel take into consideration  
(q) any assessment of the effects of the designated project that is conducted 
by or on behalf of an Indigenous governing body and that is provided with 
respect to the designated project; and 
 
(r) any study or plan that is conducted or prepared by a jurisdiction — or an 
Indigenous governing body not referred to in paragraph (f) or (g) of the 
definition jurisdiction in section 2 — that is in respect of a region related to 
the designated project and that has been provided with respect to the 
project.699 
 
Under these provisions, Indigenous-led IAs or regional studies, such as the Metlakatla 
First Nation’s CEM Program, must be taken into consideration during the completion of 
an IA. This limits consideration of these Indigenous-led processes only to findings on the 
                                                 
698 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 33(1).  
699Ibid, cl 1, s 22(1).  
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effects of a designated project and does not mandate consideration of any ultimate 
conclusion of the IA, such as whether or not consent is granted.  
It should be noted that clause 1, s.22(1) raises one inherent challenge for 
Indigenous communities: in order for the Indigenous IA to be considered for the purpose 
of assessing the effects of a project under the settler IA process, the Indigenous 
community must have completed their assessment in advance of the completion of the 
settler process. The time limitations within Bill C-69 remain quite stringent, and so 
communities must be aware of these limitations when determining whether they are able 
to complete their assessment in due time. For example, Ugo Lapointe highlighted that the 
SSN Review Panel assessment process of the Ajax Mine took two full years, in addition 
to a full year of engagement with the federal government.700 Conventional EA processes 
under CEAA, 2012 may take a maximum of two years, subject to extension, and 600 days 
under the proposed Impact Assessment Act. Thus, Indigenous communities should 
expect to have their independent process fully developed before any conventional EA 
begins so that they have ample time to mobilize their model and complete their 
assessment in due time for it to have maximum influence on the settler process.  
 
5.2.1.3 Risks Inherent in the Current Legislative Environment 
A major risk inherent in engaging in an independent, Indigenous-led IA process 
that operates outside of any settler legislative framework is the possibility that the 
conclusions and findings of the assessment will have no impact on the ultimate outcome 
of the project, and the community’s decision may not be accepted by the state or the 
project proponent.701 This is evident through the case study of the TWN and their 
assessment of the Kinder Morgan pipeline project. Despite the community’s extensive 
review, the project was still recommended for approval by the NEB, and was initially 
approved by the federal government. The community had to resort to litigation to 
challenge this approval, arguing that the NEB’s analysis of the project was inadequate 
and could not be used as the basis for Cabinet’s approval of the project, and that the 
                                                 
700 Interview with Ugo Lappinte, supra note 687. 
701 Gibson et al, supra note 467 at 35. 
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DTCA was not properly exercised. While the TWN’s assessment was filed as evidence 
within the NEB’s EA process, the fact that they withheld consent was not respected.  
Some Indigenous communities have designed their independent IA processes in 
ways that work to alleviate this risk. For example, the Squamish Nation developed a 
relationship with the project proponent through contractual obligations, and required any 
conditions developed through their independent Squamish Process to be implemented in 
the final project design. Upon this guarantee that the proponent was willing to endorse 
the conditions, the Squamish Nation gave their consent to the project.702 This agreement 
“played a key role in the success of [their] otherwise independent process.”703 Obtaining 
this type of guarantee requires a strong relationship with the project proponent, any may 
involve in entering into an agreement such as an Impact and Benefit Agreement with the 
project proponent. These types of contracts may be used to seek clarity of the IA process 
and define requirements for consent, although reaching this level of agreement with a 
proponent may require substantial political maneuvering.704 For the Squamish Nation, 
they were the only nation in the vicinity of the project, and thus were the sole Nation 
engaging with the proponent and working to build a relationship. The Ring of Fire presents 
a starkly different picture, with several individual communities each taking different 
positions on the development since the dissolution of the Regional Framework process, 
impacting the overall leverage of each community on its own. This political climate may 
make it increasingly difficult for individual communities to develop relationships with 
project proponents as the Squamish Nation did, as each community is differentially 
impacted by the development. 
 
5.2.2 CAPACITY AND FUNDING 
For communities wishing to develop their own independent IA process, “funding is 
absolutely vital to any meaningful impact assessment. Every Indigenous-led impact 
assessment requires a large team and substantive effort.”705 The report titled “Impact 
Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of Indigenous-Led Review” examined three 
                                                 
702 Ibid at 37.  
703 Ibid at 35.  
704 Ibid, Ibid at 37. 
705 Ibid at 38. 
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Indigenous-led IA case studies, including the Squamish Nation and the Tłı̨chǫ 
Government processes that were further explored in this report. The authors found that 
in each of these cases, “there were substantial funding resources put into play, and 
extensive human resources.”706 Additionally, for these case studies 
The Indigenous government mandated a core set of people to follow the impact 
assessment from the outset through to the close. Key skills were called upon, 
such as Indigenous knowledge holders, lawyers, and technical specialists 
(e.g., on key topics where project changes could be made with the insight of 
technical knowledge). Government, industry, and the Indigenous parties 
themselves may be called upon to assume some portion of the costs of these 
processes; as most Indigenous groups are the party least likely to have internal 
capacity in this regard, the question of accessing stable funding is critical from 
the outset.707 
 
Each community explored within the preceding case studies experienced capacity issues 
in some form, whether due to financial constraints or due to human resource limitations. 
For example, the Squamish Nation Process struggled with a lack of adequate staffing, 
and “it was also difficult to get a large number of members to attend all of the meetings 
on the project.”708 However, extensive face-to-face interaction, both within the community 
as well as with the project proponent, made these particular Indigenous-led IAs possible, 
and “ongoing and intense meetings over a prolonged period led to the completion of the 
review.”709 
 Financially, each example of independent Indigenous-led IA processes have 
featured some level of involvement and expertise from individuals external to the 
community, including consultants. Communities may hire a consultant to conduct 
necessary studies that are outside the capacity of the community, as was the case with 
the TWN’s assessment of the Kinder Morgan pipeline project. The Metlakatla First Nation 
engaged a consultant and also partnered with Simon Fraser University to develop their 
CEM program. The Squamish Nation also engaged independent consultants to provide 
advice throughout the process, and represent the community in the conventional EA 
process. Should a community decide to engage in an independent IA process, their 
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assessment should be scoped so as to limit the level of effort and resources required 
according to the level of funding available. This may mean that the assessment only focus 
on values of critical importance to the community and particular aspects of the project, 
rather than assessing the entire project. For example, the TWN only commissioned 
studies from consultants to provide advice on the impacts of an oil spill in the Burrard 
Inlet. 
 In each case, funding was obtained from a mix of sources – from the proponent, 
from the Crown, and from the nation itself.710 The Squamish Nation’s Process included 
contractual obligations that the proponent pay fees that would fund the process. However, 
as previously mentioned, establishing a relationship of this type with a proponent may 
require substantial political maneuvering, and may be of greater challenge in the Ring of 
Fire where there are several communities impacted by potential development. The SSN 
was able to negotiate capacity funding from the governments of Canada and British 
Columbia, although the amount only covered a portion necessary to complete their 
extensive Review Panel process. Should any EA proceed through a federal process, 
participant funding is a mandatory component of the EA process under CEAA, 2012.711 
Bill C-69 also mandates the establishment of a participant funding program, although it 
does not mandate adequate funding levels nor address the need for ongoing funding 
throughout the IA process.712 Under Bill C-69, this participant funding obligation does not 
apply with respect to substituted processes under clause 1, s.31.713 However, as 
communities often find this federal amount inadequate to even participate in the EA 
process, these funds should not be relied on as an adequate means to conduct an 
independent IA process.  
 
The “Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of Indigenous-Led 
Review” report provides a useful set of framing questions and recommendations for 
Indigenous communities planning to develop their own Indigenous IA framework. A copy 
of this document has been attached to this report as Appendix 11.  
                                                 
710 Ibid at 54.  
711 CEAA, 2012, supra note 134, ss 57, 58.  
712 Bill C-69, supra note 135, cl 1, s 75(1).  
713Ibid, cl 1, s 75(2).  
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5.3 MAKING A DECISION TO ENGAGE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL EA 
PROCESS 
Where engaging in a full independent IA process proves to be a non-feasible 
option, or where a community wishes to make an even greater impact on a project, 
Indigenous communities may opt to strategically engage in the conventional EA process 
to advance their interests and work towards their community vision. Similar concerns 
arise in this context, including determining where and how to focus attention, as well as 
capacity considerations. 
 
5.3.1 STRATEGICALLY ENGAGING IN THE CONVENTIONAL EA PROCESS 
When considering how to most effectively engage in the conventional EA process, 
Neskantaga First Nation may opt to focus their attention and resources in a few different 
ways. One option is to focus on gaps left by the conventional EA process, thereby 
addressing areas of concern that may not be adequately addressed by the proponent 
through their EA. The starting point for this type of intervention is to examine the Terms 
of Reference (provincially) or the Environmental Impact Statement Guidelines (federally) 
that are issued to the proponent. Under the proposed Impact Assessment Act, this 
document would be called the Tailored Impact Statement Guidelines. These documents 
set the stage for that the EA will look like, identifying the studies that a proponent should 
undertake, and the types of information that they will be gathering during the preparation 
of their EA or Environmental Impact Statement report. By preparing a submission to the 
EA process that addresses these gaps, Indigenous communities can work to bring new 
issues to the attention of the reviewing authority. As a result, the proponent may be 
required to undertake additional studies to address these issues, and the information may 
lead the implementation of unique mitigation measures or conditions that respond directly 
to the community’s concerns. Guiding questions that may be asked when assessing 
Terms of Reference of Environmental Impact Statement Guidelines include: 
• Is the level of detail requested for the project description appropriate? 
 
• Are all project components listed? 
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• Is the level of analysis for evaluating the environmental effects of the project 
appropriate? 
 
• Is an evaluation of project alternatives required? 
 
• Are the proposed methods for First Nation consultation sufficient? 
 
• Is there a requirement to assess all potential impacts of concern to your 
community? 
 
• Do you agree with the temporal and special boundaries for the EA?714 
 
Indigenous communities may also decide to shadow the conventional EA process, 
allowing the proponent to conduct work on topics such as engineering and biophysical 
effects assessment, but contributing to the assessment process through avenues that 
they are better equipped to address, and making this the core focus of their intervention 
in the process.715 While similar to the strategic intervention outlined above, this type of 
intervention might focus on broader impacts that might not typically be addressed through 
a conventional EA. For example, Indigenous communities may be better positioned to 
address “specific baseline data and effects characterization studies on discrete topics, 
such as: 
• Cultural IA; 
• Community-specific socio-economic IA; 
• Traditional knowledge and traditional land use studies; and 
• Cumulative effects context studies across multiple valued components.”716 
The case study of the Metlakatla First Nation’s CEM Program provides an excellent 
example of what this type of intervention might look like, and may be especially influential 
in individual project-specific EAs where cumulative effects are not adequately addressed. 
Through the CEM Program, Metlakatla worked within their community to identify a list of 
priority values, each of which was within their capacity to measure throughout time, such 
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 158 
as the impact of development on specific species of concern, or on community wellness 
indicators. This body of evidence could be a valuable addition to an EA process, 
particularly where multiple projects are proposed within a community’s traditional territory, 
and may encourage a broader assessment of the impacts of a proposed project where 
legislation might narrowly define the scope of an assessment.  
 A third approach that could be taken where capacity is limited is to focus on 
selected issues of core importance to the community, or on aspects which face the most 
significant impacts from the development. This could include items like protection of 
particular species that are of high value and importance to the community, the protection 
of water, the impacts on community wellness, or the disruption of traditional land uses. 
Both the Squamish Nation Process and the Metlakatla CEM Program feature some level 
of this type of advocacy, and extensive community consultation took place in order to 
identify these areas of priority.  
Joan Kuyek suggested that the community visioning process can play a key role 
in strategizing where to focus energy during EA advocacy. Especially where resources to 
participate in an EA process are scarce, communities might choose to focus on 
presenting their alternative vision for their future, based in their legal traditions and 
obligations to the land. This may include suggesting alternative, closed-loop ways of 
community-building and development, focusing on opportunities to make lasting, positive 
change within their community.717 
Whichever advocacy technique is selected, Indigenous communities should place 
the realities of their community at the forefront of the process, assisting the proponent 
and the Crown in understanding what impacts the project would have on their lives. Joan 
Kuyek particularly emphasized three EA process through which Indigenous communities 
have been especially effective in taking this approach: the North Kemess mine project in 
British Columbia, which was the first mining project to be turned down by the federal 
government, the Raven Coal Mine project on Vancouver Island, and the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation’s intervention in the New Prosperity Mine EA in British Columbia.718 In these 
examples, the communities were able to have EA hearings held in their own communities, 
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allowing them to talk about the proposed project in the context of their own situation. 
Kuyek stated that in the North Kemess mine EA, almost everyone from the community 
was involved, from children to elders. They approached the EA process from their own 
perspective, opting to tell their story through things like plays and stories, and also hired 
their own experts on technical matters.719  
 
5.3.2 CAPACITY AND FUNDING 
As compared to an independent IA, engagement in the conventional EA process 
may require significantly fewer resources, although this avenue for advocacy certainly 
does not come with a small burden. A negative implication of the current approach to EA 
in the Ring of Fire is that projects are being assessed individually on a project-by-project 
basis, rather than through a regional assessment. This means that there will be numerous 
EA process for communities to track and engage in, putting strain on both financial and 
human resource capacities. While federal EA processes require mandatory participant 
funding programs, providing impacted communities with some resources to participate in 
the EA process, provincial processes to not have this same obligation. 
The recent case of Saugeen First Nation v Ontario (MNRF) is a positive precedent 
that Indigenous communities in the Ring of Fire can use to advocate for funding from the 
Crown throughout the EA process. In this case, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held 
that SON was entitled to receive funding to hire independent expert assistance as part of 
the DTCA. Important to note is that in this particular case, the court found the DTCA fell 
in the middle of the spectrum. As such, this funding is not guaranteed where communities 
have a weak claim to Aboriginal or treaty rights in a particular region, or where the project 
will only have minor impacts. In order to provide a strong case for their claim, Ugo 
Lapointe emphasized the importance of documenting the land and demonstrating the 
connection to and use of the territory. Codifying knowledge such as who has authority 
over different parts of the land and how land-based decisions are traditionally made within 
the community, and use of the community’s own language will all help to strengthen the 
community’s claim, showing continuity of use throughout time through traditional stories, 
                                                 
719Ibid. 
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laws, and land use.720 The SSN Review Panel assessment is an excellent example of this 
work. Lapointe stated that the SSN included traditional stories and used their own 
language throughout all communications with the government, showing that their 
connection to the land was not just something of the past, but also critically important in 
the present.721 Many of the documents related to the SSN’s assessment are written in 
their own language as well as English, including their final decision statement.   
In order to boost internal capacity, Indigenous communities should also take 
advantage of training opportunities provided by the government. The Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency offers courses tailored towards Indigenous 
involvement in EA, the basis of EA, and about CEAA, 2012.722 The proposed Impact 
Assessment Act would also establish a Capacity Building Program which would “provide 
longer-term financial support, outside of project-specific participant funding, to support 
the development of internal capacity within Indigenous communities and organizations.” 
Details about this program have not yet been released.723 Increasing knowledge and 
capacity throughout the community in the topic of EA may help to improve community 
engagement throughout the EA process, strengthening the impact that Neskantaga First 
Nation could have within a conventional EA.  
 
5.3.3 HOW TO EFFECTIVELY ENGAGE WITH A PROJECT PROPONENT OR THE 
CROWN 
Indigenous communities often engage in their own IA processes as a way of 
exercising their inherent decision-making authority through a process designed to lead to 
FPIC. While opting to participate in the conventional EA process eliminates a level of 
control over the process, Indigenous communities still have several prospects through 
which they can assert direction over how they wish to be consulted, and the standards 
they expect will be adhered to throughout the EA process. Issuing clear and reasonable 
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722 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Training opportunities regarding environmental 
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723 Government of Canada, “Step 1: Early Planning” (2018), online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-
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guidance both to project proponents and the Crown works to set expectations upfront 
between the parties. Some of the tools available that Indigenous governments may 
choose to provide to proponents that seek project approvals are: 
• Traditional knowledge protocols; 
 
• A list of required studies that only the community is allowed to undertake; 
 
• A process chart showing key points of engagement and requirements; 
 
• Guidance to both the proponent and Crown agents on how to engage and consult 
with the community before, during, and after the project assessment; and 
 
• A document that identifies the Indigenous consent regime and process, including 
minimum engagement and information requirements without which the community 
cannot provide informed consent.724  
 
Within Ontario, Consultation Protocols are a common document issued by treaty 
communities. These types of documents effectively put project proponents and the Crown 
on notice as they provide an overview of the basis for Aboriginal rights claims within their 
territory, an overview of legal traditions and governing authority over the land, the 
requirement for nation-to-nation dialogue, as well as a process to be followed for 
consultation, including funding requirements.  
 
5.4 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Through both independent Indigenous-led IAs, as well as Indigenous involvement 
in the conventional EA framework, there is the potential for a strong confluence of western 
and Indigenous law. In each of these cases, “the Indigenous party identifie[s] its 
knowledge base and [brings] it to bear to ensure that their values, language, and way of 
life [are] considered in the review.”725 Indigenous-led approaches to IA can “greatly 
change the project in order to protect and accommodate the culture and way of life. It also 
leads to fundamental changes in the language of impact assessment.”726 This is already 
evident in the language of Bill C-69. The recent rise in Indigenous-led IA has been 
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recognized within the Bill, and as a result, there is greater opportunity for Indigenous 
involvement throughout the proposed new IA processes than existed in CEAA, 2012. 
However, Professor John Borrows has questioned the adequacy of these types of 
legislative changes. He writes that  
While the enhancement of more inclusive structures, and the incorporation of 
a broader range of ideas, may assist democracies in making better 
environmental decisions, if the only result of Indigenous participation is that 
their knowledge is merely received as evidence of better practices, then it is 
unlikely Indigenous contributions will change the way our institutions relate to 
the environment. Currently, formal and informal legal institutions have very 
little experience with Indigenous knowledge, which raises serious questions 
about their ability to effectively evaluate Indigenous contributions. Therefore, 
in order to practically assess the value of Indigenous ideas, the standards used 
to judge First Nations input must also change. Just as there must be a change 
in both the people and ideas involved in Canadian institutions, so there must 
also be a shift in the ground upon which decisions are made. Indigenous legal 
knowledge must be an integral part of our decision-making standards within 
democracy. This knowledge must be considered and received as precedent in 
law to guide answers to the questions we have concerning the environment.727 
 
Although this article from Borrows was published over 20 years ago, the sentiments are 
still valid and true today, and these concerns are especially poignant in the Ring of Fire 
region where the overwhelming majority of the population in the vicinity of any 
development are Indigenous peoples who would carry a disproportionate burden of the 
impacts. New IA legislation aims to include an ever increasing consideration of 
Indigenous knowledge, although those conducing the IA and making decisions on 
proposed project may have little to no experience interpreting and aptly applying this 
knowledge in their decisions. Whether Indigenous communities opt to engage in an 
independent IA process, or engage with the conventional EA process, communities 
should be mindful of the state’s established way of conducting these types of 
assessments and their limitations of understanding. and whether their processes are 
cognizable to the conventional EA approach. Clearly articulating the community’s 
conclusions and reasoning, as well as articulating how and why the community has 
                                                 
727 John Borrows, “Living between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning and 
Democracy” (1997) 47:4 UTLJ 417 at 451. 
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reached those conclusions, will enable concerns to be cognizable for those in charge of 
the conventional EA process.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
If anything has become obvious throughout the course of this research report it is 
that there are numerous layers of complexity inherent in development of the Ring of Fire. 
The past ten years of political negotiations have left Indigenous communities divided, 
resulting in an ever increasingly complex legal environment. As any potential 
development will be situated within the traditional territories of several Indigenous 
communities, all project approvals should be contingent on an FPIC-based model, 
ensuring that communities are properly informed about and have the opportunity to 
benefit from potential development. Where the conventional EA process and 
constitutional obligations fail to adhere to the standard of FPIC required by UNDRIP, 
Indigenous communities across the country have opted to pursue other avenues to 
express their inherent jurisdiction and apply their own laws. Indigenous-led approaches 
to IA have been an ever-increasing method used by communities to exercise their 
legitimate governing authority throughout their territories, and they have been 
transforming the EA landscape through the use of processes grounded in Indigenous 
legal traditions and community values. 
While this report is not intended to be prescriptive, it has drawn out the risks and 
opportunities that the Neskantaga First Nation should be aware of and discuss when 
making a decision about how to advocate in the context of the Ring of Fire. As there are 
no best practices for Indigenous-led IA, communities must be attuned to the realities 
unique in each situation, and adapt the principles of Indigenous-led IA to the 
circumstances, in accordance with their own internal limitations and capacities. Although 
it has been over a decade since the first discovery of minerals in the Ring of Fire, 
development of these minerals is still in the early stages. The long road ahead leaves 
ample opportunity for intervention and advocacy that can work to ensure any potential 
development is thoroughly and properly assessed.   
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APPENDIX 2:  Summary of Litigation related to Mining Conflicts in Ontario’s Far 
North 
 
Summary of Litigation related to Mining Conflict in Ontario’s Far North 
Prepared by: Amanda Spitzig | amanda.spitzig@gmail.com  
 
 
2274659 Ontario Inc v Canada Chrome Corporation, 2016 ONCA 145, 394 DLR (4th) 471 
• FACTS: Both parties had ownership interests in the Big Daddy chromite deposit in the Ring of Fire 
area, and were both seeking to build transportation links to these mineral deposits. In 2009, CCC 
staked 200+ unpatented mining claims along a transportation route running north to the claim, in 
hopes of building a railway. In 2009, the applicant, 2274659 Ontario Inc, a subsidiary of Cliffs 
Natural Resources, acquired ownership of the Black Thor chromite deposit located near the Big 
Daddy deposit, and wanted to build a gravel road to reach the deposit. The applicant made an 
application under s 21 of the Public Lands Act for disposition of surface rights over Crown lands so 
they could build this road, which would cross 108 of CCC’s unpatented mining stakes. Under s 51 
of the Mining Act the applicant sought the consent of CCC for the grant of the easement. CCC’s 
refusal led to an application to the Mining and Lands Commissioner (MLC), under s 51(4) of the 
Mining Act, to dispense with the consent, which the MLC refused to grant.  
 
• DECISION: The trial court set aside the MLC’s decision to refuse to dispense with the consent. The 
ONCA affirmed this decision, stating that s 51(1) of the Mining Act gives priority to the claim holder 
to use the surface rights to explore and exploit minerals on the claims. In this case, the surface 
rights were merely being held by CCC to construct a railway corridor, to access an alternate mineral 
deposit. Although consent is dispensed, the court ruled that the granting of an easement for a road 
is a matter for the Ministry of Natural Resources to determine, after and environmental assessment 
and consultation with affected First Nations. 
Northern Superior Resources Inc v Ontario, 2016 ONSC 3161, 267 ACWS (3d) 493 
 
• FACTS: Between 2005 and 2007, Northern Superior Resources (NSR) staked claims for three 
areas, which were highly prospective areas for gold mining. In 2008, they entered into an option 
agreement with International Nickel Ventures Corporation, whose investment allowed for core 
drilling into the bedrock. At that time, there was no regulatory authority under the Mining Act which 
compelled engagement with the Sachigo Lake (SL) First Nation, but the parties entered into several 
“Letters of Engagement” over the years which contained the FN’s acceptance of specified work to 
be done. The relationship began to deteriorate in 2012 when the SL FN claimed that NSR had 
acted in breach of a Letter by carrying out a drilling program that was not agreed to, and requested 
a new agreement for this activity. NSR claimed that the SL FN was aware of this activity, and Elders 
had visited the work sites. When the parties could not reach an agreement on the issue, NSR 
applied for an “Exclusion of Time” order under the Mining Act allowing them to leave the claims 
undisturbed while they resolved the issues. NSR asserts that Ontario owed it a duty of care, and 
argues that the failure of its relationship with the SL FN was the result of a breach of that duty of 
care, and that they should be compensated accordingly – NSR claimed $110-million in damages. 
 
• DECISION: The Judge applied the test in Anns v Merton London Borough Council – they concluded 
that there is no constitutional duty of care imposed on the Crown by a legislative scheme towards 
NSR, and, even if such a constitutional duty did arise, it would be owed to the SL FN, not NSR. 
The Crown cannot independently owe a constitutional duty to protect exploration rights of a mining 
company and at the same time owe a constitutional duty to the FN affected by mining activity. 
Additionally, there was no proximity to the relationship – NSR never asked Ontario for any 
assistance with managing relations with SL FN. The action was dismissed.  
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God’s Lake Resources: Ontario settles with God’s Lake Resources in 2012 
• Ontario acted in response to the claims of Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI) First Nation to 
resolve the dispute between it and God’s Lake Resources by issuing an Order withdrawing lands 
in the vicinity of the First Nation from prospecting and mining. The Minister of Northern 
Development and Mines has the power to withdraw lands that are the property of the Crown under 
section 35 of the Mining Act.  
• A “Withdrawal Order” cannot remove pre-existing rights held by a mining company, so as a result, 
any existing mining lease that was held by God’s Lake Resources was not affected by the Order.  
• In order to deal with this aspect of the problem, Ontario agreed to pay God’s Lake Resources $3.5-
million in return for surrendering its lease and claims in the area.  
• The Court in Northern Superior Resources Inc v Ontario (2016) stated that in issuing this 
Withdrawal Order and buying out God’s Lake Resources, Ontario acted in a fashion that was 
consistent with its constitutional responsibilities and fiduciary obligations to KI FN.  
Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, 157 ACWS (3d) 460 (Ont Sup Ct), 
[2007] 3 CNLR 181 
 
• FACTS: In July 2000, KI FN submitted a Land Entitlement Claim (LEC) to areas within the Big Trout 
Lake drilling zone, and placed a moratorium on any development in the area. KI FN believed that 
allowing drilling to take place in this zone would eliminate any opportunity for them to select the 
lands if their LEC is successful. Platinex was aware of this LEC, as well as the moratorium. In 
January 2006, Platinex requested a meeting with the KI community in an attempt to consult and lift 
the moratorium. When it was clear that Platinex could not change the community’s decision, they 
cancelled the meeting, and sent a drilling team to the camp in February, 2006. The KI FN Chief 
delivered a letter to Platinex asking that the drilling activity cease, and members of the KI FN 
travelled to the camp to protest the work. Platinex left the drilling camp on February 25-26, 2006, 
claiming they feared for their safety.  
• In July, 2006, the Judge made an order enjoining Platinex from engaging in a two-phase exploration 
program related to the Big Trout Lake Property for a period of five months, after which time the 
parties would meet again with the Judge to discuss the continuation of the order. A condition of this 
injunction was that the KI FN immediately set up a consultation committee to meet with 
representatives of Platinex and the Provincial Crown to develop an agreement to allow Platinex to 
conduct the drilling project. The parties engaged in consultations beginning in July 2006, but were 
unable to come to any agreement. This injunction was extended in January 2007, and remains in 
place at the present hearing at the Ontario Superior Court. Platinex argues that if the injunction is 
continued, they will become bankrupt. 
 
• DECISION: In applying the test for an injunction, the Judge concluded: 
o Is there a serious issue to be tried? Yes. 
o Is there irreparable harm? KI FN has traditional harvesting rights on the Treaty 9 lands, 
and also concerns regarding their Land Entitlement Claim. However, these rights failed to 
meet the relatively high standard of probability required for the grant of injunctive relief. 
o Balance of conveniences – requires balancing the harm that each party will suffer, and 
whether that harm can be compensated for in damages: The Judge ruled in favour of 
Platinex, stating that they could be put out of business if the injunction were granted, and 
this cannot be compensated for in damages. This decision runs squarely against the 
reasoning given by the same Judge when granting the first injunction, where the court ruled 
that the KI FN’s spiritual and cultural connection to the land, and their inability to select 
these lands in their Land Entitlement Claim outweighed the harm to Platinex. 
• The parties reconvened in May, 2007 and developed a Consultation Protocol, Memorandum of 
Understanding, and timetable of activities. Platinex was granted permission to begin Phase One of 
its drilling program on June 1, 2007. The Memorandum of Understanding states that Platinex will 
establish a fund to benefit the KI community, and will contribute on a semi-annual basis 2% of all 
monies spent by Platinex in connection with Phase One. 
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Wahgoshig First Nation v Ontario, 2013 ONSC 632 (Div Ct), 226 ACWS (3d) 632 
• FACTS: From November 2007 through 2010, Solid Gold staked 103 claims, called the “Legacy 
Project,” which covers land within the Wahgoshig First Nation’s (WFN) traditional territory. The 
Crown advised Solid Gold to contact WFN to consult regarding its intended mineral exploration, 
and offered to facilitate the process. In the Spring of 2011, Solid Gold began drilling without 
engaging in any prior consultation. The WFN contacted the company, and tried to consult with 
them, but Solid Gold did not reciprocate. On November 9, 2011, WFN served a Notice of Claim on 
Ontario, advising that within 60 days, they would serve a Statement of Claim on Ontario and Solid 
Gold. Following this, drilling increased, and the WFN sought an injunction restraining Solid Gold 
from engaging in all activities related to mineral exploration in Treaty 9 lands, as well as an order 
that Ontario provide an undertaking in damages to Solid Gold or, alternatively, for an order 
dispensing with the undertaking requirements of R. 40.03 of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
• DECISION: At first instance, the Judge went through the test for an injunction: 
o Is there a serious issue to be tried? Yes – Aboriginal and treaty rights, and the duty to 
consult and accommodate. 
o Is there irreparable harm? Yes – Solid Gold has threatened and may have already caused 
irreparable harm to sites of cultural and spiritual significance, including burial sites. 
o Balance of conveniences – WFN would suffer harms to constitutionally-protected treaty 
and Aboriginal rights of meaningful consultation and accommodation, while Solid Gold 
would suffer economic harms. The balance favours WFN in this case. 
• The Judge ordered an injunction for a period of 120 days, during which time Solid Gold, the 
Province, and WFN must enter into a process of meaningful consultation and accommodation 
regarding future activities on the claims block. If this is not effective, WFN is entitled to seek an 
extension of the injunction. The Court also held that it was not appropriate to impose and order 
requiring Ontario provide an undertaking in damages in the circumstances. 
• Leave to appeal the order was granted, and subsequently dismissed as moot. Solid Gold has since 
initiated a claim against the Province seeking substantial damages ( > $100-million). The claim is 
based on the damages suffered by Solid Gold including lost opportunity costs arising from the 
Crown’s negligent misrepresentations related to Solid Gold’s Legacy Project.  
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